Thursday, April 3, 2025
Army - Mitzva Or Mortal Danger? - Depends Who You Ask
In the religious Zionist world the BIGGEST mitzva in the Torah [for many] is serving in Tzahal. Many a parent gets teary eyed when their child joins the army or at various ceremonies. ושירות בצה"ל כנגד כולם.
In the Charedi world, one of the first things a child does after throwing עול מלכות שמים [after buying a new wardrobe and buying a smartphone] is go to the army. That is their ticket out of Torah and Jewish observance. The army for them is a strongly secular establishment that puts one's soul in mortal danger.
This is significant to know for many reasons. One is to understand how from the same text [Torah in this case] people can come to radically different conclusions. Another is to appreciate how impossible it is for Charedim to ever do what the non-Charedi world dreams they do i.e. join the army en masse.
Never.
Urchatz And Karpas
Have you ever wondered why, during the annual Pesach Seder, when we dip the Karpas vegetables in saltwater to symbolize our ancestor’s tears while enslaved at the hands of the cruel Egyptians, we precede it by washing our hands (Urchatz)? Isn’t handwashing exclusively reserved for prior to ‘breaking bread’? And furthermore, why is this only performed at the Seder? Is there a specific message this action is meant to portray?
All About the Children
The answer to these questions might depend on a difference of understanding. The Gemara in Pesachim (114b) asks why at the Pesach Seder we perform two dippings, i.e. Karpas into saltwater and later the Maror into Charose s. The Gemara succinctly answers ‘Ki Heichi D’lehavai Hekeira L’Tinokos, in order that there should a distinction for children.’ Both Rashi and his grandson, the Rashbam, as well as the Rokeach, explain the Gemara’s intent,[1] that this act is performed in order so that the children should ask why we are performing this unusual and uncommon action on Leil Haseder, as this action serves as a ‘hekeira tova’, an excellent distinction. This is one of the ways we ensure that the Seder Night’s Mitzvah of ‘Vehigadta Le’vincha,’ retelling the story of our ancestors’ exile, enslavement, and ultimate redemption and exodus from Egypt, is properly performed.[2]
But a question remains. Which exact action is the one that is meant to evoke the children’s questions? The answer may surprise you. The Bartenura and Tur specify that it is not the seemingly odd act of handwashing for vegetables that is peculiar,[3] but rather the timing of the dipping. They assert that it is unusual to dip food items at the beginning of a seudah. Most other days we also dip, but in the middle of the meal. In other words, the only change we do to evoke children’s questions is to perform the dipping right then.
What then of the seemingly atypical handwashing just for vegetables? Isn’t that an uncharacteristic change from the ordinary? ‘No,’ they would respond, ‘one certainly would have to wash his hands before dipping his vegetables.’
Drip and Dip
But in order to properly understand this, we must first digress to a different Gemara in Pesachim (115a). Rabbi Elazer teaches in the name of Rav Oshia “any food item that is dipped in a liquid (davar hateebulo b’mashkeh) requires handwashing before eating.” On this statement, Rashi and Tosafos (among others) differ as to the correct understanding of his intent.
Rashi and the Rashbam maintain that this ruling is still applicable nowadays, as it is similar to the requirement to wash before eating bread, while Tosafos is of the opinion that this law is only relevant during the times of the Beis Hamikdash, as it is conditional to Taharos, Ritual Purity, which in this day and age, is unfortunately non-applicable.[4] Although the Maharam M’Rottenberg, and several later poskim are of the opinion that one may indeed rely on the lenient view,[5] it should be noted that the majority of halachic authorities including the Rambam, Tur, Shulchan Aruch, Rema, Vilna Gaon, Chayei Adam, Shulchan Aruch Harav, Ben Ish Chai, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, Mishnah Berurah, Kaf Hachaim and Chazon Ish,[6] hold that even nowadays one should do his utmost to be vigilant with this and wash hands before eating a food item dipped in liquid.[7]
The lenient opinion is taken into account, however, and that is the reason why according to the majority of poskim, this washing is performed without the prerequisite blessing, as opposed to the washing before eating bread.[8] This is due to the halachic dictum of “Safek Brachos Lehakel”, meaning that in a case of doubt regarding the topic of brachos, we follow the lenient approach and do not make the blessing, to avoid the possibility of making a blessing in vain.
This all ties in to our Seder. In fact this, explains the Tur and Abudraham, and echoed by later authorities, is the reason why we wash Urchatz prior to dipping the Karpas into saltwater.[9] As this action is classified as a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh, it requires handwashing before eating. Although the Rambam, Tur and Abudraham, as well as the Levush and VilnaGaon, aver that Urchatz actually necessitates a brachah of Netillas Yadayim,[10] conversely, the vast majority of poskim conclude that we do not make the Netillas Yadayim brachah at this Seder handwashing,[11] but rather exclusively at Rachtzah immediately prior to Motzi-Matzah. This is indeed the common custom.[12]
The Chida’s Chiddush
The Chida, in his Simchas HaRegel commentary on the Haggada,[13] explains that this is the background, as well as the reason for the added ‘vav’ by Urchatz at the Pesach Seder, as it is the only one of the Seder Simanim that starts with that conjunction. We find a parallel by the brachah that our patriarch Yitzchok Avinu bestowed on his son Yaakov (Bereishis, Parshas Toldos Ch. 27: verse 28), ‘V’Yitein L’cha’ – ‘And Hashem should give you’. According to Chazal and cited by Rashi,[14] the extra conjunctive ‘vav’ means ‘yitein yachzor v’yitein’ – that Hashem should continually and constantly give.
Likewise, the Chida explains the extra ‘vav’ in Urchatz. The Baal Haggada is transmitting a message to us. Just as during the Seder we all wash before dipping a vegetable in salt water, that extra ‘vav’ is telling us - ‘rachatz yachzor v’rachatz’ – that we should continue to wash our hands, anytime we want to eat a food dipped in liquid, year round.
The Chasam Sofer and his son-in-law, the Chasan Sofer, write in a similar vein in their Haggada, that Urchatz is meant to serve as a tochacha (rebuke) and yearly reminder to those who are lackadaisical with the observance of this halacha, in order to remind everyone that this applies year round as well. Indeed, the Taz actually writes similarly, and concludes that at least during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva one should be stringent. The Ben Ish Chai remarks comparably when discussing Urchatz, that praiseworthy is one who is careful with this handwashing year round.[15]
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l adds that the ‘Vav’ is connecting ‘Urchatz’ to ‘Kadesh’ – meaning ‘Kadesh Urchatz’ – (as a command) that we should be mekadeish ourselves and continue to wash for food items dipped in liquid – even if we were previously generally not stringent with this all year round.[16]
The Medium is the Message
Yet, it is important to note that other poskim take an alternate view. Rav Yaakov Reisher in his Chok Yaakov argues[17] that since the great Maharam M’Rottenberg, as well as the Lechem Chamudos and Magen Avraham among other poskim, ruled leniently with washing before eating a food item dipped in liquid following Tosafos’ precedent, and most people do not follow the opinion mandating it nowadays, this simply cannot be the reason why we perform Urchatz at the Seder.
Rather, he explains that the Gemara’s intent with stating that Urchatz is performed in order that there should a distinction for children to ask, is that the handwashing itself for eating dipped vegetables is what is out of the ordinary, not the timing of the washing. According to this understanding, it is the Urchatz itself that is essentially the “hekker,” highlighting that something different than the norm is occurring, to enable children to ask what is different on Seder night. Meaning, although most do not wash before eating a dipped item year round, at the Seder we do; and that is the atypical action we do to arouse the interest of the children.
Not a Daas Yachid (lone dissenting opinion), this understanding of Urchatz is also given by the Abarbanel, both the Chayei Adam and Aruch Hashulchan seem to favor this explanation, and it is cited by the Mishnah Berurah in his Shaar Hatziyun as well.[18]
Alternate Views
On the other hand, the Levush understands Urchatz somewhat differently. He explains that the dipping of Karpas at the Pesach Seder is due to ‘Chovas (or in some editions ‘Chibas’)HaRegel, extra obligation or devotion for the Yom Tov.’ Ergo, the handwashing is specifically performedat the Seder, as due to its inherent holiness, ‘we go the extra mile’ to strive for an increase in purity, as opposed to year round, when in his opinion, it would not be mandated.[19]
Vayaged Moshe, the renowned classic sefer on the Haggada, after citing several authorities who discuss the extra intrinsic Kedusha of Leil HaSeder, writes that perhaps this can be seen by the ‘Vav’ in ‘Urchatz.’ He explains (in the exact opposite approach of the Chida’s) that the ‘Vav’ is connecting ‘Urchatz’ to ‘Kadesh’ – meaning ‘Kadesh Urchatz’ – (as a command) that specifically at the Seder, due to the added inherent Kedusha of Leil HaSeder, we should be mekadeish ourselves by washing before dipping our vegetables – even though we would not need to the rest of the year.[20] [21]
An alternate, yet somewhat similar, interpretation is offered by the Netziv, Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin zt”l, venerated Rosh Yeshiva of Volozhin.[22] The Seder reminds us of the eating of the Korban Pesach that took place when the Beis Hamikdash stood. Therefore, we follow the same halachic requirements at the Seder that were in place during the Temple era. Everyone agrees that at the time of the Beis Hamikdash there was an obligation to wash hands for dipped food items, and therefore, at the Pesach Seder we do so as well, regardless of whether or not we actually fulfill this year round.
Rav Yishmael Hakohen maintains an analogous distinction.[23] He explains that earlier generations were indeed stringent with Ritual Purity and hence certainly washed their hands before dipping vegetables. Since “Minhag Avoseinu B’Yadeinu” we follow in our ancestors’ footsteps by performing the Seder as accurately as possible as they did. Hence, our mandated washing Urchatz at the Seder irrespective of our actions the rest of the year.
A slightly similar, yet novel explanation is given in the Zichron Nifla’os Haggada.[24] He explains that generally speaking, people are lenient year-round with this pre-dipping handwashing following Tosafos’ understanding, that this washing is intrinsically only relevant during the times of the Beis Hamikdash, as it is conditional to Taharos, Ritual Purity. Yet, he explains, when the Beis HaMikdash will be rebuilt, we will also be required to offer and eat the Korban Pesach on Seder Night, in addition to our obligation of eating a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh. As such, if we would not be makpid on washing beforehand at the Seder, people may not realize the import of the new situation and not wash before dipping the Karpas. However, at that point, with the Beis Hamikdash standing, the intricacies of Ritual Purity will once again be ‘back in play.’ As such, if one would eat his dipped Karpas without the Urchatz pre-wash, he will have made himself ‘pasul’ (invalidated) from being able to eat Kodshim, including the Korban Pesach. Hence, explains the Zichron Nifla’os, although year-round such washing may be currently deemed unnecessary, it is nonetheless mandated on Leil HaSeder.
Another idea, cited by the Rema in his Darchei Moshe,[25] is that the Haggada is akin to a Tefillah, that we relating thanks and praise to Hashem for everything he has done for our ancestors and us. Therefore, immediately prior to the recital of the Haggada we wash our hands in preparation without a brachah similar to the requirement before davening.
One more interesting explanation, suggested by Rav Reuven Margoliyus,[26] is that this washing is performed at the very beginning of the Seder night ‘derech cheirus’, to show that we are doing so as free people and nobility, who are accustomed to washing their hands prior to eating even a small amount. This is opposed to slaves, who do not have the rights or ability for such extravagance, but rather ‘eat their bread with sweat.’ This ‘nobility’ reasoning would seem to fit well with the minhag many perform of ‘serving’ the Baal Habayis for Urchatz, by bringing him a wash basin and washing his hands.[27]
Divergences of Dipping
Interestingly, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt”l, the former Chief Rabbi of Yerushalayim, opines that the dispute among Rishonim whether only the head of the household is supposed to wash Urchatz or if everyone at the Seder does as well (the most common custom) might be dependent on this debate of why the handwashing at the Seder was instituted.[28] According to the majority opinion that Urchartz was enacted due to the halacha of davar hateebulo b’mashkeh, then everyone would be mandated to wash.
However, according to the opinions that this handwashing is only performed on Pesach at the Seder, it is possible that only the head of the household need wash Urchatz, as that should be deemed sufficient enough to arouse the interest and subsequent questions of the children.
Practically, as mentioned previously, the most common custom is that everyone washes Urchatz.[29] Yet, a notable minority minhag, performed mainly by many of Germanic / Dutch origin, as well as Sanz, Lelov, and Satmar Chassidim, is that only the head of the household wash.[30] So it is remarkable that this modern divergence of minhagim might actually depend on how Poskim understood the brief statement of the Gemara regarding children’s questions.[31]
Finger Food?
Another interesting machlokes that might depend on which hekker the Gemara intended is how to dip the Karpas into the saltwater. If the reason Urchatz was mandated is due to the halacha of davar hateebulo b’mashkeh, then it stands to reason that if one used a fork or other utensil to dip and not actually getting ‘ones’s hands dirty’ then many poskim would hold that handwashing is technically not required.[32] On the other hand, if the washing prior to dipping is considered the unusual action of Seder night, then we should perform Urchatz regardless of utensil.
Practically, although there are contemporary authorities, including Rav Moshe Sternbuch and Rav Nissim Karelitz,[33] who maintain preference for dipping the Karpas by hand in order that it should satisfy all opinions, nonetheless, due to the other understandings of Urchatz’ s role, many poskim rule that even if one used a fork for the dipping, we should still perform the handwashingprior.[34] Just another insight into the seemingly simple and straightforward, yet remarkable Urchatz.
How Do You Karpas?
Now that we explained the “Why” and “How” of Karpas, this leaves the “What,” as in which vegetable should be used. It is interesting that the Mishnah in Pesachim did not tell us a specific vegetable, with the Gemara explaining that if stuck, we may even use the Maror for Karpas as well.[35]
Although Rashi, the Rambam, and Tur tell us that any vegetable may be used for Karpas,[36] and conversely the Maharil, Arizal, and seemingly the Shulchan Aruch, understanding “Karpas” to be referring to a specific vegetable with that name,[37] yet, many sefarim cite “Petrozil” or “Petreshka” (presumably parsley, as “Petrozilia” is called in modern Hebrew) as the vegetable of choice, with the Aruch Hashulchan commenting that “we don’t know what it is.”[38]
Other popular options used over the generations include onions, radishes, scallions, and even cucumbers.[39] The main point is that its proper brachah be a “Borei Pri Ha’adama” so that it should exempt repeating this brachah again when it is time for Maror.[40]
Strictly Celery
However, it seems that the two most prevalent vegetables, at least nowadays, are celery and potatoes. Celery is considered an excellent choice, as the Chasam Sofer relates, his rebbi, Rav Nosson Adler did much research in tracking down the Maharil’s elusive “Karpas” vegetable, and his findings were that it is none other than celery. The Chasam Sofer writes that therefore that is what he used as well for Karpas. The Machatzis Hashekel writes similarly, that he was told by a “Great Man” (presumably Rav Adler) that after much research in Medical books, “Karpas” is truly none other than celery. The word he uses to identify it – “ipiya” or “ipuch,” is also cited as such in earlier sefarim, including the Bartenura in classifying “Karpas.”[41]
Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, in his annual Luach Eretz Yisrael, writes that in Eretz Yisrael the “Mehadrin” use “Karpas” that is known by its Arabic name. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach fills us in that he was referring to celery. The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch cites a preference for celery as well, and this is the minhag of many, including the Mareh Yechezkel, and later, Rav Yisrael Yaakov Fischer.[42]
Pontificating a Perchance for Potatoes
The other common “Karpas”, perhaps the most common, is potatoes. Cited by the Aruch Hashulchan and Misgeres Hashulchan, it is the minhag in Belz, Skver, and Spinka, and many Gedolim, including Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, and Rav Moshe Sternbuch, were known to use potatoes as Karpas.[43]
Yet, there are those, including chassidim of Sanz, Bobov, and Kamarna who will not use potatoes for Karpas. This can be traced back to the famed Yismach Moshe, Rav Moshe Teitelbaum, rebbi of the Divrei Chaim of Sanz.
In his Tehillah L’Moshe, the Yismach Moshe writes that he used to use potatoes for Karpas, but then heard that the great Rav Naftali of Ropschitz made a Shehakol brachah on it (and hence would not be fitting for Karpas). He writes that he found that the Aruch, Rav Nosson M’Romi (literally, of Rome; d. 1106), when referring to the proper brachah of mushrooms and other food items that do not actually get their nourishment from the earth and consequentially their brachah being Shehakol, translates them as “Tartuffel.” Not familiar with the archaic word, the Yismach Moshe maintained that the Aruch must have been referring to “Kartuffel,” colloquially known as the potato.[44]
Although there are different rationales for this,[45] this idea is also found in several other sefarim, and there are prominent authorities who therefore made a Shehakol brachah on potatoes.[46] On the other hand, the facts do not seem to corroborate that potatoes should be classified in the same category of mushrooms, as potatoes not only grow and root in the ground, but they also get their nourishment from the ground, as opposed to mushrooms and their ilk. Several contemporary authorities point out that it is highly unlikely, if not outright impossible, for the Aruch, who lived in Europe in the eleventh century, to have been referring to “Kartuffel”(potatoes) as the proper translation for mushrooms, as tubers were unknown on that continent until almost five hundred years later![47]
In fact, according to the Tiferes Yisrael, this act of Sir Francis Drake’s, of introducing potatoes to the European continent, merited him to be classified as one of the Chassidei Umos Ha’Olam, as over the centuries potatoes have saved countless lives from starvation.[48]
Moreover, in modern Italian, “tartufo” still translates as “truffle,” the prized underground fungus,[49] and not a potato. Therefore, the vast majority of authorities rule that the proper blessing on the potato is indeed “Borei Pri Ha’adama,” and hence, it is still the preference for many as “Karpas.”
Urchatz Everyday!
Back to Urchatz, the Chida, in his Simchas HaRegel Haggada, continues that although many are aware of the halacha of davar hateebulo b’mashkeh, they do not realize that it even applies to something as ubiquitous as dipping cake into coffee![50] One might contend that the connection between vegetables in saltwater to tea biscuits in coffee seems tenuous, but actually, according to the majority of authorities, from a halachic perspective they are remarkably similar.
So the next time you get that dunkin’ urge, it might be prudent to be conscientious by following the Haggada’s hidden exhortation, and head to the sink before diving in to your cup-of-joe.
Thanks are due to my 12th-grade Rebbi in Yeshiva Gedolah Ateres Mordechai of Greater Detroit, Rav Yitzchok Kahan, for first enlightening me to this passage of the Chida’s.
This article is dedicated L’iluy Nishmas Maran Sar HaTorah Harav Shmaryahu Yosef Chaim ben Harav Yaakov Yisrael zt”l (Kanievsky), this author’s beloved grandmother, Chana Rus (Spitz) bas Rav Yissachar Dov a”h and uncle Yeruchem ben Rav Yisroel Mendel (Kaplan) zt”l, and l’zechus Shira Yaffa bas Rochel Miriam v’chol yotzei chalatzeha for a yeshua sheleimah teikif u’miyad!
For any questions, comments or for the full Mareh Mekomos / sources, please email the author: yspitz@ohr.edu.
Rabbi Spitz’s recent English halacha sefer, “Insights Into Halacha - Food: A Halachic Analysis,” (Mosaica/Feldheim) has more than 500 pages and features over 30 comprehensive chapters,
discussing a myriad of halachic issues relating to food. It is now available online and in bookstores everywhere.
[1] Rashi and Rashbam (Pesachim ad loc. s.v. dilma), Rokeach (483).
[2] Meaning, the children will ask “Why is this night different than all other nights?” – a.k.a. ‘The Mah Nishtana’ – and we respond with “Avodim Hayinu” and the retelling of our nation’ origins. This is in line with the Torah’s referring to the Seder as “Ki Yishalcha Bincha” – when your children will ask, “Vehigadta Le’vincha,’ – you will tell your childr, meaning, recite the Haggada. Interestingly, the Mishnah’s version of the Mah Nishtana regarding dipping (Pesachim 116a) is slightly different than ours, as it asks that we generally dip once and not twice, as in the Mishnaic period it was common to dip during a meal. However, by the Gemara’s time this was no longer prevalent so it amends the Mishnah’s version of Mah Nishtana to “afilu paam echas,” that we generally do not dip at all during a Seudah. Either way, we can ask, well, if this is the question that children ask, then what is the actual answer that dipping shows? The Bach (O.C. 473: 8 s.v. v’loke’ach; and later cited by the Pri Megadim ad loc. Mishbetzos Zahav 7) cites three diverse solutions: 1) That we are showing Derech Cheirus, that free men dip before a Seudah to whet the appetite. 2) It serves as a small taste, as the Seder’s Seudah is much later, after Haggada and Hallel, so we should not sit so long without eating anything. 3) Citing the Maharal M’Prague (Gevuros Hashem Ch. 50), that the first dipping before the Seudah shows that the second dipping by Maror, is performed exclusively for the Seder Night’s special Mitzvah of eating Maror; otherwise, as many people dip during their meals, it would not appear out of the ordinary. The Taz (ad loc. end 7 s.v. u’me’od) offers an alternate approach, that the fact that the first dipping is performed prior to the Seudah shows that it is not actually performed as part of the Seudah, so too, it proves that the second one, Maror is also not performed as part of the Seudah but rather for its unique Mitzvah. On the other hand, the Pri Chodosh (ad loc. 6 s.v. Rashbam) raises the point that everyone knows that there is a different Mitzvah of dipping and eating Maror that is performed much later on in the Seder, well after the ‘answer’ of ‘Avadim Hayinu.’ He therefore suggests that perhaps the main purpose of Karpas is for the children to ask questions, irrelevant of the answer or whether it actually answers that exact question. Once the children realize early on in the Seder that there are actions out of the ordinary being performed on Leil HaSeder, they will notice and ask the purpose of all of them, and thus enable the Mitzvah of ‘Vehigadta Le’vincha’ to be performed in the optimal manner.
[3] Bartenura (Pesachim Ch. 10, Mishnah 5) and Tur (O.C. 473: 6). Many later authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch Harav (ad loc. 14) and Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 105) understand the Gemara this way as well.
[4] Rashi(ad loc. s.v. tzarich), Rashbam and Tosafos (ad loc. s.v. kol). See Maharsha (ad loc.) for explanation.
[5] Including the Maharam M’Rottenberg (cited in Tashbatz Kattan 99 and Tur ibid.), Rashbat (cited by the Mordechai on Pesachim 34a), Baal HaItur (Aseres HaDibros Matzah U’Maror pg. 134b, third column), Maharil(Hilchos Hahaggada, pg. 14a s.v. darash Maharash; explaining that this handwashing on Pesach is essentially a ‘chumra b’alma meshum srach Terumah, ul’didan ha’idna ain shayach’; thanks are due to R’ Yisroel Strauss for pointing out this essential source), Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo on Chullin, Ch. 8: 18), Lechem Chamudos (Divrei Chamudos on the Rosh, Chullin Ch. 8: 41), Levush (O.C. 473: 6), Magen Avraham (O.C. 158: end 8), Ateres Zekeinim (O.C. 158: 4, end s.v. oh hapri), Chok Yaakov (O.C. 473: 28), and Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 158: 4 and 5). The Yaavetz (Mor U’Ketziah 158 end s.v. v’ha) is also melamed zechus for those who are lenient with this. On a more contemporary note, Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Hilchos HaGr”a U’minhagav 135; pg. 149-150) adds a compelling reason for the common custom of not washing. He cites that the Brisker Rav zt”l explained that the handwashing necessitated for a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh is not for the same reason as the washing for bread. Whereas for bread we wash due to the need for Kedushah, on the other hand, for a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh all that is necessary is to have ‘yadayim tahoros’, but not necessarily is an actual maaseh to make them tahor required. Hence, since nowadays we generally make sure that our hands are not ‘halachically dirty’ (as we make sure to wash our hands in many situations throughout the day – see Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 4: 18), it is sufficient for these halachos and handwashing is technically not actually mandated. The Kozoglover Gaon, Rav Aryeh Leib Frommer HY”D (Shu”t Eretz Tzvi vol. 1: 32) and Rav Shalom Messas (Meshash) zt”l (Shu”t Shemesh U’Magein vol. 2: 45) also defended the common practice not to wash before eating dipped food items. See also footnote 7.
[6] Rambam (Hilchos Brachos Ch. 6: 1), Tur (O.C. 158: 2 and 473: 6), Shulchan Aruch and Rema (O.C. 158: 4), Biur HaGr”a (O.C. 158: 4 s.v. b’lo brachah and Maaseh Rav 81), Chayei Adam (vol. 1, 36: 4), Shulchan Aruch Harav (O.C. 158: end 3), Ben Ish Chai (Year 1, Tazria 19), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (40: 17), Mishnah Berurah (O.C. 158: 20), Kaf Hachaim (O.C. 158: 13 and 25), and Chazon Ish (O.C. 25: 14 & 15 s.v. kasav b’M”B). The Chazon Ish and Steipler Gaon were known to be very stringent with this - see Orchos Rabbeinu (5775 edition; vol. 1, pg. 153-154, Dinei Netillas Yadayim V’Seudah 6 and 7). See also next footnote.
[7] Other authorities who hold this way include Rabbeinu Yonah (Brachos 41a s.v. kol), the Rosh (Chullin Ch. 8: 10), the Knesses HaGedolah (Shiyurei Knesses Hagedolah, O.C. 158 Hagahos on Beis Yosef 3), Matteh Yosef (Shu”t vol. 2, 18: 19 - who uses extremely strong terms against those who are lackadaisical with this), Taz (O.C. 473: 6; who concludes that at the very least one should be makpid during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva), Chida (Birkei Yosef, O.C. 158: 5), Shlah (Shaar Ha’Osiyos 81b, haghah), and Ba’er Heitiv (O.C. 158: 11). See also Halichos Shlomo (Moadim vol. 2, Ch. 9, pg. 253, footnote 184) which quotes Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l as maintaining that even though in previous generations many were lenient with this issue, adding that the Chayei Adam, in his hesped for his son (titled ‘Matzeves Moshe’) stressed that the niftar was a tzaddik and illustrated this by stating that he was makpid to always wash his hands before dipping food items into liquid, implying that even in his time and place it was an uncommon procedure, nevertheless, nowadays we should definitely do our utmost to fulfill this halacha. Likewise, Rav Shmuel Halevi Wosner zt”l is quoted (Kovetz M’Beis Levi vol. 17, pg. 17, 3) as sharing a similar assessment, that although the common custom seems not to be makpid, nonetheless, it is indeed preferable to strive to do so. Rav Ovadiah Yosef zt”l (Chazon Ovadia vol. 1 - Pesach, Hilchos Leil HaSeder pg. 32, Urchatz 1) likewise stresses that since the majority of poskim, including the Shulchan Aruch, hold that one need be makpid year-round, ‘b’vaday hachi naktinan.’ For more on this topic, as well as which Gedolim over the ages were or were not makpid, see Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Brodt’s Bein Kesseh L’Essor (Ch. 9, pg. 148 - 153).
[8] Beis Yosef, Shulchan Aruch, and Rema (O.C. 158: 4), Taz (ad loc. 6), Chayei Adam (vol. 1, 36: 4), Shulchan Aruch Harav (158: 3), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (40: 17), Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 158: 5), Ben Ish Chai (Year 1, Parshas Tazria 17), Mishnah Berurah (158: 20), and Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 13; citing ‘the Acharonim’). However, the Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGr”a ad loc. 11 and Maaseh Rav 81) and several others actually do mandate a brachah on the washing for a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh. See next footnotes.
[9] Tur (ibid.),Abudraham (Seder HaHaggada s.v. u’le’achar).
[10] Tur and Abudraham (ibid.), with the Tur adding that although the Maharam M’Rottenberg and Baal Ha’Itur (ibid.) are of the opinion that nowadays it is not necessary, nevertheless, as the Gaonim, as well as Rashi, as quoted by Rav Shmayah, mandate it, the ikar is to make Netillas Yadayim by Urchatz. The Rambam (Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah Ch. 8: 1) rules this way as well. The Levush (O.C. 473: 6) and Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGr”a ad loc. 30 and Maaseh Rav beg. 191; also cited in Shaar Hatziyun ad loc. 70) also rule this way by Urchatz. Interestingly, in the famous 1526 Illuminated Prague Haggada, it cites that Urchatz should be recited with a brachah. Thanks are due to Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Brodt for pointing this out. See his article titled ‘The 1526 Prague Haggadah and its Illustrations’ (Ami Magazine, Issue 313; April 5, 2017 / 9 Nissan 5777; Double Issue pg. 143). Yet, it is important to note that there is a practical difference between the shittos of the Levush and Gr”a. The Gr”a maintains that Urchatz shares the same status as any davar hateebulo b’mashkeh, which in his opinion is obligated in handwashing with a brachah. However, and quite conversely, the Levush maintains that generally we rule that nowadays a davar hateebulo b’mashkeh does not require handwashing. It is only at the Seder, due to Chovas HaRegel (some editions have ‘Chibas HaRegel’) that we do so by Urchatz. Accordingly, since we are performing this handwashing especially for the Seder, it requires the full status of the Gemara’s ruling and therefore, in his opinion, does require Netillas Yadayim as well. See also footnote 19. On the other hand, theTaz (ad loc. end 7 s.v. u’me’od) questions the Tur’s (and Levush’s) ruling, as by Pesach he mandates Urchatz with a brachah, whereas year-round rules one does not make the brachah for such handwashing at all. The Taz states that it is inconceivable that the same action for the same purpose can require a brachah parts of the year, whereas other times not. Interestingly, in his Darchei Halacha glosses to the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (119: 8), Rav Mordechai Eliyahu writes that those who generally follow the rulings of the Rambam should wash with a brachah for Urchatz, and not like the common halachic consensus. Interestingly, Rav Yitzchak Isaac Tirna (Tyrnau) in his Sefer HaMinhagim (Minhag HaPesach) cites both sides of this machlokes regarding Urchatz with a brachah or not, with no clear ruling. Even more interesting, is that the Haghos ad loc. (89) succinctly adds that this very same machlokes applies year round regardingdevarim hateebulo b’mashkeh.
[11] Maharil (Seder Hahaggada), Beis Yosef (O.C. 173: 6 s.v. u’mashekasav Rabbeinu) and Darchei Moshe (ad loc. 12), and conclusively ruled in Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.), and followed authoritatively by the Bach (ad loc. s.v. ul’inyan halacha), Taz (ad loc. 7), Elyah Rabbah (ad loc. 23), Hagahos Mohar”a Azulai (on the Levush ad loc. 6), Malbushei Yom Tov (ad loc. 3), Pri Chodosh (ad loc.), Shulchan Aruch Harav (ad loc. 19), Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav ad loc. 6), Chayei Adam (vol. 2, 130, HaSeder B’Ketzara 4, s.v. Urchatz), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (119: 3), Ben Ish Chai (Year 1, Parshas Tzav 31), Mishnah Berurah (473: 52), Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 18), and Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 106). This is also cited lemaaseh in most Haggados. There is also some discussion as to if one eats less than a kezayis of dipped Karpas if he may be lenient with washing with a brachah according to the opinions who mandate it. One can posit that this idea is logical, as the Rambam, Abudraham, Levush, and Vilna Gaon (ibid.), who all mandate Urchatz with a brachah, also hold that one should eat a kezayis of Karpas(as less than a kezayis is not true “achillah” – eating). Therefore, it would stand to reason that if one eats less than that amount, washing with a brachah is not necessitated. In his Shaar Hatziyun (ad loc. 70) the Mishnah Berurah adds that although the Vilna Gaon maintains to eat more than kezayis as well as make the brachah of Netillas Yadayim at Urchatz, nonetheless, he would agree that if one would eat less than a kezayis, then he should not make the Netillas Yadayim brachah. On the other hand, the Tur also mandates washing with a brachah but writes that eating a kezayis in not necessary. Most Rishonim, including the Maggid Mishneh, Hagahos Maimoniyos, and Rosh (ad loc.), as well as the Beis Yosef, Shulchan Aruch Harav (ad loc. 15), and Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 18), maintain that a kezayis is not necessary, as even eating a small amount would arouse the interest of the children. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (ad loc. 6) rules this way lemaaseh, to specifically eat less than a kezayis. The Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 53), echoing the Maharil (Minhagim; Seder HaHaggada ibid.) and his talmid, the Matteh Moshe (625), and ruling like the Magen Avraham (ad loc. 18) and Taz (ad loc. 8), concludes that it is preferable not to eat a kezayis of Karpas not to enter a question of whether a brachah acharonah would be mandated. However, although the Magen Avraham and Taz agree that one should not eat a kezayis of Karpas, they differ as to the proper halacha if one would actually do so, whether a brachah acharonah would be mandated. Although a Machlokes Rishonim between the Ri (Tosafos ad loc. 115a s.v. v’hadar) and Rosh (Pesachim ad loc. Ch. 10: 26) against Rashbam (Pesachim 114b s.v. peshita; see Tur O.C. 473 and 475 on this machlokes), the Taz seemingly holds that one would be required to in such an eventuality (and not as the Ba’er Heitiv ad loc. 18 quotes him as agreeing with the Magen Avraham), whereas the Magen Avraham maintains that it is a safek, and therefore even if done, we would not recite a brachah acharonah. Ultimately, the Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 56) sides with the Magen Avraham, that if one would eat more than a kezayis of Karpas, he would not make a brachah acharonah. Although the Bach (ad loc.) cites a possible solution to fulfill both sides of this debate, the Chok Yaakov (ad loc. 29) questions its applicability. To further complicate matters, the Vilna Gaon, in his Biur HaGr”a (ad loc. v’aino mevareich) writes that according to the Rema, it should come out that we should make a brachah acharonah after Karpas (and not as most Poskim understood). However, in Maaseh Rav (191) it is recorded that the Gr”a would not make a brachah acharonah, even after eating a kezayis of Karpas. This is also cited as the Vilna Gaon’s own personal hanhaga in the Chavas Daas’ Maaseh Nissim Haggadah with Hanhagos of the Vilna Gaon (Vilna; 1864 / 5624 edition; while stating that the Chavas Daas held to wash without a brachah and eat less than a kezayis, like most poskim). The Chazon Ish (cited in Orchos Rabbeinu, 5775 edition, vol. 2, pg. 95, Hanhagos Pesach M’Maran HaChazon Ish, 20) would also eat a kezayis of Karpas without a brachah acharonah. There is also some debate as to the Ben Ish Chai’s final opinion if one ate a kezayis of Karpas whether he should make a brachah acharonah – see Ben Ish Chai (Year 1, Parashas Tzav 32), Od Yosef Chai (Parashas Tzav 7), and Rav Yaakov Hillel’s Luach Dinim U’Minhagim Ahavat Shalom (Leil Pesach, footnote 569). For more on this topic, see Shaar Hatziyun (ad loc. 70), Biur Halacha (ad loc. s.v. pachos m’kezayis), Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 19), Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. end 106 and 158: 20), and the Mekoros U’Biurim to the recent Weinreb edition of Maaseh Rav (191: footnote 58, pg. 210; who concludes “tzarich iyun”).
[12] Another interesting question is whether “heseibah – reclining,” is required by Karpas. Also a machlokes, with the Abudraham (ibid.) requiring it and theRambam (Hilchos Chometz U’Matza, Ch. 8: 2) implying it, whereas the Shibolei Haleket (218) and Matteh Moshe (625) writing that it is not performed. The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (119: 3) writes to do so, but the Chida (Birkei Yosef O.C. 473: 14) and Ben Ish Chai (Year 1 Parashas Tzav 32) argue that it is not necessary. The Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 114) concludes that either way is acceptable – “Nahara Nahara U’Pashtei.” Practically, it is recorded that Rav Yisroel Yaakov Fischer (Halichos Even Yisrael, Moadim vol. 1, pg. 164: 3) did not recline when eating Karpas, whereas Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (Hanhagos Rabbeinu pg. 214: 97) was not makpid to do so – some years he did and others he did not.
[13] The Chida’s Simchas HaRegel Haggada - in the end of his passage explaining Urchatz.
[14] Midrash Rabba (Parshas Toldos, Ch. 66: 3), cited by Rashi (ad loc. s.v. v’yitein l’cha).
[15] Haggada of the Chasam Sofer and Chasan Sofer (Urchatz), Taz (O.C. 473: 6), and Ben Ish Chai (Year 1 Parshas Tzav 31).
[16] Halichos Shlomo (Moadim vol. 2, Seder Leil Pesach, pg. 253, Orchos Halacha 184).
[17] Chok Yaakov (473: 28). See also footnote 5.
[18] In the Abarbanel’s Zevach Pesach (end; Dinei HaSeder), Chayei Adam (vol. 2, 130, HaSeder B’Ketzara 4, s.v. Urchatz), Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 473: 18), and Shaar Hatziyun (ad loc. 69). Interestingly, in his Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 51), the Chofetz Chaim implies conversely, like the basic understanding of the Tur and most commentaries, that the Urchatz handwashing is due to the halacha ofdavar hateebulo b’mashkeh.
[19] The Levush (O.C. 473: 6) understands Urchatz differently than the other two main opinions. He explains that since the dipping of Karpas at the Pesach Seder is due to “Chovas HaRegel” and is considered a “Tevillah shel Mitzvah” we should therefore to strive for an increase in purity and that is why the handwashing is performed, even though the rest of the year it is deemed non-mandatory; quite the opposite of the Chida’s and Chasam Sofer’s understanding. Rav Shmuel Avigdor zt”l (Haggada shel Pesach im Pirush Maharsha; cited in Bein Kesseh L’Essor, Ch. 9, pg. 152-153), the Pri Megadim (ad loc. Mishbetzos Zahav 6; although he implies that it should thus apply equally to every Yom Tov, due to the dictum of ‘Chayav L’Taher Atzman L’Regel’) and Shlah (Shaar Ha’Osiyos ibid.) understand Urchatz akin to the Levush. The Taz (ibid.) also mentions the idea of being more stringent at the Seder due to Chovas Haregel [however, as mentioned previously, he ultimately concludes that it is preferable to be makpid year-round, and at least during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva]. This understanding is also cited by the Kozoglover Gaon (Shu”t Eretz Tzvi vol. 1: 32 s.v. amnam), and later by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Halichos Shlomo ibid.). For more on this topic, as to Urchatz being mandated due to the inherent extra-Kedusha of the Chag, seeBein Kesseh L’Essor (Ch. 9, pg. 152-153). In a sort-of similar vein, the Maharil (Seder HaHaggada) writes succinctly that a ‘Rechitzah Gemurah’ (without a brachah) is necessitated to ensure that our hands remain pure when dipping the vegetables, as liquid makes an item huchshar l’Tumah (enabled to become Tamei).
[20] Vayaged Moshe (16: 1). This sefer, an incredible compilation of Dinei V’Minhagei Leil HaSeder, was originally written by Rav Moshe Yehuda Katz HY”D, who was murdered in Auschwitz. The manuscript was later edited by his nephew Rav Chaim Yehuda Katz, and published by his brother Rav Yehoshua Katz. Since first being printed over 50 years ago, Vayaged Moshe, a perennially popular, yet, hard-to-find sefer, a new updated (eighth) edition was just published last month.
[21] This author feels it is important to note that not every Posek or commentary ties the unique conjunctive ‘Vav’ in Urchatz with the halachos of ‘davar hateebulo b’mashkeh.’ For example, in the Shem M’Shmuel’s Haggada (pg. 17a s.v. Kadeish Urchatz), he cites an explanation from his father, Rav Avraham Borenstein, the illustrious Avnei Nezer. He asks why the order at the Seder is ‘Kadeish Urchatz’ and not the other way around. Generally speaking, we ‘wash’ in order to properly prepare ourselves for ‘Kadeish’ – sanctifying ourselves. To borrow the phrase “Why is this night different than all other nights?” The Avnei Nezer explains that during Yetzias Mitzrayim our ancestors were redeemed even though they were technically not worthy of Geulah at the time. Similarly, at the Seder we are able to tap into the inherent spirituality of the day and ‘jump’ and reach higher levels of Kedusha than we ordinarily could, even without proper preparation. [A similar elucidation is given in the Zichron Nifla’os Haggada (pg. 9b s.v. v’achar).] An entirely different, yet halachic explanation for this interesting turn of phrase is given by Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l (Machzor L’Chag HaPesach Siach Sifsoseinu pg. 683, footnote; thanks are due to my talmid Rabbi Rafi Wolfe for pointing this out). Rav Chaim explains that the conjunctive ‘Vav’ in Urchatz is connected to Kadeish to teach us that washing for Karpas must take place soon after Kiddush, in order to ensure that the Kiddush is considered Kiddush B’Makom Seudah, as Karpas is the beginning of the actual Seudah. The halachic issues of the obligation of Kiddush B’Makom Seudah were detailed at length in a previous article titled “More Common Kiddush Questions” Kiddush B’Makom Seudah.”
[22] In the introduction to the Netziv’s Imrei Shefer commentary on the Haggada. Thanks are due to Rabbi Yaakov Luban for providing me with this important source. In his words: ‘This thought of the Netziv takes on even greater significance if we accept the position of the Rosh (Pesachim Ch. 10: 34), that the Afikoman matzah is eaten in place of the Korban Pesach. Accordingly, one can suggest that at the Pesach Seder we not only remember the Korban Pesach as a historical event last practiced 2,000 years ago. Rather, when we eat the Afikoman, we replicate the experience and feel the excitement of eating the Korban Pesach in Yerushalayim in the close proximity of the Beis Hamikdash. As we relive this experience we feel compelled to wash Urchatz, just as we did in the days of old.’
[23] In his sefer Shevach Pesach (cited by Vayaged Moshe 16:2 s.v. v’hinei). The Vayged Moshe refers to Rav Yishmael as “HaGaon HaSefardi Rebi Yishmael Hakohen z”l.”
[24] Zichron Nifla’os Haggada (pg. 11a-b s.v Kadeish Urchatz and ulefi aniyus daati). The Zichron Nifla’os Haggada was written by Rav Elazar ben Rav Zev Wolf Hakohen, Av Beis Din of Sokatchov, and son-in-law of Rav Yaakov of Lissa, renowned author of Chavas Daas, Nesivos Hamishpat, Derech Hachaim, and other essential works.
[25] Darchei Moshe (O.C. 473: beg. 12). Washing before Tefillah (and without a brachah) is based on Gemara Brachos (15a) and ruled accordingly in Shulchan Aruch and Rema and main commentaries (O.C. 92: 4 and 5).
[26] In his Haggada (as cited in sefer Haggada V’Aggadata pg. 81).
[27] This was the minhag of the Chasam Sofer (cited in his Haggada pg. 43) in order to show ‘Derech Cheirus’ and aristocracy. Rav Moshe Feinstein (cited in his Haggada pg. 100) was noheg this way as well. For more on this minhag, see Vayaged Moshe (16: 5), Rav Asher Weiss’s Haggada shel Pesach Minchas Asher (pg. 30, Urchatz 3), Netei Gavriel (Hilchos Pesach vol. 2, Ch. 81: 10), and Rabbi Yaakov Skoczylas’s Ohel Yaakov (on Hilchos U’Minhagei Leil HaSeder, pg. 51: 2 and footnote 5).
[28] Mikraei Kodesh (Pesach vol. 2: 39, pg. 142). This logic is also later cited in Minhag Yisrael Torah (vol. 3, pg. 133-134: 14), and Ohel Yaakov (on Hilchos U’Minhagei Leil HaSeder, pg. 51, footnote 4). Although there does not seem to be a direct dispute regarding whether everyone at the Seder or just the head of the household wash by Urchatz, it is implied by their specific writings. For example, the Rambam (ibid.) when discussing the customs of the Seder, uses plural tense (lashon rabbim) for almost all of the minhagim, except Urchatz, which he uses the singular tense (lashon yachid), implying that in his opinion only the one leading the Seder need to wash. Similarly, the Shibolei Haleket (218) writes “natel habaki,” the expert takes (the Karpas). On the other hand, from the way the Ritva (Pesachim, Seder Hahaggada), Maharil (Seder Hahaggada), Abudraham (Seder HaHaggada s.v. u’le’achar), and Mordechai (Pesachim 37b; cited by the Beis Yosef ibid. s.v. u’mashekasav v’lo) discuss the topic, it is clear that they are of the opinion that everyone should be washing.
[29] As aside for the aforementioned Rishonim, is also explicitly cited by the Seder HaYom (Seder Tefillas Arvis V’Kiddush [shel Pesach] s.v. achar), Misgeres Hashulchan (on the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 119: 3), and Chakal Yitzchak Haggada (pg. 59). See also Vayaged Moshe (16:2), Halichos Even Yisrael (Moadim vol. 1, pg. 163, Urchatz 1 and footnote 6), Haggada shel Pesach of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (pg. 109), Haggada shel Pesach Chazon Ovadiah (‘Urchatz’; at the end of Sefer Chazon Ovadiah vol. 1 - Pesach), Netei Gavriel (Hilchos Pesach vol. 2, Ch. 81: 11), and Ohel Yaakov (ibid; citing Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l and others).
[30] This is cited as the proper minhag in Sefer Minhagei Amsterdam (new edition, Ch. 3: 6, 4; pg. 52), as well as the minhag of Rav Shalom M’Neustadt (Minhagei Maharash, 302: 3; also cited by his talmid, the Maharil, Seder Hahaggada ibid.; although the Maharil himself seems to side with his other Rabbeim who mandated everyone washing Urchatz – the Mahari Weil and Mahari Segal; see also Leket Yosher vol. 1, pg. 88, and Shu”t V’Drashos Mahari Weil 193). Thanks are due to R’ Avraham Schijveschuurder for pointing out several of these important sources. This is also cited as the proper minhag in Moreshes Machon Ashkenaz’s Madrich L’Minhag Ashkenaz Hamuvhak (pg. 33, Urchatz), stating that although in Ashkenaz the general minhag is not to be makpid on washing for a ‘davar hateebulo b’mashkeh’ year round, nonetheless at the Seder, only the Baal HaBayis does, “derech serara” (meaning in a royal manner). In Rav Asher Weiss’s Haggada shel Pesach Minchas Asher (pg. 30, Urchatz 5) he cites this as Minhag Sanz, following the precedent of the Divrei Chaim and Kedushas Yom Tov. See also Vayaged Moshe (16: 2), Netei Gavriel (Hilchos Pesach vol. 2, Ch. 81: 11, and footnote 20 and 21), Minhag Yisrael Torah (ibid.), and Ohel Yaakov (ibid.) who cite different minhagim on this. Sanz, Satmar, Lelov, and Ziditchov, as well as Rav Shmuel Halevi Wosner zt”l, maintain that only the Baal Habayis needs to wash, and that this was also the personal hanhaga of the Chasam Sofer, while Belz, Gur, Ropshitz, Spinka, Skver, Boyan, and Chabad hold everyone washes. Vizhnitz minhag is that only once one is married does he wash for Urchatz.
[31] An additional possible rationale for leniency that not everyone wash even though all are dipping and eating the vegetable (cited by the Vayaged Moshe ad loc. s.v. v’daas), is that it is unclear in halacha if handwashing is indeed mandated for eating less than a kezayis of a vegetable. Although, as mentioned previously, the Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion is to wash Urchatz and eat less than a kezayis of Karpas, nonetheless the earlier Tashbetz (Yavin Shemuah, Maamar Chometz, 35a end s.v. tanya; cited by the Chida in his Birkei Yosef, O.C. 158:7, and later the Kaf Hachaim ad loc. 20) maintains that ‘davar hateebulo b’mashkeh pachos m’kezayis lo bae’i netillah,’ handwashing is unnecessary when eating less than a kezayis. Indeed, the Mishnah Berurah (Biur Halacha 473: 6 s.v. pachos) cites both sides of this debate, ultimately concluding “tzarich iyun l’dina.”
[32] Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt”l (Mikraei Kodesh ibid.) makes this distinction as well. Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor U’Ketziah 158 end s.v. v’ha) writes leshittaso regarding a ‘davar hateebulo b’mashkeh’ that those who dipped with a fork or spoon are not required to wash their hands. Many other authorities rule similarly regarding a ‘davar hateebulo b’mashkeh’ that is always eaten with a spoon (or fork etc.), including the Taz (O.C. 158: 9), Shulchan Aruch Harav (ad loc. 3), Derech Hachaim (Din Netilas Yadayim L’Seudah 5), Chayei Adam (vol. 1, 36: 8), Magen Giborim (Shiltei Hagiborim 7), Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 158: 12), and Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 26). However, see Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 23) who cites several authorities who differ and rules that even though there is what to rely upon, nevertheless one should be stringent and wash his hands. This machlokes of understanding between the Yaavetz and Kaf Hachaim (citing Mekubalim) is extant in many issues of handwashing, including the one mandated in-between milk and meat and also regarding Mayim Acharonim. An alternate approach, given by several Poskim including the Pri Megadim (Y”D 89 S.D 20), is that even if not required me’ikar hadin, nonetheless, optimally one should still wash his hands after eating a dairy product with a fork, as handwashing does not usually entail too much effort. This topic is discussed at length in this author’s recent English halacha sefer ‘Food: A Halachic Analysis’ (pg. 9-11, 25-26, 312-313). Interestingly, this machlokes seems to be originally based on different understandings of a debate amongst Tannaim (Nedarim 49b; thanks are due to R’ Baruch Ritholtz for pointing this out) regarding whether it is more proper to eat die’sah (porridge) with one’s fingers or a ‘hutza,’ a sliver of wood. The Yaavetz understood that this topic was only relevant in their time, as they apparently did not have proper eating utensils. Accordingly, nowadays, when everyone uses cutlery, this debate would seem somewhat irrelevant. Others, however [see Maharsha and Ben Yehoyada (ad loc.), and Bnei Tzion (vol. 3, O.C. 181: 9; from Rav Ben Tzion Lichtman, Chief Rabbi of Beirut, Lebanon approximately seventy-five years ago)], seem to understand that the Tannaim did generally have spoons, but in that instance did not have them readily available. Thus, the Gemara’s discussion was only regarding when spoons were not available, debating whether it was preferable to use fingers or a wood chip in such an instance. Following the latter approach would seemingly unsubstantiate the Yaavetz’s proof from this Gemara. Remarkably, the earliest use of forks as cutlery in Rabbinic literature seems to be from Rabbeinu Chananel (990-1053) in his commentary on Bava Metzia (25b s.v. pi’ homnick), which was first published as part of the famous Vilna Shas by the Brothers Romm, in the 1870s and 1880s. To describe the Gemara’s ‘homnick’ (or ‘hemnick’), he explains that it is a two-pronged fork, similar to a ‘mazleig,’ which he elucidates is a three-pronged fork that ‘Bnei Yavan’ use to hold pieces of meat and help cut them with a knife, as an aid for eating without touching the food with one’s hands. As implied from Rabbeinu Chananel’s terminology that using a fork was a novelty even in his days, it seems that his phraseology can be used as proof to Rav Yaakov Emden’s understanding of the Tannaic debate in the Gemara Nedarim, some 700 years later. Thanks are due to Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein, author of ‘Lashon Hakodesh: History, Holiness, and Hebrew,’ and ‘God versus gods’ for pointing out the location of this comment of Rabbeinu Chananel’s.
[33] Haggada shel Pesach Moadim Uzmanim (pg. 58; see also Shu”t Teshuvos V’hanhagos vol. 2: 116 and Hilchos HaGr”a U’Minhagav 135; pg. 150 s.v. uvmakom acher) and Chut Shani on Hilchos Pesach (Ch. 17: 16); cited in Ohel Yaakov (ibid. pg. 52: 3 and footnote 6).
[34] See Mikraei Kodesh (ibid.), Haggada shel Pesach Minchas Asher (pg. 30, Urchatz 7), Netei Gavriel (Hilchos Pesach vol. 2, Ch. 81: 5), and Ohel Yaakov (ibid.). Also, the fact that this issue is not even raised by the majority of poskim proves that they were of the opinion that it should not factor lemaaseh regarding Urchatz.
[35] Mishnah Pesachim (114a), Gemara (114b-115a). For what to do practically if only Maror is available for both Karpas and Maror, see Rambam (Hilchos Chometz U’Matza, Ch. 8: 12), Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 475: 2), Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 28), and Halichos Shlomo (Moadim vol. 2, Pesach, Ch. 9: 27).
[36] Rashi (Pesachim 114a on the Mishnah), Rambam (Peirush HaMishnayos, Pesachim Ch. 10, Mishnah 3 and Hilchos Chometz U’Matza, Ch. 8: 2), and Tur (beg. O.C. 473).
[37] See Magen Avraham (ad loc. 4) and Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 19) famously citing the Maharil (Minhagim, Seder HaHaggada), to use “Karpas,” which stands for “60 Parech,” the 600,000 Jews who suffered Avodas Parech – backbreaking labor in Mitzrayim. The Shulchan Aruch (ad loc. 4) writes similarly to the Rokeach (ibid.), to take “Karpas or Yerek Acheir,” implying that “Karpas” itself is the name of a vegetable. In his earlier Beis Yosef (ad loc.) he cites the Agur quoting the Mahari Mulin, who specifically used “Karpas.” He writes this more explicitly in his Maggid Meisharim (Parashas Tzav, Ohr L’Gimmel shel Pesach; bottom right corner of pg. 41b) that it is more of a Mitzva to use ‘Karpas’ than other vegetables. The Arizal is quoted as stating similarly (Shaar Hakavannos, Drush 6; cited in Vayaged Moshe ibid. 20), that one should specifically search for and use ‘Karpas’ and not any other vegetable.
[38] See for example, Maharil (ibid.), Magen Avraham (ad loc. 4; although he questions this choice), Chok Yaakov (ad loc. 12), Elyah Rabba (ad loc. end 27), Chayei Adam (vol. 2, 130, HaSeder B’Ketzara 3), the Chavas Daas’ Maaseh Nissim Haggadah with Hanhagos of the Vilna Gaon (Karpas), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (118: 2), and Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 10). Rav Akiva Eiger (ad loc. s.v. v’ani) points to the Yerushalmi in Sheviis (beg. Ch. 9), cited by the Tosafos Yom Tov in Shabbos (Ch. 9, Mishnah 5), that states that “Karpas Shebineharos” is “Petrosilinen.” The Aruch (erech ‘Karpas’) cites this as well in his definition of ‘Karpas.’ Interestingly, the Taamei HaMinhagim (Inyanei Pesach, hagahah 517) writes that in Arabic, “Petrosilin” are called “Karpas.”
[39] All of these vegetables are cited by various Poskim through the ages, including the Chayei Adam, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, and Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.). For a full listing and their various customs, as well as potential issues raised by others for using each specific vegetable [for example, is it generally eaten raw or cooked, or is it perhaps ‘sharp’ so rather used for Maror (see Chochmas Shlomo ad loc. 5), etc.], see Vayaged Moshe (ibid.) at length. Regarding the different vegetables for Karpas, see also Shu”t Tirosh V’Yitzhar (117), Shu”t Kinyan Torah B’Halacha (vol. 4: 53), and Shu”t Lehoros Nosson (vol. 3: 24). The idea of using cucumbers for Karpas seems to be more recent, as Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is quoted as sometimes using cucumbers (Halichos Shlomo, Moadim vol. 2, Pesach, Ch. 9: 28), and the Strasbourger Rav (Shu”t Kinyan Torah B’Halacha ibid. s.v. ulifi aniyus daati) maintaining a preference for it; yet, if my memory serves me correctly, Rav Dovid Feinstein is quoted in the ArtScroll Kol Dodi Haggada as maintaining a preference for green vegetables for Karpas, and hence specifically “not using cucumbers.”
[40] Hence one should also have kavanna when making the Ha’adama brachah on Karpas, that it should cover Maror as well. Although many commentaries discuss this, see Mishnah Berurah (473: 20 and 54) for a succinct explanation. If one did not have this specific kavanna by Karpas, he still would not repeat Ha’adama when eating Maror (see Kaf Hachaim ad loc. 113).
[41] Shu”t Chasam Sofer (O.C. 132, end s.v. odos), Machatzis Hashekel (O.C. 473: 4), Bartenura (Sheviis Ch. 9, Mishnah 1). See also Shu”t Lehoros Nosson (vol. 3: 24, end 2) as to the distance the Chasam Sofer would go to procure celery for his rebbi for Karpas. The Chasam Sofer adds that the “ipiya” (or “ipuch” as the Maharil writes) perhaps stands for “Keil Poel Yeshuos Attah.”
[42] Luach Eretz Yisrael (Nissan, Aleph D’Pesach), Halichos Shlomo (Moadim vol. 2, Pesach, Ch. 9, footnote 197), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (118: 2), Mareh Yechezkel Haggada (end; cited in Vayaged Moshe ibid. 4; that in Eretz Yisrael celery is truly called “Karpas” in Arabic like the Chasam Sofer), Halichos Even Yisrael (Moadim vol. 1, Pesach, pg. 164: 1).
[43]Aruch Hashulchan (ibid. 10), Misgeres Hashulchan (118:1), Chakal Yitzchak Haggada, Vayaged Moshe (ibid. 7), Shu”t Lehoros Nosson (ibid. 6), Halichos Shlomo (ibid.), Hanhagos Rabbeinu (ibid.), and Haggada Moadim U’Zmanim (ibid.).
[44] Aruch (Erech Petter), cited in Tehilla LeMoshe (hakdama to Yismach Moshe al Tanach, vol. 3:pg. 12a). See She’arim Metzuyanim B’Halacha (118: end 4). Thanks are due to Rabbi Nosson Wimer of Kiryat Sanz, Netanya for pointing this out.
[45] This topic is discussed at length in this author’s recent English halacha sefer ‘Food: A Halachic Analysis,’ in a chapter titled ‘The Halachic Adventures of the Potato.’
[46] Likutei Mahariach (vol. 1, Seder Birkas Hanehenin pg. 182b), Maharam Ash(Zichron Yehuda pg. 23b s.v. al esrog), Shulchan HaTahor (204:3 and Zer Zehav 2), Otzar Hachaim (Parashas Vayelech, Mitzvas Birkas Hanehenin), Pischa Zuta (Birkas HaPesach 12:3), Minhagei Kamarna (pg. 25:97). See also Shu”t Divrei Yatziv (O.C. vol. 1:82), Shu”t Migdalos Merkachim (O.C. 18), and Shu”t Shraga HaMeir (vol. 6:119).
[47] Shu”t B’tzeil Hachochma (vol. 4:83), Shu”t Mishnah Halachos (vol. 6:39 and 40), and many of the Poskim whose teshuvos on topic are printed in the recent Teshuvos HaPoskim (11; pg. 143-170). See also Shu”t Igros Moshe (O.C. vol. 3:63), who also defines the potato as such. Interestingly, although another famous Ashkenazic Rishon, the Maharil (Hilchos Erev Yom Kippur, Seudah Hamafsekes, 8; cited by the Elyah Rabba, O.C. 608:9, and Kaf Hachaim, ad loc. 41), quoting his Rebbeim, mentions that a good way to cool off and get nutrition before a fast day is by soaking a so-called “erd-apple,” another common colloquialism used for the potato, in water and eating it, he could not possibly have been referring to our potatoes which were not extant in Europe for another several hundred years. Additionally, he refers to it as a “pri,” and not a vegetable. As an aside, soaked raw potatoes also does not seem to be one of the usual manners which potatoes are nowadays enjoyed.
[48] Tiferes Yisrael (Avos Ch. 3: Mishnah 14, Boaz Beg. 1). Thanks are due to Rabbi Elchanan Shoff for pointing out this fascinating source.
[49] Thanks are due to my uncle, Rabbi Avrom Baker, for pointing this out.
[50] See also Orchos Rabbeinu (5775 edition; vol. 1, pg. 153, 154, and 159 Dinei Netillas Yadayim V’Seudah 6, 7, and 27) which records that the Chazon Ish and Steipler Gaon were known to be very stringent with this halacha, and always washing before dipping cake into tea, eating washed fruit, and even fruit taken from the fridge that is slightly damp.
Disclaimer: This is not a comprehensive guide, rather a brief summary to raise awareness of the issues. In any real case one should ask a competent Halachic authority.
L'iluy Nishmas the Rosh HaYeshiva - Rav Chonoh Menachem Mendel ben R' Yechezkel Shraga, Rav Yaakov Yeshaya ben R' Boruch Yehuda.
A Secular Vision Of The State
In a recent article on a pseudo-charedi website, the author [in the context of a discussion of the WZO election] writes:
There are many examples contained in the kol korei that will tick people off.. here [is one]:
“The Zionist Movement was founded 125 years ago with the purpose of uprooting the foundations of Judaism.” Of course this is not true [note that R' Chaim Brisker said just that (Ohr Layisharim p. 55) and his belief was shared by many - too many to quote here E.E.]. It was started to allow Jews to escape persecution and penury in Europe by creating a Jewish homeland on the Land we had been linked to for millennia. Uprooting them from the foundations of Judaism was certainly what many, many of the adherents of secular Zionism wished for – and later acted upon. But it was not a definitional element of Zionism.
That comment exposes ignorance of basic history. Actually, Secular Zionism was about escaping Europe and building a completely secular homeland in Israel. It wasn't *just* to escape persecution. Let us read two short passages from the father of the movement himself - Theo H. [no relation to Theodore Huxtable. If you don't catch the reference - consider yourself fortunate]:
Shall we, then, end up by having a theocracy? No! Faith unites us, knowledge makes us free. Therefore we shall permit no theocratic inclinations on the part of our clergy to arise. We shall know how to restrict them to their temples, just as we shall restrict our professional soldiers to their barracks. The army and the clergy shall be honored to the extent that their noble functions require and deserve it. But they will have no privileged voice in the State which confers distinction upon them, for otherwise they might cause trouble externally and internally.
Every man will be as free and as unrestricted in his belief or unbelief as he is in his nationality. And should it happen that men of other creeds and other nationalities come to live among us, we shall accord them honorable protection and equality before the law.
Of course Ben Gurion and his kofrim-kronies [:-)] similarly dreamt of building a secular state and only for pragmatic reasons they made agreements with the religious on such matters as draft exemptions for Yeshiva students.
This is important information as not much has changed. Netanyahu and most of the powers that be also wish for a secular-non-Halachic-non-Jewish-Jewish-State. "להיות עם חילוני בארצנו".
That sorta tempers my euphoria every ה' אייר.
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The author continues:
To argue otherwise is not only inaccurate, but a slap in the face of those who supported a Torah Zionism – like Rav Shmuel Mohliver, the Netziv, and Rav Isser Zalman.
No slap. No face. All of the early pro-settlement Rabbonim [we must add Rav Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Maran HaRav Kook, Rav Reines and many others] understand what the secular Zionists wanted and their purpose in joining forces was to make sure it didn't happen!!
Exciting Adventures In The Laws Of Accepting Tzedaka From Goyim And Goyim Keeping Mitzvos #5
From my new "radio show".
The Nomenclature Of Destruction
Human history has few tragedies that rival the magnitude and moral bankruptcy of the Holocaust, the systematic state-sponsored killing of six million Jewish men, women, and children and millions of others by Nazi Germany and its collaborators during World War II. For the anti-Semitic Nazis who met at the Wannsee Conference in Berlin on January 20, 1942, this mass murder was the “final solution” to the so-called Jewish question. The deliberate and systematic destruction of a group of people because of their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race was given a name, “genocide,” by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-born jurist who served as an adviser to the U.S. Department of War during World War II. Genocide was made a crime that was punishable under international law by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1946. But how did this most infamous of genocides become known as the Holocaust?
In the years immediately after World War II, Yiddish-speaking Jews and survivors of Nazi persecution called the murder of the Jews the Churban (“Destruction”), the same word used to denote the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586 BCE and the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 CE.
In Israel and France, Shoʾah, a biblical Hebrew word meaning “catastrophe,” became the preferred term for the event, largely in response to director Claude Lanzmann’s influential nine-and-a-half-hour 1985 motion picture documentary of the same name. The term Shoʾah is also preferred by speakers of Hebrew and those wishing to be more particular about the Jewish experience or who are uncomfortable with the religious connotations of the word Holocaust. The term Shoʾah emphasizes the annihilation of the Jews—not the totality of Nazi victims, which also included the Germans deemed intellectually, physically, or emotionally unfit who were murdered through the T4 “euthanasia” program, as well as the Roma and Sinti (pejoratively known as Gypsies), homosexuals, and J-s Witnesses.
The word Holocaust is derived from the Greek holokauston, a translation of the Hebrew word olah, meaning a burnt sacrifice offered whole to God. This word was chosen, and gained wide usage, because, in the ultimate manifestation of the Nazi killing program—the extermination camps—the bodies of the victims were consumed whole in crematoria or open fires.
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The word "Holocaust" - from "עולה", has a Christian connotation. We don't believe in human sacrifice.
Here is a summary of a famous talk given by Maran Rosh HaYeshiva ztz"l [by R' Yitzchak Rudomin].
1) The Questions: (1) Is the term "Shoah" (lit. "Holocaust") acceptable in describing the Churban — the destruction of European Jewry during World War II? (2) Should the "Holocaust" be taught separately as many schools are now doing or planning to do, or incorporated into the regular courses on Jewish History and taught as part of the studies on this particular time period? (3) If the latter, where indeed does the Holocaust "fit in" with the rest of Jewish History?
Yeshiva and Jewish Day School principals posed these questions to Rabbi Yitzchok Hutner [1906–1980] Rosh HaYeshiva of Mesivta Rabbi Chaim Berlin and member of the Moetzes Gedolei GaTorah (Council of Torah Sages) of Agudath Israel of America. In response he delivered a discourse to a gathering of [about] 100 Menahalim (Principals [of Jewish schools]) assembled at the yeshiva [in Brooklyn, USA]. In it, he focused on significant aspects of the Churban ("destruction/catastrophe" i.e. The Holocaust) that were hitherto either little known or studiously avoided.
2) Answer/The Response: Before we attempt to designate a name for the shattering events of 1939-1945, we must examine the significance of those events in their historical context. We shall refer to the term "Holocaust" only when we discuss the Nazi destruction of European Jewry during World War II. This in no way signifies the acceptability of this term. We shall not merely discuss history. Our orientation toward Jewish history must reflect an attitude toward Kedushah (holiness). This sanctity stems from the fact that "the Jewish people and the Torah are one" (Zohar Acharei Mos 73), thus intimately relating the proper study of Jewish history with the study of Torah.
3) The Origins of the Term: The term "Shoah" was coined by the [secular] founders of Yad Vashem [Holocaust museum/center] in Jerusalem, since they were convinced that the tragedy of European Jewry was so unique in its proportions and dimensions that no previous phrase could encompass its meaning. By singling out the quantitative differences of this particular Churban ("destruction/catastrophe' i.e. The Holocaust), those who sought a new terminology for these events missed the essence of their uniqueness. It is not just the proportions and dimensions of the Holocaust which define its quintessence, but its establishment of a new and significant pattern in Jewish history.
We shall uncover two new directions in recent Jewish history with reference to the gentile persecution of Jews. Recent history has shifted dramatically in two new areas.
THE FIRST NEW DIRECTION IN JEWISH HISTORY:
4) The Era of Disappointment: Jews have always been beaten by gentiles; only the means and instruments of torment have varied. The innovation of recent times has been that for long periods Jews were deluded into trust in the gentiles by a series of laws and regulations on their behalf, only to have that trust shattered by the rescission of those very laws. This historical period culminated in the Holocaust, the largest-scale annihilation of a people in history, yet resulting not from lawless hordes but flowing directly from legalized and formal governmental edicts. The end result of this period for the Jewish psyche was a significant – indeed, crucial – one. From trust in the gentile world, the Jewish nation was cruelly brought to a repudiation of that trust. In a relatively short historical period, disappointment in the non-Jewish world was deeply imprinted upon the Jewish soul.
5) Torah Source for the New Era: Let us study together the passage in the Torah where this monumental turn of events is [prophetically] reflected: "And God said to Moses;...this nation [Israel] shall arise and fall prey to the lure of strange nations and trust in them [according to the interpretation of Onkelos (c. 35–120 CE), meaning 'the temptation of the nations.']...And I [God] will hide my Face from them, and they will become as food (for their enemies), and great evils and troubles will come upon them, then shall they declare: 'It is because my God has not been in my midst that these evils have befallen me'." (Deuteronomy 31: 16-17).
The "great evils and troubles" which are the direct result of trusting and relying upon the gentile world signify the impetus for the next immediate stage in Jewish history, a unique point in the Teshuvah-repentance process.
6) The First Steps Toward Teshuvah ["return/repentance"]: What we encounter in the above passage, Deuteronomy 31:16-17, there seems to be Teshuvah ("return/repentance"): yet, no real admission of wrongdoing [by Israel] has been made. What we encounter in this passage, unique in the Torah, is a kind of Teshuvah/non-Teshuvah, a leaning toward Teshuvah, yet not quite reaching the point of Teshuvah Gemurah, the complete penitence required by the Torah and God. This is a stage of Teshuvah, a kind of Teshuvah-readiness that Knesses Yisrael [Gathering/People of Israel] will reach in future days before it achieves total repentance. This stage of Teshuvah will come about as a direct result of the "great evils and troubles" which – as we interpreted according to Onkelos – come upon them because of their trust in the [gentile] nations.
Thus there is revealed to us both the chronology and the impetus for the Teshuvah of Acharis HaYamim (the End of Days). This can only come about through promises rescinded, rights revoked, and anticipations aborted. The pain and anguish at the time of these shattered illusions is all too real and tragic; yet the events themselves serve to bring us to the recognition that "it is because my God has not been in my midst that these evils have befallen me." This the RAMBAN [Nachmanides, 1194–1270] sees as the necessary prerequisite to the final step of [complete] Teshuvah when "they will add to their earlier regret the complete confession and total penitence."
7) Children of the Violators: Our new understanding of the essence of our era allows us some comprehension of the phenomenon of our "Age of Baalei Teshuva". Teshuvah seems to "be in the air," and indeed the many [Orthodox Jewish] movements currently succeeding to an unprecedented degree in bringing [secular or non-Orthodox] Jews closer to [Orthodox] Judaism are but a reflection of the fact that the very climate is permeated with a kind of Teshuvah-readiness.
This climate is the result of the disappointment in the gentiles, which demolished the first stumbling-block to Teshuvah, and forced the recognition that "it is because my God has not been in my midst" (Deuteronomy 31:16-17) that the awesome events of recent times have occurred. There are characteristics and trends common to an entire epoch that eventually affect each individual in his own way.
So much for the first new direction in Jewish history in relation to gentile persecutions.
THE SECOND NEW DIRECTION IN JEWISH HISTORY:
8) Public Opinion versus Truth: Before we explore the second of the new directions in detail, it is important to establish a clear distinction between any common approach to world events and Daas Torah, a Torah view of the world. "Public opinion" is by definition colored by outside forces, subjective considerations and the falsehood of secular perspective. Sadly, even in our own circles, the model for shaping public opinion lies in the hands of the [secular powers in the] state of Israel.
To cover up the contributions of the secular leaders of pre-state Israel to the final catastrophic events [as vividly recounted in the 1961 book Perfidy by Ben Hecht] those in a position to influence public opinion circulated the notorious canard that Gedolei Yisrael [great Torah scholars] were responsible for the destruction of many communities because they did not urge emigration [to the British Mandate of Palestine]. The [secular leaders] of the state of Israel omitted any mention of their own contributions to the then-impending tragedy. What they omitted in their own version of history is the second of the above-mentioned new directions in recent Jewish history. It is that phenomenon which we must now examine.
9) East and West Meet: For centuries, indeed millennia, gentile persecution of Jews took one of two forms, but the two never worked simultaneously. Either Jewry had to contend with the Yishmael [Arab, Muslim] nations of the East or was persecuted and expelled by the [European, Christian] nations of the West. With World War II, this long epoch was brought to a crude and malevolent close. Haj Amin el-Husseini [1897–1974], the [Islamic] Grand Mufti of Jerusalem joined with [Nazi leader] Adolf Hitler [1889–1945] to found one of the most significant alliances of modern times. Soon after he landed in Berlin in November 1941, the Mufti demanded that all available resources be used to annihilate Jews. Two months later (January 20, 1942) at the Wannsee Conference, the formal decision was made [by the Nazis] to annihilate all Jews who had survived the ghettos, forced labor, starvation, and disease.
Of course, the Mufti was serving his own perverted fears, which were the influx of millions of Jews into [the British Mandate of] Palestine and the destruction of the Mufti's personal empire. Yet, there can be no doubt that through their symbiotic relationship, Hitler and the Mufti each helped the other accomplish his own evil goal.
10) The Mufti's First Step: The Mufti's trip to Berlin was the first ominous step in the joining of the anti-Jews of the East with those of the West to accomplish their diabolic design. From the purely secular historical standpoint, there is no connection between the two directions we have discussed. The Moslem world never granted privileges [to the Jews] that it later retracted, and thus never disappointed the Jews in its midst. What, then, joins the two trends which seem to have coincided so significantly in our generation? A passage from the Torah can give us the answer: "And Esau [according to Torah Judaism, he is the progenitor of the Europeans and Christianity of the West] went to Yishmael [according to Torah Judaism, he is the progenitor of the Arabs and Muslims of the East] and took Machlas the daughter of Yishmael, Abraham's son, the sister of Nevayos, in addition to his other wives, for a wife." (Genesis 28:9)
Since the actions of the Patriarchs are a sign of what would happen later to the children [Ma'aseh Avos Siman Lebanim] and every action in the Chumash [Torah] is eternally significant, we may learn from this passage that it was [prophetically] inevitable for the forces of Eisav [the West] and Yishmael [the East] to combine. We are now living in the midst of that pivotal moment in Jewish history.
11) Coming to Terms: We may now return to the original questions. "Is the term 'Shoah' acceptable?" The answer is CLEARLY NOT. The word "Shoah" in Hebrew, like "Holocaust" in English, implies an isolated catastrophe, unrelated to anything before or after it, such as an earthquake or tidal wave. As we have seen, this approach is far from the Torah view of Jewish history. The Churban ("destruction/catastrophe" i.e. The Holocaust) of European Jewry is an integral part of our history and we dare not isolate and deprive it of the monumental significance it has for us. In truth, the isolation of one part of Jewish history from another, the separation of one part of Torah from another, has caused much of the inability to deal with events such as Churban Europe (i.e. The Holocaust in Europe).
We have exposed the mistake of the [secular] founders of Yad Vashem who felt compelled to find a new term ("Shoah") for the destruction of European Jewry because of its proportions and dimensions. They did not realize that the significance of the Holocaust is precisely in its intricate relationship with what will come after [according to a Torah perspective].
The pattern of Jewish history throughout the ages is Churban, Golus, Geulah – Destruction, Exile, Redemption, and no event requires new categories or definition. The answers to questions (2) and (3) are therefore obvious and need no further elaboration.
12) Tochachah [Rebuke] versus Specific Guilt: The Churban ("destruction/catastrophe" i.e The Holocaust) of European Jewry was a Tochachah ("rebuke" [by God]) phenomenon [as explicitly stated by God in the Torah in the portions of Bechukosai (Leviticus 26:3–27:34) , Ki Savo (Deuteronomy 26:1–29:8), Nitzavim-Vayeilech (Deuteronomy 29:9–31)], an enactment and rebuke which Klal Yisrael ("People/Community of Israel") carries upon its shoulders as an integral part of being the Am Hanivchar, God's chosen ones, we have no right to interpret these events as any kind of specific punishment for specific sins.
The Tochachah is a built-in aspect of the character of Klal Yisrael until Mashiach [the true Jewish Messiah] comes and it is visited upon Klal Yisrael at the Creator's will and for reasons known and comprehensible only to Him [God Himself]. One would have to be a prophet or a Talmudic sage to claim knowledge of the specific reasons for what befell us [during The Holocaust]; anyone on a lesser plane claiming to do so tramples in vain upon the bodies of the Kedoshim ("[Jewish] martyrs') who died Al Kiddush Hashem [for the Sanctification of God's Name] and misuses the power to interpret and understand Jewish history.
Only through a rededication to sole use of the Torah as guide through the byways of history will we be sure to arrive at the truth we all seek.
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Interesting. I recently heard an interview with a well known not religious Jewish intellectual who made the point that we should call it a "Churban" in order to see it in the context of Jewish history and not as an isolated event. Exactly the point the RY made decades ago.
If one sees oneself and world events as part of a bigger picture it is an entirely different narrative. Of course that is what the Pesach seder is all about [among many other things]. מתחיל בגנות ומסיים בשבח. Context is everything.
If Jews would see themselves this way our world of instant gratification would look much different. People would find it almost impossible to go off the derech. When one goes OTD it is ALWAYS about oneself and NEVER about the Jewish people and our 5000 year chain.
Mussar Haskel: Help your children feel part of something bigger!!:-)!!!
Wednesday, April 2, 2025
Intermarriage
There are three [persons] who drive away the Shekhinah from the world…. [The second is] he who cohabits with the daughter of a gentile…. The leaders of the people in each generation are punished for this transgression if they are aware [of it] and are not zealous, for this obligation is incumbent upon them, [viz.,] to be zealous on behalf of the Holy One, blessed be He.
ZOHAR, SHEMOT 3b
Among Jews no practice is more widely abhorred than is intermarriage. Commitment to take as a marriage partner only a fellow member of the Jewish community is not only a matter of religious obligation but the bedrock of Jewish ethnic identity.
A popular folk saying observes that wherever there are two Jews, there are three opinions. It seems that in the area of Halakhah the number of opinions often increases geometrically according to the number of authorities writing about or discussing any given topic. In the area of intermarriage, this is simply not the case. There is little, if any, disagreement, and there are very, very few hairs to split.
There is a well known anecdote about a modern synagogue that was wont to conduct annual meetings. Each year the chairman of each of the standing committees was called upon to deliver a report. Year after year, the chairman of the Ritual Committee was called upon, and year in, year out, he stood up and delivered a two word report: "Men davent—we pray." Then, one year, after the composition of the congregation had undergone a radical change, he rose at the annual meeting and delivered a three word report. On that occasion he declared: "Men davent nisht!" The question of intermarriage can be dealt with quite briefly: "Men tor nisht!—It is not permitted!" In reality there is very little more to say about the subject. "Ha-mefursamot einan zrikhot ra'ayah—Matters which are well known do not require substantiation."
Yet, although aversion to intermarriage is universally recognized, the sources and nature of the halakhic prohibitions surrounding intermarriage are less widely known, even by those thoroughly dedicated to a Jewish life-style. Indeed, while Jewish law clearly and unequivocally forbids intermarriage, the biblical source of this prohibition has been a matter of considerable debate and discussion among rabbinic authorities over the centuries.
There are grounds for assuming the existence of an interdiction against intermarriage pre-dating the Sinaitic covenant. This is manifest in the biblical narrative concerning the incident which occurred between Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, and Shechem, the son of Hamor, as well as the subsequent narrative concerning Tamar, the daughter-in-law of Judah. The Torah censures the actions of Shechem in harsh terms: "Ki nevalah asah be-Yisra'el—He has committed a heinous deed in Israel; ve-khen lo ye'aseh—and such a deed cannot be sanctioned" (Genesis 34:7). The Brisker Rav, Rabbi Yitzchak Ze'ev Soloveitchik, examines this verse and offers an illuminating interpretation. Given the structure of society in antiquity, Shechem's action was not entirely unparalleled. It must be remembered that Hamor ruled the area as an absolute monarch. Shechem was a member of the aristocracy, a princeling, and, quite apparently, could do as he wished with any damsel in his father's domain. Why, then, is the deed deemed so heinous? The Brisker Rav points out that the Gemara, Avodah Zarah 36b, declares that at an early point in history, the Court of Shem, the son of Noah, promulgated a decree against intermarriage. When Tamar is found to be with child, Judah passes judgement: "Bring her forth, and let her be burnt." Tamar is condemned to death but her punishment is, in terms of Halakhah, incongruous. She was ostensibly a widow at the time. Fornication is not a capital transgression. The Gemara indicates that Tamar was punished, not for simple harlotry, but for the infraction of having violated the edict of the Bet Din of Shem, i.e., for apparently consorting with a gentile. The Gemara declares that even in the pre-Sinaitic era there existed a prohibition forbidding members of the family group from which stemmed the progenitors of the people destined to become the community of Israel from intermarrying with members of a gentile nation. From the early dawn of history the people of Israel sought to preserve their ethnic purity and legislated against intermarriage.
A decree of the Court of Shem does not, however, establish a biblical prohibition. Subsequently, we find Ezra and later Nehemiah decrying intermarriage, but in neither instance do we find an explicit reference to a biblical prohibition. Nehemiah goes so far as to pronounce a curse: "In those days also saw I the Jews that had married women of Ashdod, of Ammon, and of Moab … And I contended with them and cursed them …" (Nehemiah 13:23-25). Since Nehemiah pronounces a curse upon those who behave in this manner, there is strong reason to assume that such conduct must have been banned by virtue of an explicit prohibition. The question then is: where is the scriptural locus of the prohibition concerning intermarriage?
I. Lo Titḥaten Bam
1. Rambam
The most obvious source of this ban is Deuteronomy 7:3: "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son. For he will turn away thy son from following Me, that they may serve other gods." However, the source which appears to be the most evident is not necessarily the most correct. The exegetical problem attendant upon this apparently explicit reference is whether the prohibition encompasses only the "Seven Nations" who at that time inhabited Erez Yisra'el, or whether it includes all gentile nations as well. This verse is immediately preceded by an introductory sentence in which the Torah states, "When the Lord thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou goest to possess it, and shall cast out many nations before thee … seven nations greater and mightier than thou." The prohibition occurs within a specific historic context, viz., entry into the promised land and conquest of the seven indigenous nations who inhabited Erez Yisra'el. These seven nations are specifically enumerated in this verse. It is in this context that the Torah admonishes, "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them."
The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 36b, records a difference of opinion regarding precisely this point. The Gemara states explicitly, "The prohibition against marrying non-Jewish women is biblical as it is written, 'Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them.' " According to the Sages, the biblical prohibition is limited to the Seven Nations specifically enumerated in this verse. According to the opinion of the Sages, marriage with members of other gentile nations is forbidden only by virtue of rabbinic decree. R. Shimon ben Yoḥai disagrees with the Sages and maintains that the concluding phrase of this verse, "For he will turn thy son from following Me," serves to broaden the prohibition to encompass marriage with members of other nations as well. R. Shimon ben Yoḥai reasons that Scripture explicitly states the rationale underlying the prohibition as a means of extending the ban to encompass all non-Jews. The fear expressed in this explanatory phrase certainly is not limited to marriage with a member of one of the Seven Nations, but is a valid consideration with regard to marriage between a Jew and any non-Jew.
In examining Rambam's codification of this law in his Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 12:1, we find that he rules in accordance with the opinion of R. Shimon ben Yoḥai:
A Jew who cohabits with a non-Jewish woman of any of the gentile nations in the manner of matrimony, or a Jewish woman who cohabits with a non-Jew in the manner of matrimony incurs the biblical punishment of lashing, as it is written, "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son." Both the Seven Nations and all [other] nations are included in this prohibition. This is made explicit through Ezra, "And that we would not give our daughters unto the peoples of the land, nor take their daughters for our sons." (Nehemiah 10:31)
The quotation of Nehemiah 10:31 is obviously intended to establish that the prohibition against intermarriage applies to all gentile nations. In ruling in this manner, Rambam follows the opinion of R. Shimon ben Yoḥai who maintains that the prohibition, "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them," is applicable not only to the Seven Nations indigenous to the land of Canaan, but applies to all non-Jews equally.
Rambam's formulation of this ruling, however, raises a separate problem with regard to the question of intermarriage. He declares that cohabitation is biblically forbidden, but he qualifies this statement by adding that only cohabitation derekh ishut—in the manner of matrimony—is forbidden. Rambam was obviously troubled by the usage of the phrase "lo titḥaten—thou shalt not enter into marriage" in conjunction with the prohibition against intercourse between a Jew and a non-Jew. The use of the phrase "lo titḥaten" in this context is a halakhic anomaly. It is axiomatic that there can be no ḥitun, i.e., marriage in the halakhic sense, between a Jew and a non-Jew. The institution of kiddushin (matrimony) as a category of Halakhah has no application insofar as non-Jews are concerned. A marriage contracted between a Jew and a non-Jew requires no get (religious divorce) for its dissolution, since it is a nullity ab initio. Kiddushin, with all its halakhic ramifications, applies only to a matrimonial relationship in which both parties are members of the Jewish faith-community. Yet, paradoxically, the Torah, in speaking of forbidden intercourse between a Jew and a non-Jew, states, "Thou shalt not enter into marriage with them." Rambam resolves this difficulty by postulating that this term is not to be understood as a reference to matrimony in the narrow legal sense, but as a term designed to describe the conjugal context within which cohabitation with a non-Jew is proscribed. Thus the prohibition lo titḥaten bam is understood as referring not simply to any act of cohabitation, but rather to cohabitation "derekh ishut," i.e., in a manner analogous to matrimony, viz., within the context of a permanent conjugal relationship.
Rambam's position is very clear. Intermarriage between a Jew and any non-Jew is biblically proscribed; cohabitation under those conditions constitutes the violation of a negative commandment and carries with it the penalty of corporal punishment. The biblical prohibition is limited to cohabitation which takes place within the context of a permanent conjugal relationship, a state which, from the point of view of Jewish law, is roughly analogous to the secular notion of a common law marriage.
2. Tur
Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16, disagrees with Rambam with regard to two salient points. Firstly, the Tur disagrees with Rambam in maintaining that the definitive ruling of Halakhah, and hence the normative position of Judaism, is not in accordance with the opinion of R. Shimon ben Yoḥai, but rather is in accordance with the opinion of the Sages. Accordingly, the prohibition "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them" is to be understood as referring only to intercourse with members of the Seven Nations who inhabited Erez Yisra'el at the time of entry into the promised land, but is not applicable to members of other non-Jewish nations. Secondly, the Tur understands the words, "lo titḥaten—thou shalt not marry" quite literally as referring to actual ḥitun, i.e., marriage in the technical halakhic sense of the term. Since there cannot be a marriage, in the halakhic sense of the term, between a Jew and a non-Jew, the position of the Tur is that the prohibition must of necessity be limited to marriage between a Jew and a member of the Seven Nations who has converted to Judaism. The Tur thus understands the prohibition "lo titḥaten" as referring to a) the Seven Nations and b) the Seven Nations be-gerutan—only subsequent to their conversion. According to the Tur, the prohibition "Neither shalt thou enter into marriage with them" applies only after one of the members of the seven indigenous nations of the land of Canaan has converted to Judaism. Prior to conversion the prohibition "lo titḥaten bam" simply does not apply. Hence the Tur declares:
It appears to me, that [this prohibition] applies only to the Seven Nations for we do not rule in accordance with R. Shimon ben Yoḥai. And even with [members of] the Seven Nations there are no lashes for [the transgression] of lo titḥaten other than after they have converted. However, while they are gentiles, "marriage" is not possible.
Nevertheless, the severity of the stricture against intermarriage tends to indicate that, even according to the Tur, some form of biblical prohibition against intermarriage with non-Jews who are not members of the Seven Nations must exist. The question to be resolved is the nature of the biblical prohibition.
II. Kana'im Poge'im Bo
1. The Prohibition
Although the prohibition is not expressly formulated in Scripture, the action of Phinehas, described in Numbers 25:6-8, serves to establish that cohabitation with a non-Jewess is proscribed, at least under some circumstances. The concept of "kana'im poge'im bo" is one which is well known to students of Halakhah. Halakhah prescribes that, subject to certain limitations, a Jew who is apprehended in flagrente delicto in the act of cohabiting with a non-Jewess may be executed summarily. Translated literally, "kana'im poge'im bo" means that zealots may take justice into their own hands and may execute the transgressor on the spot. There are, to be sure, many halakhic fences which serve to limit implementation of this principle. First, punishment may be meted out only while the act is actually in the course of being performed. According to some authorities, the usual hatra'ah or warning must be administered. Most significantly, the rule which applies is: "Halakhah ve-ein morin ken"; while the punishment is justified, no one may be instructed to carry it out. Nevertheless, a person who acts in accordance with this principle acts in accordance with Halakhah. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 82a, describes Phinehas' action with regard to Zimri as having been based upon this principle. Zimri was engaged in an act of fornication with a Midianite woman and, while yet in the midst of the coital act, was executed by Phinehas.
It certainly stands to reason that a breach of law punishable by death at the hands of a zealot should not go completely unpunished in the absence of a zealot who feels called upon to act summarily. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 82a, states that the punishment for such a deed is karet, death at the hands of Heaven. In support of this statement the Gemara cites the verse, "Judah hath dealt treacherously, and an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem; for Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord which he loveth, and hath married the daughter of a strange god. May the Lord cut off to the man that doeth this" (Malachi 2:11-12). In rabbinic literature this punishment is referred to as karet me-divrei kabbalah, death at the hands of Heaven as recorded in the words of the Prophets.
The punishment to which Malachi refers is incurred not only by one who is guilty of public cohabitation with a member of the Seven Nations, but also by one who cohabits with any gentile woman. It is clear that this punishment applies to cohabitation with any gentile woman for two reasons:
1. The narrative concerning Phinehas, described as an application of the principle of kana'im poge'im bo, involved Cozbi, the daughter of Zur, a Midianite woman. Midian was not one of the Seven Nations indigenous to the land of Canaan. The Gemara states that all persons subject to execution at the hands of kana'im are culpable with regard to karet. It follows, therefore, that death at the hands of Heaven is incurred by one who consorts with any non-Jewess.
2. Malachi inveighed against intermarriage in a historical epoch during which the Seven Nations were no longer extant. Sennacherib, king of Assyria, conquered virtually all of the civilized world of his day and in order to solidify his rule engaged in massive population exchanges (Yadayim 4:4; Berakhot 28a; and Yoma 54a). As a result, the Seven Nations, which had originally inhabited Canaan, are no longer ethnically identifiable. Malachi, who lived much after the reign of Sennacherib, could not possibly speak of the Seven Nations as contemporaneous peoples. Therefore, it is clear that, in admonishing his contemporaries and in announcing that the punishment of karet would be the fate of those who consort with gentile women, Malachi refers to all gentiles, not merely to members of the Seven Nations.
The problem, then, is how is it possible to establish a biblical prohibition on the basis of a prophetic verse? The commandments and legal strictures of Judaism are contained in the Mosaic code as recorded in the Pentateuch. The Gemara, Shabbat 104a, unequivocally declares that the Prophets had no license to establish novel prohibitions which are not contained in the Pentateuch; they may make no additions to the Law revealed at Sinai. Therefore, since Malachi describes cohabitation with a non-Jewess as punishable by death at the hands of Heaven, it follows that a biblical prohibition must have already existed.
Rambam, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 9:6, and Ramban, in his commentary on Rambam's Sefer ha-Mizvot, the second shoresh, resolve this problem by explaining that there did indeed exist a prohibition prior to Malachi's exhortation. This prohibition, although unrecorded in the Pentateuch, has the status of a halakhah le-Mosheh mi-Sinai, one of the manifold ordinances handed down to Moses at Mount Sinai. As such, this prohibition constitutes an intrinsic component of the Oral Law. Thus, the prohibition against cohabitation with a non-Jewess is endowed with the status of a biblical law since it was transmitted by Moses to the community of Israel. Malachi's admonition served merely to record what, until that point in Jewish history, had been an oral tradition. The identical thesis, although in a different context, is set forth by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 22b.
2. Public and Private
It has been established that cohabitation with a gentile woman is, at least under some circumstances, forbidden by virtue of divine command. The question requiring further analysis is whether the prohibition with regard to cohabitation is limited to acts of public fornication or whether it emcompasses private acts as well. The halakhic category of kana'im poge'im bo applies only to instances of public fornication. The zealot is granted license to conduct a summary execution only if the culpable act is a brazen and public one. The zealot dares not act in this manner if the transgression is performed in private. The question, then, is whether the punishment of karet to which the Gemara and Malachi refer, and the prohibition for which this punishment is incurred, are similarly limited to instances of public fornication, or whether death at the hands of Heaven as well as the prohibition for which such punishment is decreed, are attendant upon private acts of fornication as well.
It is precisely this point which is the subject of considerable dispute among halakhic authorities. Two early authorities, Rambam and Nemukei Yosef in their commentaries on Sanhedrin 82a as well as Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 420, followed by Helkat Meḥokek, in the latter's commentary on Even ha-Ezer 16:5, and apparently by Rema as well, maintain that the punishment of karet is limited to acts committed in public. Another early authority, Rabbenu Nissim, in his commentary on Sanhedrin 82a, states that he is in doubt with regard to this point. Bet Shmu'el, in his commentary on Even ha-Ezer 16:4, cites Derishah and Baḥ in remarking that insofar as the biblical prohibition and the prescribed punishment are concerned, there can be no difference between public and private acts. Insofar as the provision of kana'im poge'im bo is concerned, the zealots may take the law into their own hands only in matters affecting public morality; but, insofar as the intrinsic prohibition is concerned, there exists no essential difference between a public act and a private one. Accordingly, rules Bet Shmu'el, the prescribed punishment for cohabitation with a non-Jewish woman is death at the hands of Heaven, whether the act is committed in public or in private.
However, insofar as the prohibition attendant upon intermarriage is concerned, this controversy is entirely academic. This highly significant point is made by the nineteenth-century authority, R. Moses Schick, in two separate responsa, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Even ha-Ezer, nos. 37 and 155, and by his contemporary, R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes, in a footnote appended to the latter's Minḥat Kena'ot (Kol Sifrei Maharaz Hayes, II, 998). The principle established independently by these authorities is that cohabitation within the context of matrimony, as that term is conventionally understood, must be considered to be a public act. The rationale underlying this thesis is not at all difficult to fathom. It is a principle of Halakhah that certain acts, while ostensibly performed in private, are nevetheless considered to be public in nature. Thus, with regard to certain aspects of the law of testimony it is not necessary for witnesses to have direct knowledge of the sexual act itself; witnesses testifying to seclusion of the two parties are deemed ipso facto to be witnesses to the sexual act. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 74b, describes Esther's cohabitation with Ahasuerus as a public act. Although there is no reason for assuming that Ahasuerus violated prevailing norms of modesty in his relationship with Esther, the Gemara finds it necessary to seek grounds justifying what is described as public adultery on the part of Esther. Here, then, is clearly a case of an ostensibly private act which is halakhically categorized as a public act.
The reason for this categorization is quite simple. A Jew is obligated to suffer martyrdom rather than renounce his faith-commitment. He is therefore obliged to allow himself to be killed rather than permit himself to be coerced into committing a transgression in public when such an act is construed as a renunciation of Jewish teaching and practice. This obligation is mandated by the commandment concerning kiddush ha-Shem, sanctification of the Divine Name. It is, of course, necessary to establish the precise definition of a "public" act for purposes of this obligation. The commandment is couched in the words, "And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel" (Leviticus 22:32). On the basis of talmudic exegesis, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 74b and Berakhot 21a, establishes that a Jew is obligated to sacrifice his life rather than profane the Name of God in this manner only if it is demanded that the act of profaning the Name of God be performed publicly in the presence of the "congregation." The term "edah" or congregation is defined as denoting a group of ten Jews. An act is, therefore, considered to be performed in public if it is witnessed by ten people. Nevertheless, Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 154:5, rules that for purposes of the mizvah of sanctification of the Divine Name, an act is considered to be a public one not only if it is witnessed by ten persons, but even if the act is merely known to ten people. A transgression of which ten people have knowledge constitutes a "public" act of profanation of the Divine Name.
Of crucial significance in defining the nature of the prohibition against cohabitation with gentile women is the terminology employed by Malachi in castigating those who transgressed in this manner. Malachi, assailing the abominable nature of this deed, declaims "… for Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord." This sexual relationship is described by the prophet as ḥillul ha-Shem, profanation of the Divine Name, and hence as being tantamount to a renunciation of Judaism. Accordingly, both Maharam Schick and R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes argue that, even assuming that the prohibition against cohabitation with a non-Jewess is limited to public acts, consorting with a gentile woman within the context of a matrimonial relationship constitutes the transgression of a biblical prohibition. Both authorities argue that intermarriage, despite the absence of sexual acts of a public nature in the literal sense, constitutes a public profanation of the Divine Name. The essence of matrimony is the establishment of a permanent conjugal relationship between two individuals. Cohabitation between marriage partners is presumed as a matter of course and hence is a matter of public knowledge. Therefore, marriage to a non-Jewish woman is tantamount to public cohabitation even though no person has seen the couple actually engaged in a sexual act. For this reason, cohabitation within the context of intermarriage constitutes a violation of a biblical prohibition punishable by death at the hands of Heaven according to all authorities, including those who maintain that private sexual acts do not fall within the parameters of this prohibition.
3. Women
One further point requires clarification. The provision for kana'im poge'im bo applies only to the case of a Jewish male who consorts with a non-Jewish female. What is the status of a Jewish woman who intermarries or publicly consorts with a non-Jewish male? Ramban, in his Milḥamot ha-Shem, Sanhedrin 74b, declares that the punishment of kana'im poge'im does not apply to a Jewish woman who cohabits with a gentile. A number of early authorities (including Rambam, cited by Rabbenu Nissim, Yoma 82a; Hiddushei ha-Ran, Sanhedrin 74b; Nemukei Yosef, Sanhedrin 74b; and Tosafot, Kiddushin 75b) maintain that there is no ḥiyyuv karet associated with such an act, i.e., that the act is not punishable by death at the hands of Heaven and, indeed, is not the subject of a biblical proscription. However, Hagahot Mordekhai, Yevamot 4:108, asserts that kana'im poge'im applies to a Jewess who consorts with a gentile no less than to a male Jew who consorts with a non-Jewess. Hazon Ish, Even ha-Ezer 4:10, expressly indicates that, according to this opinion, the punishment for a Jewess who consorts publicly with a gentile is identical in every respect to that of a Jewish male who consorts with a non-Jewish female.
Maharam Schick demonstrates that even those previously cited early authorities who maintain that a Jewish woman who consorts with a gentile does not incur the penalty of karet would nevertheless agree that, despite the absence of this severe punishment, the act constitutes a violation of a divine edict. The biblical prohibition against intercourse with gentiles applies equally to both sexes according to Maharam Schick, even though the punishment for a male is more severe than for a female. In demonstrating the cogency of this conclusion, Maharam Schick refers to the previously cited verse, Nehemiah 10:31. It is this verse which is adduced by Rambam in order to show that the prohibition encompasses all gentiles. Nehemiah refers explicitly to both "our daughters" and "our sons" thereby demonstrating that both Jewish males and Jewish females are forbidden to cohabit with non-Jews.
Another authority, Avnei Milu'im, Even ha-Ezer 16:1, adduces yet another proof in establishing a biblical commandment prohibiting a Jewess from cohabiting with a non-Jew. According to Avnei Milu'im, the primary reference of the verse "For he will turn away thy son from following Me" (Deuteronomy 7:3) is to a Jewess who consorts with a non-Jew and applies only secondarily to a Jew who cohabits with a gentile woman. In the latter case, argues this authority, a child born of the liaison is a gentile and cannot properly be spoken of as "thy son," since Jewish law recognizes no relationship between a Jewish father and his non-Jewish progeny. However, since the child of a Jewish mother is a Jew even if the father is a non-Jew, a filial relationship does exist in Jewish law between the child and the mother. Accordingly, concludes Avnei Milu'im, in speaking of intermarriage as being forbidden "For he will turn away thy son from following Me" the verse must be addressed primarily to Jewish women. Hence, this verse serves to establish the existence of a biblical prohibition against cohabitation between a Jewess and a gentile.
III. Lo Yiheyeh Kadesh
It may cogently be argued that yet another prohibition is associated with the act of cohabitation with a gentile. This prohibition is based upon Deuteronomy 23:18: "Lo tiheyeh kedeshah mi-benot Yisra'el ve-lo yiheyeh kadesh mi-benei Yisra'el." This passage is rendered in standard English translation as "There shall be no harlot of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a sodomite of the sons of Israel." Rashi, following one opinion presented in Sanhedrin 54b, does indeed understand the term "kadesh" as referring to a male prostitute who makes himself available for homosexual activity. Rambam, Sefer ha-Mizvot, lo ta'aseh, no. 350, records the latter part of this verse as an injunction against homosexual relations. However, this passage was not universally understood in this manner by Jewish exegetes. Rambam, Hilkhot Ishut 1:4, understands the first section of this verse as establishing a prohibition against fornication. Sexual intercourse between unmarried persons constitutes a violation of this commandment according to Rambam. Targum Onkelos translates this verse as follows: "No Jewish woman of the daughters of Israel shall marry a slave and no male of the children of Israel shall marry a female slave." Maharam Schick and others point to the fact that the verse in the original Hebrew does not specify cohabitation with a slave. They observe that Targum Onkelos speaks of a slave simply as an example of the type of sexual liaison to which reference is made. Instead of rendering a literal translation the Targum offers an example of a sexual relationship between individuals who cannot be united in matrimony with the implication that all comparable relationships are likewise included in the prohibition. Fornication between an unmarried male and an unmarried female does not fall within the scope of this prohibition according to the Targum because such persons are eligible to contract a valid marriage. The prohibition, for the Targum, is limited to a situation in which matrimony is halakhically precluded but includes cohabitation between any male and female who are halakhically incapable of contracting a valid marriage. A liaison between a Jewish male and a non-Jewish female slave or between a Jewish woman and a male slave is merely an instance of such a relationship. According to this analysis, Targum Onkelos' example of a slave serves as a general paradigm applying to all situations in which marriage between the two individuals is a halakhic impossibility. It follows, therefore, that since Jewish law does not under any circumstances recognize the existence of a matrimonial relationship between a Jew and a non-Jew, the prohibition "lo yiheyeh kadesh" is applicable in all cases of intermarriage.
IV. Rabbinic Edicts
In addition to the biblical prohibitions which have been discussed, cohabitation with non-Jews is proscribed by virtue of two rabbinic edicts. The first of these, recorded in Avodah Zarah 36b, is the previously mentioned decree of the Bet Din of Shem forbidding a Jewish woman to consort with a non-Jew. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 82a, reports that subsequently, during the Maccabean period, the Bet Din of the Hasmoneans similarly promulgated a decree forbidding sexual intercourse between a Jewish male and a non-Jewess. The latter decree forbids all acts of fornication and, moreover, prescribes corporal punishment for violation of this edict. There can, then, be no question that not only is intermarriage between a Jew and a non-Jew forbidden, but that all forms of sexual intercourse between a Jew and a non-Jew constitute a violation of Jewish law.
V. A Concluding Observation
To be sure, an analysis of halakhic prohibitions and their ramifications does nothing for the resolution of a problem which currently has reached epidemic proportions. The solution lies in an undertaking of an entirely different nature.
We would do well to focus our attention upon the last chapter of the Book of Nehemiah in which Nehemiah inveighs against intermarriage. Upon careful examination of the text, one notes that, before addressing himself to the problem of intermarriage, Nehemiah first expresses his concern regarding Sabbath observance. He addresses the populace telling them that he has seen people publicly carrying their wares in the streets of Jerusalem for sale on the Sabbath. Before he speaks of intermarriage and before he admonishes his listeners to put away their non-Jewish wives, he tells them that he had personally locked the gates of the walls surrounding Jerusalem so that no one would be able to bring merchandise into the city on the Sabbath. Only then does he address himself to the problem of intermarriage. Nehemiah was very well aware of the fact that, before one attacks the problem of intermarriage, it is first necessary to do something about the problem of commitment. Only after the problem of commitment has been addressed in a resolute manner can one address oneself to the problem of intermarriage.
There is a well-known story which bears repetition. The anecdote involves a young man who arrives at a train station and, spying an elderly gentleman, walks over to the gentleman and asks him what time it is. The elderly man just stares at him and does not answer. The young man asks a second time, "What time is it, please?" and, again, no reply. The young man asks a third time. Finally, he says, "I asked you nicely and politely to tell me the time. Why don't you answer?" Thereupon, the elderly gentleman turns to the young man and says: "My friend, if I tell you the time, then, when the train arrives, you will board the train with me and you will sit down next to me. You will begin talking to me and then you will ask me where I live. When we reach our destination, you will find some excuse to come to my house. When you come to my house, you will see that I have an attractive daughter. You will begin dating her and eventually you will marry her. But I don't want a son-in-law who doesn't even own a wristwatch!" These things can be prevented only at a very, very early stage. The time to prevent them is in early childhood; and the way to prevent them is by providing an intensive Jewish education, an education which is geared to promoting observance of mizvot.
Where one finds intensive education, deep commitment and maximum observance, instances of intermarriage are much, much lower than elsewhere. We live in an open society and, of course, there may well be individuals who will be lost to our community no matter what we do. Those are the exceptions which prove the rule. The chances of a Bridget marrying a Bernie are statistically very high, but the chances of a Bridget marrying a Baruch or a Berel are remote, to say the least.
Quite apart from the gravity of the formal prohibition, Jews have always seen intermarriage as the greatest threat and danger to their very survival. In his commentary to the Song of Songs, Rashi eloquently gives voice both to our perception of the extent of this peril and to our conviction that, as a community, we will never succumb.
Song of Songs 8:9 declares "If she be a wall we shall build upon her a turret of silver; but if she be a door we shall enclose her with panels of cedar." According to Rashi, God addresses Israel and describes two alternative modes of conduct open to Israel in the Diaspora. The community of Israel may resolve to "be a wall," and to comport itself as if fortified with "walls of brass" (Jeremiah 1:18) which cannot be penetrated, i.e., Israel may gird herself as a defensive wall, withstand incursions and refuse to allow the nations to infiltrate through intermarriage. If Israel acts in this manner "a turret of silver" will be erected, i.e., Israel will survive to witness the rebuilding of the Holy City and the Temple. However, if the community of Israel "be a door which revolves on its hinges," the result will be far different. If Israel wavers and succumbs to every alien knock, opening her door to foreign nations through intermarriage, rather than being fortified with noncorroding silver, her doors will be lined with wooden panels which are exposed to rot and decay. The corrosive effect of intermarriage is such that the community decays and withers away.
In the immediately following verse the Jewish people reply with the resounding words: "Ani ḥomah—I am a wall!" In effect, Israel addresses the Almighty, proudly assuring Him that all fears for her future are unjustified. The Jewish people vows to comport itself, not as a door, granting entry to all who knock, but as a fortified wall, jealously guarding the security and integrity of the nation.
In an open society, the losses sustained as a result of intermarriage are staggering and painful. There is no greater or more pressing problem which besets the contemporary Jewish community. Nevertheless, the words "Ani ḥomah" resound over the centuries as a vow and as an assurance that the integrity of Klal Yisra'el as a people will be preserved through the fortitude of those who stand firm in their commitment to uphold the covenant between the Jewish people and the God of Israel.
