ובכן אבוא אל המלך אשר לא כדת

 

The Core Halachic Dilemma: Esther's Status

Rabbi Dudi builds his lecture on a foundational Talmudic premise from Tractate Megillah: Esther was not merely Mordechai’s cousin or ward; she was his wife.

This presents a severe Halachic dilemma: How could a married Jewish woman be with King Achashverosh?

The initial answer is that Esther was taken to the palace against her will (ones). Under Jewish law, a woman taken by force is permitted to return to her husband afterward. Therefore, during the initial years in the palace, while acting passively and under duress, Esther remained halachically permitted to Mordechai, and they maintained their marital relationship in secret.

The Turning Point: The Ultimate Sacrifice

The pivotal crisis in the Purim story occurs when Haman issues his decree, and Mordechai commands Esther to go to Achashverosh uninvited to beg for her people.

Here, the Halachic reality shifts drastically. The Talmud explains that the moment Esther goes to the king willingly (b'ratzon)—even though she is doing it to save the Jewish people—she becomes permanently forbidden to Mordechai. When Esther says to Mordechai, "As I perish, I perish" (Ka'asher avad'ti avad'ti), the Talmud translates this as: "Just as I am lost to my father's house, so I am lost to you."

By voluntarily going to the King, Esther was consciously sacrificing her marriage, her purity, and her personal spiritual life for the sake of the nation. This is the ultimate act of Mesirut Nefesh (self-sacrifice).

The Talmudic Difficulties 

Rabbi Dudi then explores the contradictions this raises within Talmudic law:

The Rule of Dying Rather Than Sinning: According to Tractate Sanhedrin, one must choose death rather than commit three cardinal sins, one of which is illicit sexual relations (Gilui Arayot). Furthermore, one must die rather than commit any sin if it is done publicly (Pharhesya). Why, then, was Esther allowed to go to the King willingly?

The answer is that Esther was entirely passive ("like the ground" - Karka Olam), and therefore not committing an active sin. Furthermore, the rules change when the survival of the entire Jewish nation (Pikuach Nefesh on a national scale) is at stake.

The Question of Divorce: Rabbi Dudi introduces a brilliant question asked by the Hassidic master, the Tiferet Shlomo (Rabbi Shlomo of Radomsk): If going to the king willingly would destroy her marriage, why didn't Mordechai simply divorce Esther before she went? If she were unmarried, the sin would be far less severe.

The Answer: The Tiferet Shlomo explains that even if she were unmarried, engaging with a non-Jewish king is still a sin. To permit this act under the rare allowance of "a sin for the sake of Heaven" (Avera Lishma), the act had to be one of total, agonizing self-sacrifice. If Mordechai had divorced her, it would have been an "easy way out." By remaining married and sacrificing her most sacred bond, she generated the massive spiritual merit required to save the Jews.

The Zohar's Secret and Spiritual Self-Sacrifice

The lecture then shifts into mystical thought (Machshava). Rabbi Dudi introduces a radical concept from the Zohar, which claims that Esther never actually slept with Achashverosh. Instead, she used divine names to send a demon/spirit (Shedit) in her exact likeness to the king.

This raises a massive philosophical question, addressed by the Admor of Sadigura (of the Ruzhin dynasty): If Esther just sent a demon, where was her self-sacrifice? Why the dramatic statement, "If I perish, I perish"?

The profound Hassidic answer is that while her physical body may have been spared, her soul went into the palace. Esther had to completely disconnect herself from her pristine, pure, spiritual environment. She had to place her soul in a realm of absolute impurity and darkness. She surrendered her personal spiritual perfection to descend into the "mud" of the palace to orchestrate the salvation of Israel.

Contemporary Resonance: The Sacrifice of Today's Soldiers

In a moving conclusion, Rabbi Dudi connects Esther's spiritual sacrifice to the current generation, specifically referencing the soldiers fighting in the ongoing war.

Like Esther, these young men (and the women supporting them at home) are leaving the pure, spiritually safe environment of the Yeshiva or the home. They are entering the messy, brutal, and physically/spiritually dangerous reality of war. They are sacrificing their personal "spiritual perfection"—praying at exact times, studying Torah constantly, remaining in a pristine environment—to engage in the gritty reality required to save the Jewish people.

Rabbi Dudi concludes that this is the highest form of Mesirut Nefesh. It is not just the willingness to risk one's physical body, but the willingness to risk one's spiritual comfort and purity for the sake of Klal Yisrael. Just as Esther's internal, spiritual sacrifice brought about the miracle of Purim, the immense sacrifices of today's generation are the driving force behind the continued survival and redemption of Israel.

When The Shechinah Became Manifest In Moshe

The Core Question: "To You" vs. "To Me"

The discourse opens with a textual question regarding the phrasing in Parshas Tetzaveh. God commands Moses, “V’ata tetzaveh... v’yikchu elecha” (And you shall command the children of Israel, and they shall take to you...). Why does God use the word "elecha" (to you/Moses)? Seemingly, the offerings are to Hashem not to Moshe, so why to "you" [Moshe]? Also, it says “V’ata hakrev elecha es Aharon” (And you shall bring near to you Aaron) and the Zohar says that V'ata refers to none other than the Shechina!! To understand... 

Moshe as the Ultimate Shield Against the Yetzer Hara

To answer this, we must delve into the spiritual role of Moshe. God created the Yetzer Hara and created the Torah as its tavlin (spice/antidote). Because the Torah was given exclusively through Moshe at Sinai, a person’s spiritual connection to the soul of Moshe is their primary defense against evil.

This is proven by the Sin of the Golden Calf (Cheyt HaEgel). As long as Moshe was physically present, the Jewish people were shielded from this massive spiritual failure. The sin only occurred when Moshe departed. Consequently, God tells Moshe to "go down" from the mountain because without his presence, the protective light of the Torah is absent, and the people are vulnerable to corruption. While the Torah is accessible to all, and every great sage is metaphorically referred to as "Moshe," the root of this protective light originates directly from Moses himself.

The Priesthood (Kehuna) as a Response to Sin

Originally, the entire nation of Israel was intended to be a "Kingdom of Priests." However, because of the Golden Calf, this direct, universal priesthood was lost. The Kehuna was subsequently designated exclusively to Aaron and his sons, and the Tribe of Levi, because they did not participate in the Sin of the Golden Calf.

The establishment of the Mishkan and the specific designation of the Kehunah in this Parsha were a tikun (rectification) for the Golden Calf. If the Jewish people had not sinned, the divine revelation would have manifested in a purely meritorious way. Instead, because they sinned (kilkul), this specific system of the Mishkan had to be established. The Kohanim now draw their holiness from the hidden, collective holiness of the entire Jewish nation, acting as their representatives.

Why Moshes's Name is Missing from Parshas Tetzaveh

It is a well-known fact that Parshas Tetzaveh is the only Parsha (from the time of his birth) where Moshe's name is not mentioned. The traditional explanation is that Moshe said to God after the Golden Calf, "Erase me from Your book" if He was going to destroy the Jews. But this omission was not an punishment. The depth is that Moshes's essence is entirely pure and has absolutely no connection to sin or corruption (kilkul). Because the entire concept of the Mishkan and the specific Kehuna detailed in this Parsha came about as a result of a sin, God deliberately omitted Moshes's name. God did not want Moses's name associated with a system born out of spiritual failure.

The Connection to Purim and Eternal Light

There is a profound parallel between the Mishkan and the holiday of Purim. Just as the Mishkan was born out of the corruption of the Golden Calf, the miracle of Purim was born out of the corruption of the Jewish people (e.g., participating in King Ahashveirosh's feast and bowing to idols).

Despite originating from a place of sin, Purim reveals a sublime, brilliant spiritual light—so great that the Sages declare that even if all other holidays are nullified in the future, Purim will never be nullified. God allowed this immense light to be revealed specifically through the mechanism of their sin and subsequent repentance, demonstrating His boundless love for the Jewish people.

Answering the Core Question: The Voice of the Shechinah

As we said, the word "V'Ata" (And you) is a reference to the Shechinah (the Divine Presence). During this communication ot the Jewish people [vi-atah titzaveh], the Shechinah was speaking directly out of Moses's throat.

Therefore, when the voice says "elecha" (to you), it is actually the Shechinah referring to itself. It effectively means "to Me," but because God and Moshe were so unified in that moment, the phrasing seamlessly bridges the two. Furthermore, God uses this intimate language because the Priesthood and the Mishkan—though born of sin—have become incredibly precious (chaviva) to God, as they represent the ultimate reconciliation between Him and His people.

Conclusion: The Metaphor of the Rose

The discourse concludes with a beautiful metaphor from the Zohar regarding the Shoshana (rose), tying into the Purim song Shoshanas Yaakov. The Zohar notes that the more a thorn pricks a rose, the more fragrant the rose becomes.

Similarly, the kilkulim (sins, corruptions, and spiritual "pricks") of the Jewish people ultimately serve to bring out a deeper, more beautiful spiritual fragrance. Through their stumbling, the people are pushed toward repentance, resulting in the Mishkan, the Kehuna, and the eternal joy of Purim—transforming pain and sin into Ora, v'Simcha, v'Sasson, v'Yekar (light, joy, gladness, and honor).

השאלה המרכזית: "אליך" לעומת "אלי"

הדרשה פותחת בשאלה טקסטואלית בנוגע לניסוח בפרשת תצוה. הקב"ה מצווה את משה: "וְאַתָּה תְּצַוֶּה... וְיִקְחוּ אֵלֶיךָ" (ואתה תצווה את בני ישראל, ויקחו אליך...). מדוע הקב"ה משתמש במילה "אליך" (אליך/משה)? לכאורה, התרומות הן לה' ולא למשה, אז מדוע "אליך" [משה]? כמו כן, נאמר "וְאַתָּה הַקְרֵב אֵלֶיךָ אֶת אַהֲרֹן" (ואתה הקרב אליך את אהרן), והזוהר אומר ש"ואתה" מתייחס לא אחר מאשר לשכינה!! להבין...

**משה כמגן האולטימטיבי נגד היצר הרע**

כדי לענות על כך, עלינו להתעמק בתפקידו הרוחני של משה. הקב"ה ברא את היצר הרע וברא את התורה כתבלין שלו. מאחר שהתורה ניתנה באופן בלעדי דרך משה בסיני, הקשר הרוחני של האדם לנשמתו של משה הוא ההגנה העיקרית שלו מפני הרע.

דבר זה מוכח מחטא העגל. כל עוד משה היה נוכח פיזית, עם ישראל הוגן מפני הכישלון הרוחני העצום הזה. החטא התרחש רק כאשר משה עזב. כתוצאה מכך, הקב"ה אומר למשה "רד" מההר, משום שבלא נוכחותו, אור המגן של התורה נעדר, והעם חשוף לשחיתות. אמנם התורה נגישה לכולם, וכל חכם גדול מכונה במטאפורה "משה", אך שורש אור המגן הזה מקורו ישירות במשה עצמו.

**הכהונה כתגובה לחטא**

בתחילה, כל עם ישראל נועד להיות "ממלכת כהנים". אולם בגלל חטא העגל, הכהונה הישירה והאוניברסלית הזו אבדה. הכהונה הוקצתה לאחר מכן באופן בלעדי לאהרן ולבניו ולשבט לוי, משום שלא השתתפו בחטא העגל.

הקמת המשכן והייעוד הספציפי של הכהונה בפרשה זו היו תיקון לחטא העגל. אילו עם ישראל לא חטא, ההתגלות האלוקית הייתה מתגלה בדרך טהורה וראויה בלבד. אולם בגלל שהם חטאו (קלקול), נאלץ להיקבע מערכת ספציפית זו של המשכן. הכהנים שואבים כעת את קדושתם מהקדושה הנסתרת והכללית של כל עם ישראל, ומשמשים כנציגיהם.

**מדוע שמו של משה חסר בפרשת תצוה**

ידוע היטב שפרשת תצוה היא הפרשה היחידה (מאז לידתו) שבה שמו של משה אינו מוזכר. ההסבר המסורתי הוא שמשה אמר לה' לאחר חטא העגל: "מחקני מספרך" אם הוא עומד להשמיד את היהודים. אולם ההשמטה הזו אינה עונש. העומק הוא שמהותו של משה טהורה לחלוטין ואין לה כל קשר לחטא או לשחיתות. מאחר שכל מושג המשכן והכהונה הספציפית המפורטת בפרשה זו נולדו כתוצאה מחטא, הקב"ה השמיט במכוון את שמו של משה. הקב"ה לא רצה ששמו של משה יקושר למערכת שנולדה מכישלון רוחני.

**הקשר לפורים ולאור הנצחי**

ישנה מקבילה עמוקה בין המשכן לחג הפורים. כשם שהמשכן נולד מתוך הקלקול של חטא העגל, כך נס הפורים נולד מתוך הקלקול של עם ישראל (למשל, השתתפות בסעודת אחשוורוש והשתחוות לעבודה זרה).

למרות שמקורו במקום של חטא, הפורים מגלה אור רוחני נשגב ומזהיר – כל כך גדול, עד שחכמים הכריזו שאפילו אם כל החגים האחרים יתבטלו בעתיד, פורים לעולם לא יתבטל. הקב"ה אפשר להתגלות אור עצום זה דווקא דרך מנגנון החטא והתשובה שלאחריו, ובכך להדגים את אהבתו האינסופית לעם ישראל.

**תשובה לשאלה המרכזית: קול השכינה**

כפי שאמרנו, המילה "וְאַתָּה" (ואתה) היא רמז לשכינה (הנוכחות האלוקית). בזמן תקשורת זו אל עם ישראל [וְאַתָּה תְּצַוֶּה], השכינה דיברה ישירות מגרונו של משה.

לכן, כאשר הקול אומר "אֵלֶיךָ" (אליך), זה למעשה השכינה המתייחסת לעצמה. בפועל, הכוונה "אלי", אך מאחר שה' ומשה היו מאוחדים כל כך באותו רגע, הניסוח מגשר בצורה חלקה בין השניים. יתרה מזו, הקב"ה משתמש בשפה אינטימית זו משום שהכהונה והמשכן – אף שנולדו מחטא – הפכו יקרים מאוד (חביבה) בעיני ה', שכן הם מייצגים את ההשלמה האולטימטיבית בינו לבין עמו.

**מסקנה: המשל של השושנה**

הדרשה מסתיימת במשל יפהפה מהזוהר בנוגע לשושנה (ורד), הקשור לשיר הפורים "שושנת יעקב". הזוהר מציין שהכות יותר שקוץ דוקר שושנה, כך ריחה נעשה משובח יותר.

בדומה לכך, הקלקולים (חטאים, שחיתויות ו"דקירות" רוחניות) של עם ישראל משמשים בסופו של דבר להוציא ריח רוחני עמוק ויפה יותר. דרך מעידותיהם, העם נדחף לתשובה, וכתוצאה מכך נולדים המשכן, הכהונה ושמחת הפורים הנצחית – והופכים כאב וחטא לאורה, לשמחה, לששון וליקר (אור, שמחה, גיל והדר).

Piteda

Introduction: The Choshen and the Modern Struggle

The speaker, delivering a Torah lecture (shiur) ahead of Parshat Tetzaveh, focuses on the Choshen Mishpat—the High Priest’s breastplate, which contained twelve precious stones representing the twelve tribes of Israel. Specifically, he focuses on the second stone, the Piteda (פטדה), which corresponds to the tribe of Shimon.

The rabbi uses the concept of the Piteda stone as a profound metaphor for surviving the spiritual dangers of the modern era, specifically the "struggle of the networks"—the temptation, lewdness, and inappropriate content found on social media and the internet.

The Dual Nature of the Piteda Stone

To understand the stone's significance, the speaker brings several classical commentaries:

The Color and the Sin: According to Targum Onkelos and Rabbenu Bachya, the Piteda was a green stone. Rabbenu Bachya explains that this color was assigned to the tribe of Shimon to remind them of the sin of their leader, Zimri ben Salu, who publicly committed an act of gross immorality with a Midianite woman. The green color represents how the faces of the sinners "turned green" with shame and spiritual illness.

The Antidote to Lust: Rabbenu Bachya notes that this specific stone, found in the hot climate of Kush (Africa), has a unique mystical and physical property: it "cools the body" and suppresses physical lust. Thus, the stone was a spiritual remedy for the specific weakness of the tribe of Shimon.

The Positive Association: The Alshich offers a contrasting, positive reason for the stone. Shimon (along with Levi) famously defended the honor of their sister, Dina, destroying the city of Shechem after she was defiled. The Midrash Rabba supports this, noting that Shimon’s tribal flag was green and featured an image of the city of Shechem. Therefore, the Piteda does not merely represent a failure regarding immorality; it represents Shimon's zealous fight against immorality.

The Theological Dilemma: Why Remember a Sin?

The speaker then introduces a powerful question raised by the Toldot Yitzchak (Rabbi Yitzchak Caro): The High Priest wore the Choshen to seek divine guidance (via the Urim V'Tummim) and to invoke merit for the Jewish people. Why, then, would he wear a stone whose green color explicitly reminds God of Shimon's shameful sin?

The Toldot Yitzchak answers that remembering a past sin is only detrimental if the person is still attached to it. However, if a person has genuinely repented, distanced themselves from the sin, and proven they can resist the temptation, remembering the sin becomes a merit. It serves as proof of their spiritual triumph.

The Psychological Root of Sin: Sadness vs. Joy

Transitioning to the practical, the speaker explores the psychological mechanics of falling into sin, particularly on social media.

Why do people fall into the "abyss" of inappropriate content online? The speaker explains that the Evil Inclination (Yetzer Hara) uses sadness and depression as its primary weapon. When a person feels down, frustrated, or unsuccessful, the inclination offers them the "cheap comfort" of digital distractions and lewdness as a coping mechanism.

To combat this, the speaker cites Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (Orot HaTeshuvah), who explains that true repentance transforms intentional sins into merits. This realization should fill a person with immense joy. When a person is joyful and content with their spiritual journey, the "cheap thrills" of the internet lose their appeal.

The Ultimate Cure: Torah and a "Mouth of Thanks"

The speaker concludes by revealing the ultimate "cooling agents" for the burning temptations of the modern world, hidden within the symbolism of the Piteda:

Torah Study: Kabbalistically, the six edges of the Piteda stone correspond to the Sefirah of Tiferet, which represents the Torah. The ultimate way to cool the fires of physical lust is to immerse oneself in the intellectual and spiritual pursuit of Torah study (e.g., studying a daily page of Talmud).

Gratitude (Pi-Toda): The rabbi offers a beautiful homiletical play on words. The word Piteda (פטדה) can be split into two words: Pi Toda (פי תודה), meaning "A mouth of thanks."

Conclusion:

The speaker’s final message is that the way to survive the spiritual pitfalls of social media is not merely through white-knuckled avoidance, but through proactive positivity. A person must cultivate a Pi Toda—a mouth of gratitude. By constantly thanking God for one's life, successes, family, and spiritual opportunities, a person cultivates a state of joy. This joy, combined with the study of Torah, acts as the modern-day "Piteda stone," cooling the fires of negative temptations and protecting the soul.

Machlokes Shaul HaMelech And Shmuel HaNavi #2

Overview

This lecture explores the parameters of a Jewish King’s authority (Toras Melech / Din Melech), focusing on the historical dispute between King Saul (Shaul) and the Prophet Samuel (Shmuel). It delves into a king's extraordinary judicial powers, the Halachic distinctions between different types of wars, and how these laws apply to biblical events, including the story of Purim and the commandment to eradicate Amalek.

The Authority of the King (Tikun HaMedina)

The speaker begins by outlining the special judicial powers granted to a Jewish king.

Extraordinary Justice: According to the Rambam (Maimonides), a king is permitted to bypass standard Torah law—which usually requires formal warnings and two witnesses—for the sake of Tikun HaMedina (maintaining the order and stability of the state).

Rebellion (Mored B’Malchus): If a king issues a decree (even regarding religious or social matters, like modesty or Sabbath observance) and the people disobey, the king has the authority to judge and execute violators as rebels against the crown.

Individual vs. National Judgement: The speaker notes a key distinction: A king can only use these extraordinary powers (Din Melech) when judging an individual or a small group. If a king attempts to judge an entire city or the whole nation at once, it ceases to be a judicial matter and becomes classified as an act of war (Milchama), which falls under an entirely different set of rules.

Categories of War in Halacha

Drawing heavily on the Rambam’s Hilchos Melachim (Laws of Kings), the lecture defines the two primary categories of war:

Milchemes Mitzvah (Obligatory War):

Definition: This includes wars against the original Seven Canaanite Nations, the eradication of Amalek, and preemptive/defensive wars to save Jewish lives from an enemy.

Requirements: The king does not need the permission of the Sanhedrin (the high court of 71 judges) to wage this war. He can initiate it on his own authority.

Contemporary Context: Modern wars fought by the State of Israel to defend Jewish lives are not classified as Milchemes Mitzvah because we lack a king. However, Rav Kook ruled that without a formal king or Sanhedrin, the Jewish people possess the sovereign right to defend themselves.

Milchemes Reshus (Discretionary/Optional War):

Definition: Wars fought to expand Israel's borders, increase the king's wealth, or enhance the king's prestige.

Requirements: A king cannot wage this war independently. He absolutely requires the explicit approval of the Sanhedrin of 71 judges.

Biblical Case Studies

The speaker applies these laws to specific biblical narratives to explain the actions of various leaders:

1. King Rechavam and the Ten Tribes:

When the ten northern tribes seceded from the Kingdom of Judah, King Rechavam amassed an army to fight them. The Avnei Nezer asks: How could Rechavam wage war without the Sanhedrin? The answer is that the ten tribes were considered Mored B’Malchus (rebels against the Davidic dynasty). However, when a prophet intervened and told Rechavam that God forbade the war, the army immediately disbanded and went home. Since it was not a Milchemes Mitzva, the prophet had the right to cancel the war.

2. King Saul and Amalek:

King Saul was commanded to entirely wipe out the nation of Amalek (a Milchemes Mitzvah). However, he spared the Amalekite king, Agag, and the best of the livestock.

Who is obligated to destroy Amalek? While early authorities debate whether eradicating Amalek is solely the King's responsibility, the Sefer HaChinuch and Rambam rule that it is a Tzibur (communal) obligation that falls upon every individual Jew, not just the monarch.

The Purim Connection: Haman, Amalek, and the Spoils

The lecture concludes by connecting these Halachic principles to the Book of Esther:

Haman's Execution: Why was Haman, an Amalekite, hanged by King Achashverosh? Citing the Targum, the speaker explains that Achashverosh executed Haman under the legal category of Mored B’Malchus (rebelling against the king) because he planned to kill the king and to take over.

Refusing the Spoils: In the Megillah, it is emphasized that the Jews killed their enemies but "did not lay their hands on the spoils" (u'ba'biza lo sholchu es yadam). Rabbeinu Bachya explains that because their enemies were of the seed of Amalek, the Jews treated the war as a Milchemes Mitzvah to eradicate Amalek. According to Torah law, it is strictly forbidden to derive any personal benefit (Issur Hana'ah) from the property of Amalek. The Mechilta says [cited by Rashi] thatt here is even a mitzva to destroy all of their property. 

Conclusion and Unanswered Question

The speaker ends the class on a cliffhanger. If it is forbidden to benefit from the property of Amalek, and the Torah commands that Amalek's property be completely destroyed, why did the Jews in Shushan merely leave the property alone? Why didn't they actively destroy Haman's estate and the spoils, as Saul was commanded to do? Queen Esther even received Haman's estate. That can be explained by the fact that as a Mored Bi-malchus his property went to Achashveirosh. But why did the Jews not destroy the rest of the property of Amalek?

סקירה כללית

הרצאה זו בוחנת את פרמטרי סמכותו של מלך ישראל (תורת מלך / דין מלך), תוך התמקדות במחלוקת ההיסטורית בין המלך שאול לנביא שמואל. היא מעמיקה בכוחות השיפוטיים יוצאי הדופן של המלך, בהבחנות ההלכתיות בין סוגי מלחמות שונים, וכיצד חוקים אלה חלים על אירועים מקראיים, כולל סיפור פורים ומצוות מחיית עמלק.

סמכות המלך (תיקון המדינה)

המרצה מתחיל בתיאור הכוחות השיפוטיים המיוחדים המוקנים למלך ישראל.

משפט יוצא דופן: לפי הרמב"ם, מלך רשאי לעקוף את דין התורה הרגיל – הדורש בדרך כלל התראה והתראה ושני עדים – למען תיקון המדינה (שמירה על סדר ויציבות המדינה).

מורד במלכות: אם המלך גוזר גזירה (אפילו בענייני דת או חברה, כמו צניעות או שמירת שבת) והעם אינו מציית, רשאי המלך לדון ולהוציא להורג את העוברים כמורדים במלכות.

שיפוט פרטי לעומת לאומי: המרצה מציין הבחנה מרכזית: המלך יכול להשתמש בכוחות יוצאי דופן אלה (דין מלך) רק כאשר הוא דן ביחיד או בקבוצה קטנה. אם המלך מנסה לדון עיר שלמה או את כל האומה בבת אחת, הדבר אינו נחשב עוד לעניין שיפוטי אלא הופך למעשה מלחמה (מלחמה), הכפוף לסט כללים שונה לחלוטין.

קטגוריות המלחמה בהלכה

בהסתמך רבות על הלכות מלכים של הרמב"ם, ההרצאה מגדירה שתי קטגוריות עיקריות של מלחמה:

מלחמת מצווה (מלחמה חובה):

הגדרה: כוללת מלחמות נגד שבעת העממים המקוריים, מחיית עמלק, ומלחמות מנע/הגנה להצלת חיי יהודים מאויב.

דרישות: המלך אינו זקוק לרשות הסנהדרין (בית הדין הגדול של 71 דיינים) כדי לנהל מלחמה זו. הוא יכול לפתוח בה על דעת עצמו.

הקשר עכשווי: מלחמות מודרניות של מדינת ישראל להגנת חיי יהודים אינן מסווגות כמלחמת מצווה משום שאין לנו מלך. עם זאת, הרב קוק פסק כי בהיעדר מלך או סנהדרין רשמיים, לעם ישראל יש זכות ריבונית להגן על עצמו.

מלחמת רשות (מלחמה רשות/אופציונלית):

הגדרה: מלחמות להרחבת גבולות ישראל, הגדלת עושר המלך או העלאת יוקרתו.

דרישות: מלך אינו יכול לנהל מלחמה זו באופן עצמאי. הוא חייב לקבל אישור מפורש של הסנהדרין של 71 דיינים.

מקרי בוחן מקראיים

המרצה מיישם חוקים אלה על נרטיבים מקראיים ספציפיים כדי להסביר את מעשי מנהיגים שונים:

המלך רחבעם ועשרת השבטים:

כאשר עשרת השבטים הצפוניים פרשו ממלכות יהודה, רחבעם אסף צבא להילחם בהם. השאלה של האבני נזר: כיצד יכול רחבעם לנהל מלחמה ללא הסנהדרין? התשובה: עשרת השבטים נחשבו מורדים במלכות (מורדי בית דוד). אולם כאשר נביא התערב ואמר לרחבעם שה' אוסר את המלחמה, הצבא התפזר מיד והלך לביתו. מאחר שלא הייתה זו מלחמת מצווה, היה לנביא סמכות לבטל את המלחמה.

המלך שאול ועמלק:

שאול נצטווה למחות את עמלק לחלוטין (מלחמת מצווה). אולם הוא חס על אגג מלך עמלק ועל מיטב הבהמה.

מי חייב למחות את עמלק? בעוד שראשונים מתווכחים אם מחיית עמלק היא אחריותו הבלעדית של המלך, ספר החינוך והרמב"ם פוסקים כי זו מצווה של ציבור החלה על כל יהודי באופן אישי, ולא רק על המלך.

הקשר לפורים: המן, עמלק והשלל

ההרצאה מסיימת בקישור עקרונות הלכתיים אלה למגילת אסתר:

הוצאת המן להורג: מדוע המן העמלקי נתלה על ידי המלך אחשוורוש? בהסתמך על התרגום, המרצה מסביר שאחשוורוש הוציא את המן להורג תחת קטגוריית מורד במלכות, משום שתכנן להרוג את המלך ולתפוס את השלטון.

סירוב לשלל: במגילה מודגש שהיהודים הרגו את אויביהם אך "לא שלחו את ידם בביזה" (ובביזה לא שלחו את ידם). רבנו בחיי מסביר: מאחר שהאויבים היו מזרע עמלק, היהודים התייחסו למלחמה כמלחמת מצווה למחיית עמלק. לפי דין תורה, אסור להפיק כל הנאה אישית (איסור הנאה) מרכוש עמלק. המכילתא אומרת (כפי שמצטט רש"י) שיש אפילו מצווה להשמיד את כל רכושם.

מסקנה ושאלה פתוחה

המרצה מסיים את השיעור בסימן שאלה. אם אסור להפיק תועלת מרכוש עמלק, והתורה מצווה להשמיד לחלוטין את רכוש עמלק, מדוע היהודים בשושן רק השאירו את הרכוש במקומו? מדוע לא השמידו באופן אקטיבי את רכוש המן והשלל, כפי ששאול נצטווה? אפילו המלכה אסתר קיבלה את רכוש המן. זאת ניתן להסביר בכך שכמורד במלכות, רכושו עבר לאחשוורוש. אך מדוע היהודים לא השמידו את שאר רכוש עמלק?

Why Does Religion Sometimes Make People Evil?

Introduction: Sharing a World 

A. N. Wilson begins his tract Against Religion with the following words: 

It is said in the Bible that the love of money is the root of all evil. It might be truer to say that the love of God is the root of all evil. Religion is the tragedy of mankind. It appeals to all that is noblest, purest, loftiest in the human spirit, and yet there scarcely exists a religion which has not been responsible for wars, tyrannies and the suppression of the truth. 

As a religious leader I do not take that proposition lightly. I spent the whole of the Gulf War in Israel with my family, watching our children put on their gas-masks as, thirty-nine times, Scud missiles rained down on civilian targets in a country not at war with Iraq. None of us knew until the war was over whether the next would contain chemical weapons. I know that religion kills. 

But so does the absence of religion. People have killed in the name of God. But their crimes do not rival the crimes of those who have killed believing that they were gods. The greatest crimes of this century, those of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, were committed by secular regimes, and they remind us of the force of the words of Abraham, “I said to myself, ‘There is no fear of God in this place, and they will kill me’” (Genesis 20:11). Christian theologians have written about Christian guilt for the Holocaust, and there can be no denying that racial antisemitism had its roots in religious anti-Judaism. Nonetheless, the distinguished Jewish historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi has argued that Christianity, so long as it was the dominant belief, actually prevented a Holocaust. Christians had every interest in preserving Jews, albeit as pariahs, as evidence of the truth of Christianity. The Holocaust, he says, was possible only when religious prejudice was freed from religious restraints. George Steiner traces a direct line in German thought from Nietzsche’s declaration of the “death of God” to the attempted murder, sixty years later, of the people of God. 

Wilson’s critique is too easy. Religion is not the source of evil. Humanity is, and religion is sometimes powerless to prevent it. But a question remains. How is it that a religion based on love can have a history of hate, and one which values peace can engage in holy war? 

It was Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Moral Man and Immoral Society, who pointed out the difference between the behaviour of individuals and groups. Individuals “are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind.” They can behave with great altruism. Once organised into groups, however, “there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism.” That difference is magnified when applied to religion. 

Traditions of faith bind us together as communities. Through our several religious heritages we arrive at a special sense of kinship and compassion towards those who share our belief and way of life. But the very walls we build around ourselves for mutual protection serve to divide us from those who do not belong to the group. Forming an “Us” also creates a “Them.” There is a difference between insiders and outsiders. “We have truth, they do not. We have the salvation that they are denied.” It is relatively easy to love our neighbour as ourself. It is considerably more difficult to love the stranger, the outsider, the one whose way of life is so unlike our own. The stronger are the bonds of fellowship within a community, the more likely is there to be suspicion and fear of those outside. That is why a religion, even as it promotes peace within its own borders, can inspire war across the frontiers of faith. 

This fact is always disturbing, but there are times when it is simply intolerable. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, those who had seen into the abyss came to a conclusion: Never again. Never again should hostility be allowed to fester between peoples, races and religions, for the road that begins with hatred in the heart can end in attempted genocide. Thus began the great conversation across faiths, most notably between Judaism and Christianity, in an effort to find another way. Dialogue has been one of the great religious achievements of the past half-century, and it has promoted a new mood of mutual understanding and respect. But its work has hardly begun. There are too many parts of the world and too many faith communities it has not yet touched. Religion is still used to defend ethnic or national rivalries, and it still claims human sacrifices. 

In Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Bosnia and elsewhere, religion fuels the flames of conflict, justifying the unjustifiable and allowing people to believe that by aggression, terrorism and murder they contribute to the greater glory of God. At such times the voice of religious leadership must be heard, loud and unequivocally, saying: This is not the way. God is found in life, not death; in reconciliation, not hate; in justice, not vengeance; in peace, not war. 

The rabbis of the first centuries of the Common Era communicated profound truths in a deceptively simple way. Commenting on the phrase “the God of faith” (Deuteronomy 32:4) they said, “This means the God who had faith in the world He was about to create.” In that sentence lies an extraordinary suggestion of the risk God took when He made mankind. 

Biblical faith, with its emphasis on free will and responsibility, constantly holds before us the paradox of human history. There are times when we scale the heights of goodness. But there are others when we descend to the depths of evil. Modern thought has focused on the wrong question. It has asked how God could have created nature. The rabbis posed a question altogether more profound. How could God have created man? It is one thing to believe that God in His goodness made the universe. It is another to believe that God in His goodness made a form of life, homo sapiens, capable of inflicting untold cruelty and suffering on its own members. The Torah says that before the Flood, contemplating the violence that filled the world, God “regretted that He had made man on earth and His heart was filled with pain” (Genesis 6:6). After Auschwitz, that verse echoes with almost unbearable pathos. 

The rabbis gave a remarkable answer. Creation testifies not merely to God’s power but also, as it were, to His belief in mankind. At the heart of religion is not just the faith we have in God. No less significant is the faith God has in us. That faith is surely often tested. It is tested when we turn our back on God. It is tested no less when we commit evil in His name. Yet He does not lose faith that one day we will learn this: that God has given us many universes of faith but only one world in which to live together.

"Faith in the Future"

Journeys Into A Kohen Gadol's Marriage Prospects #4

Introduction and Context

This fascinating lecture is the fourth in a series focusing on the halachic definitions regarding a Kohen Gadol marrying a besulah and the broader legal status of a bogeres (a mature maiden, over the age of twelve and a half).

The speaker begins by recapping a central issue from the previous class: According to the Tanna Rabbi Shimon, the term besulah in the Torah strictly implies a besulah shleimah—a "complete virgin," which halachically translates to a na'arah (a young maiden), specifically excluding a bogeres.

The Foundational Questions (Kashes)

If Rabbi Shimon maintains that a bogeres is categorically not considered a besulah shleimah, the speaker raises several logical questions regarding the need for specific Torah verses:

The Fine for rape (Knas Ones): Why does the Torah need a specific verse to exclude a bogeres from receiving the statutory fine given to a rapist? If she isn't a besulah shleimah, it should be obvious she is excluded.

The Capital Penalty for Rape (Knas Oness): Similarly, why is a specific verse needed to exclude a bogeres from the capital penalty of stoning when one rapes a na'arah me'orasah (a betrothed maiden)?

The Case of Ten Men: In Tractate Kesubos, there is a theoretical case where ten men must pay a fine if they rape a girl in an irregular way [she'lo ki-darka]. If the woman is not a besulah shleimah after the first time, how can the fine be applied at all to the other acts?

The Core Conceptual Distinction: Status vs. Action

To answer these questions, the speaker introduces a fundamental conceptual distinction (yesod) based on a discussion in Tractate Yevamos (61b) and the commentary of Tosafos.

The Gemara discusses the rule that a Kohen Gadol [who may only marry a besulah] cannot marry a ketanah (minor). The text implies [and is thus understood by the Braisa] that only a na'arah is a besulah. Tosafos asks: If the definition of besulah is already established as a na'arah, why does the Torah ever need to use use both words?

The speaker resolves this by explaining that there are two entirely separate ways to define a besulah:

Hagdoras HaMahus (Essential Status/Title): This defines the woman's personal, legal status (shem gavrah). In terms of her essence and title, only a na'arah holds the complete title of a besulah. Once she becomes a bogeres, she loses this overarching legal title.

Hagdoras HaBiah (Definition of the Physical Act): This has nothing to do with her age or legal title, but rather her physical state regarding intimacy. Even if a woman is technically a bogeres (and lacks the status of a being a full besulah), if she has never had relations, the act of being with her is still defined as a biah (relations) with a besulah.

Applying the Distinction to Resolve the Questions

With this duality established, the speaker seamlessly resolves the initial questions:

Regarding the Kohen Gadol: The Torah commands that a Kohen Gadol must marry a besulah. Because this law is about imbuing a legal status and title (hacholas hashem), it demands a woman who possesses the essential status of a besulah (a na'arah). Therefore, he cannot marry a bogeres [or a ketanah for that matter], even if she is physically intact, because she lacks the essential legal title.

Regarding the Fines (Knas) and Capital Punishment: Why do we need specific verses to exclude a bogeres from the financial penalty of rape or the capital punishment of na'ara ha'meurasa? Because unlike marrying the Kohen Gadol (which requires a status), a fine or other punishment is generated by an action (ma'aseh) done to the woman. Because a virgin bogeres partial still physically has the Hagdoras HaBiah of a virgin, doing an action to her is still considered an action done to a besulah. Therefore, without a specific Torah verse excluding her, one would assume the violator does owe the fine or receive the punishment. The Torah must explicitly write her out of the penalty.

The Concept of "Miktsas" (A Partial Status)

The speaker deepens the analysis by exploring the concept of a miktsas besulah—a "partial virgin" (which a bogeres is considered to be)—and comparing it to other areas of Halacha where a "partial" status exists:

Laws of Impurity (Tumah): The speaker cites a law regarding a regular Kohen becoming impure for his deceased sister. The Torah requires a specific derivation (ribui) to teach that a Kohen can become impure for a sister who is a bogeres. Without this special inclusion, we would assume that since she is only a miktsas besulah, she doesn't qualify. In this case we are dealing with Hagdoras Mahus. She is only defined as a besulah if she is a complete besulah [if not for the ribui in the pasuk]. 

Collecting a Partial Kesubah (Miktsas Kesef): In Kesubos (97b), the Gemara links this concept to a ruling by Rabbi Shimon regarding a woman who has already collected a portion of her kesubah (marriage contract funds). Rabbi Shimon holds the principle that miktsas kesef (a partial monetary amount) is not treated as the whole. Meaning, if she collects part of the kesubah, she cannot collect the rest while maintaining the original, fully intact status of the contract (and she consequently loses associated rights, like mezonos/sustenance). The Gemara draws a direct parallel: just as Rabbi Shimon holds that a partial kesubah loses its overarching complete legal status, he holds that a miktsas besulah (a partial virgin) loses the overarching complete legal status of a besulah.

Conclusion: The Ultimate Rule of "Ma'aseh" vs "Hagdara"

The speaker concludes by summarizing the ultimate Talmudic mechanism at play—a linguistic and legal debate about how titles are applied in Jewish law:

If a law relies on Hagdoras Mahus (a defined essence or title, like the wife of a Kohen Gadol or the collection of a complete kesubah), a miktsas (partial status) is invalid. It must be 100% complete.

If a law relies on a Ma'aseh (a physical action done to a person, such as the act of rape or seduction), an action done to a partial status is still considered a valid action. Therefore, she would theoretically be included in the fines, which is exactly why the Torah had to provide specific verses to explicitly exclude her.

**מבוא והקשר**  

הרצאה מרתקת זו היא הרביעית בסדרה העוסקת בהגדרות ההלכתיות בנוגע לנישואי כהן גדול עם **בְּתוּלָה**, וכן במעמד ההלכתי הרחב יותר של **בּוֹגֶרֶת** (נערה בוגרת, מעל גיל שתים עשרה וחצי).

המרצה פותח בסיכום נקודה מרכזית מהשיעור הקודם: לפי התנא רבי שמעון, המונח **בְּתוּלָה** שבתורה מציין באופן מחמיר **בְּתוּלָה שְׁלֵמָה** – כלומר בתולה שלמה, שמבחינה הלכתית פירושו **נַעֲרָה**, וזאת תוך שלילת **בּוֹגֶרֶת** באופן מוחלט.

**השאלות היסודיות (קושיות)**  

אם רבי שמעון סובר שבוגרת אינה נחשבת כלל לבתולה שלמה, מעלה המרצה מספר שאלות הגיוניות בנוגע לצורך בפסוקים ספציפיים בתורה:

- **קנס אונס**: מדוע נזקקת התורה לפסוק מיוחד כדי לפטור בוגרת מקנס האונס? אם היא אינה בתולה שלמה, הרי זה אמור להיות מובן מאליו שהיא פטורה.

- **עונש מיתה באונס נערה מאורסה**: באופן דומה, מדוע נדרש פסוק מיוחד כדי לפטור בוגרת מעונש הסקילה באונס **נַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה**?

- **מקרה עשרה אנשים**: במסכת כתובות מוזכר מקרה תיאורטי שבו עשרה אנשים חייבים בקנס אם אנסו נערה **שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ**. אם לאחר הפעם הראשונה האישה כבר אינה בתולה שלמה, כיצד בכלל ניתן לחייב בקנס גם על שאר המעשים?

**ההבחנה המושגית המרכזית: מעמד מול מעשה**  

כדי לענות על שאלות אלו, מציג המרצה יסוד מרכזי (יסוד) המבוסס על דיון במסכת יבמות (דף ס"א ע"ב) ועל פירוש התוספות.

הגמרא דנה בכלל שכהן גדול [הרשאי לשאת רק בתולה] אינו יכול לשאת **קְטַנָּה**. הברייתא משתמעת מכך שרק **נַעֲרָה** היא בתולה. התוספות שואלים: אם הגדרת בתולה כבר קבועה כנערה, מדוע התורה בכלל משתמשת בשני המונחים?

המרצה פותר זאת בהסבר שקיימות **שתי הגדרות נפרדות לחלוטין** של בתולה:

- **הַגְדָּרַת הַמָּהוּת** (מעמד מהותי / שֵׁם גָּבְרָא): זו הגדרה של המעמד המשפטי-אישי של האישה (שמה ותוארה). מבחינת מהותה ותוארה, רק **נַעֲרָה** נושאת את התואר המלא של בתולה. ברגע שהיא הופכת לבוגרת – היא מאבדת את התואר המשפטי הכולל הזה.

- **הַגְדָּרַת הַבִּיאָה** (הגדרת המעשה הפיזי): אין לה כל קשר לגיל או לתואר המשפטי, אלא למצבה הפיזי ביחס לביאה. גם אם אישה היא טכנית **בּוֹגֶרֶת** (וחסרה את המעמד המלא של בתולה), אם מעולם לא נבעלה – מעשה הביאה איתה עדיין מוגדר כ**בִּיאָה בְּבְתוּלָה**.

**יישום ההבחנה לפתרון הקושיות**  

עם דואליות זו מבוססת, המרצה פותר את השאלות הראשוניות בצורה חלקה:

- **באשר לכהן גדול**: התורה מצווה שכהן גדול ישא **בְּתוּלָה**. מאחר שדין זה עוסק בהחלת מעמד משפטי ותואר (**הַחֲלָת הַשֵּׁם**), הוא דורש אישה בעלת **הגדרת המהות** של בתולה (נערה). לכן אסור לו לשאת בוגרת [וגם לא קטנה], גם אם היא שלמה פיזית, משום שהיא חסרה את התואר המהותי.

- **באשר לקנסות ולעונש מיתה**: מדוע נדרשים פסוקים מיוחדים כדי לפטור בוגרת מקנס אונס או מעונש מיתה של נערה מאורסה? משום שבניגוד לנישואי כהן גדול (הדורשים מעמד), קנס או עונש נוצרים כתוצאה מ**מַעֲשֶׂה** שנעשה לאישה. מאחר שבוגרת בתולה עדיין מחזיקה ב**הגדרת הביאה** של בתולה, מעשה שנעשה לה עדיין נחשב כמעשה שנעשה לבתולה. לכן, ללא פסוק מפורש ששולל אותה, היינו אומרים שהאונס חייב בקנס או בעונש. התורה חייבת לכתוב במפורש את הפטור.

**מושג ה"מִקְצָת" (מעמד חלקי)**  

המרצה מעמיק את הניתוח ובוחן את מושג **מִקְצַת בְּתוּלָה** (בתולה חלקית – מעמדה של בוגרת) ומשווה אותו לתחומים נוספים בהלכה שבהם קיים מעמד "חלקי":

- **דיני טומאה**: המרצה מביא את הדין שכהן רגיל יכול להיטמא לאחותו הבוגרת רק מכוח **רִבּוּי** מיוחד בפסוק. ללא הריבוי, היינו אומרים שאם היא רק **מִקְצַת בְּתוּלָה**, היא אינה נכללת. כאן מדובר בהגדרת המהות – היא מוגדרת כבתולה רק אם היא בתולה שלמה [אלמלא הריבוי].

- **גביית מִקְצַת כְּתֻבָּה**: בכתובות (דף צ"ז ע"ב) מקשרת הגמרא זאת לדעת רבי שמעון באישה שכבר גבתה חלק מכתובתה. רבי שמעון סובר ש**מִקְצַת כֶּסֶף** אינו נחשב כשלם – כלומר, אם גבתה חלק, היא מאבדת את המעמד המלא של הכתובה ואת הזכויות הנלוות (כגון מזונות). הגמרא מושכת קו ישיר: כשם שרבי שמעון סובר שמִקְצַת כסף מאבד את המעמד השלם, כך הוא סובר ש**מִקְצַת בְּתוּלָה** מאבדת את המעמד השלם של בתולה.

**סיכום: הכלל העליון – "מַעֲשֶׂה" מול "הַגְדָּרָה"**  

המרצה מסכם את המנגנון התלמודי העליון – דיון לשוני ומשפטי על אופן החלת תארים בהלכה:

- אם הדין תלוי ב**הגדרת המהות** (כגון אשת כהן גדול או כתובה שלמה), **מִקְצָת** אינה תקפה – חייב להיות 100% שלם.

- אם הדין תלוי ב**מַעֲשֶׂה** (מעשה פיזי שנעשה לאדם, כגון אונס או פיתוי), מעשה שנעשה כלפי מעמד חלקי עדיין נחשב מעשה תקף. לכן היא הייתה אמורה להיכלל בקנסות – וזו בדיוק הסיבה שהתורה נדרשה לכתוב פסוקים מפורשים כדי לשלול אותה במפורש.

The Heavy Price of Honor: A Lesson from the Mishkan

Introduction: The Joy and the Tragedy

The Shiur delves into the events surrounding the inauguration of the Mishkan (Tabernacle), transitioning from Parshas Tzav to Parshas Shmini. For seven days—the Yemei Miluim—Moshe Rabbeinu commanded Aharon and his sons not to leave the Ohel Moed (Tent of Meeting). On the eighth day, the ultimate joy of the Mishkan’s dedication was shattered by a profound tragedy: the sudden death of Aharon’s two eldest sons, Nadav and Avihu.

Following their death, Moshe comforts Aharon with a cryptic statement (Vayikra 10:3): "This is what Hashem spoke, saying, 'Through those near to Me I will be sanctified (B'krovai Ekadesh), and before all the people I will be glorified.'"

The Core Question: Why the "Hint"?

Rashi, quoting the Medrash, points back to a verse in Parshas Tetzaveh (29:43): "And there I will meet with the children of Israel, and it shall be sanctified by My glory (V'nikdash Bichvodi)." The Medrash states: Do not read Bichvodi (My glory), but rather Bimchubadai (Through My honored ones).

Moshe tells Aharon: "I knew the Mishkan would be sanctified through those closest to Hashem. I thought it would be either me or you. Now I see that Nadav and Avihu were greater than us."

The speaker raises a powerful question: What was the purpose of Hashem hinting at this tragedy beforehand? If Moshe didn't fully understand the hint, and if the hint didn't prevent the tragedy, why did Hashem give it? A warning is only useful if it can prevent disaster.

The Social Dynamics of the Mishkan: A Monopoly on Honor

To answer this, the speaker paints a vivid picture of the social dynamics among the Jewish people at that moment. Imagine the scene: A nation of millions (men, women, and children) gathers around the newly built Mishkan. Among all these millions—including the Leviim, the Nesiim (princes of the tribes), and even Moshe himself—only five people were chosen to perform the Avodah (service): Aharon and his four sons.

This created an unprecedented concentration of Kavod (honor). When only a select few are granted ultimate prestige, it naturally breeds a dangerous spiritual environment. Jealousy, resentment, and a pursuit of honor can easily take root among the people. Everyone else becomes a "spectator" while these five men receive all the glory.

The Warning: The Lethal Nature of "Kavod"

Hashem’s hint—"Sanctified through My honored ones"—was not merely a fatalistic prophecy; it was a severe warning about the nature of Kavod.

The Mishkan is the epicenter of holiness. In such a place, ego, pride (Ga'avah), and the pursuit of honor are lethal. Hashem was warning the people: Be incredibly careful with honor. The pursuit of Kavod is so dangerous that even the greatest and most honored individuals (Nadav and Avihu) could lose their lives if there was even the slightest miscalculation in their spiritual boundaries or their perception of their own honor.

Practical Mussar: Escaping the Trap of Ego

The speaker masterfully transitions this historical event into a practical lesson for our daily lives, particularly within our own "Mishkanot" communities.

How often do people fight over Kavod? The speaker notes that people will create lifelong disputes over shul honors: Who gets the Aliyah? Who sits at the Mizrach (the eastern wall/head table)? Who gets to pay for the building?

He shares a sharp anecdote about two wealthy men arguing over who gets the "privilege" of paying for a new Shul. One says, "I want to pay for it all!" and the other says, "No, I want to pay for it!" Rather than compromising, they let the project stall. This is not about building a Shul for Hashem; this is about Kavod—the desire to be the sole benefactor.

The Antidote: Humility and Silence

Quoting great sages like the Chazon Ish and the Steipler Gaon, the speaker emphasizes that the root of many sins, especially Loshon Hara (slander) and communal strife, is Ga'avah (arrogance). When a person feels their honor has been slighted, they retaliate.

The ultimate takeaway from the tragedy of Nadav and Avihu and the dedication of the Mishkan is the necessity of Anivus (humility). Real honor belongs exclusively to Hashem.

The speaker concludes with a powerful directive: Learn to take a slight in silence. If someone insults you, or if you don't get the honor you feel you deserve, remain silent. Passing over one's rights (Ma'avir al Midosav) and ignoring an offense is the highest level of spiritual refinement. We must remove our own egos to make room for the Kavod of Hashem.