Thursday, April 2, 2026

בין מטר לטל: על גלות, גאולה ושתי התורות

פסוקי שיר השירים, המתארים את בוא האביב – "כִּי הִנֵּה הַסְּתָיו עָבַר הַגֶּשֶׁם חָלַף הָלַךְ לוֹ" – נושאים בחובם משמעות עמוקה הרבה מעבר לתיאור חילופי העונות. חז"ל במדרש מלמדים כי ה"סתיו" וה"גשם" הם משל לתקופות החשוכות של גלויות ישראל – ממצרים ובבל ועד גלות אדום הארוכה. אך כאן עולה תמיהה: הרי במקומות רבים בתלמוד נמשל הגשם לברכה העילאית ביותר, ליום שקול כנגד מתן תורה ובריאת שמיים וארץ? כיצד הופך הגשם, סמל השפע, לסמל של שעבוד וקושי?

התשובה טמונה במהותם של הגשמים ושל הכוחות הפועלים בעולם. הגשם, בבסיסו, הוא כוח חיובי שנועד להצמיח ולתת "לחם לאוכל". כך גם אומות העולם: בתוכנית האלוקית המקורית, תפקידן הוא לשמש כ"איכריכם וכורמיכם" – לסייע לישראל בענייני החומר כדי שיוכלו להתפנות לעבודת ה'. עבור מי שדבק בתורה, המציאות החומרית ואומות העולם הם כלי עזר מברך.

אולם, כאשר האדם הופך ל"עובר דרך" – כזה הסוטה מדרך ה' – המציאות משתנה. עבורו, הגשם הופך למטרד המקשה על הדרך, ואומות העולם הופכות למשעבדות המצרות את צעדיו. זוהי הסיבה שהכהן הגדול ביום הכיפורים מתפלל שלא תיכנס לפני ה' תפילתם של עוברי דרכים: כדי שהעיכובים האישיים של מי שאינו בדרך הישר, לא ימנעו את שפע הברכה הכללי מלהגיע לעולם.

מכאן אנו למדים על ההבדל המהותי בין שתי צורות של גילוי אלוקי: הגשם והטל, המקבילים לתורה שבכתב ולתורה שבעל פה.

התורה שבכתב נמשלה לגשם. היא יורדת ב"גבורה" ישירות מן השמיים, בקולות וברקים. בדומה לגשם היורד מתוך עננים המכסים את עין השמיים, כך גם התורה שבכתב ניתנה מתוך ענן וערפל. מדוע? כיוון שהאור האלוקי שבה כה חזק, שאין ביכולתו של אדם לראות את כבודו של הקדוש ברוך הוא "באספקלריה מאירה" ולחיות. הענן הוא הכיסוי המאפשר לנו לקבל את הדברים.

לעומתה, התורה שבעל פה נמשלה לטל. הטל יורד בשקט, ב"לחישה", בשעה שהשמיים זכים ונטולי עננים. הוא אינו נראה בשעת ירידתו, והוא נדמה כנובע מתוך המציאות עצמה. כך היא התורה שבעל פה: היא נראית כאילו החכמים הם אלו שמחדשים אותה בכוח שכלם, אך באמת היא דברי אלוהים חיים המופיעים דרך כלי הקיבול האנושי.

חלוקה זו באה לידי ביטוי במעגל השנה:

בחג הסוכות ובשמיני עצרת, אנו מתחילים להתפלל על הגשם. זהו הזמן המקושר למתן הלוחות השניים ביום הכיפורים – שיא הגילוי של התורה שבכתב. אנו מבקשים שהשפע השמימי ירד אלינו, ושתורת ה' תהיה לנו לברכה ולא לדין.

לעומת זאת, בחג הפסח אנו עוברים לבקש על הטל. פסח הוא חגו של אברהם אבינו, איש החסד, והתורה שבעל פה היא "תורת חסד" הדורשת עמל של לימוד והוראה. הטל של פסח הוא "טלא דעתיקא" – אותו טל רוחני שעתיד להחיות מתים. ביציאת מצרים זכו ישראל להתעלות רוחנית עליונה (עד בחינת 'כתר'), שהייתה הכנה למתן תורה. אמנם הלוחות הראשונים נשברו בעקבות החטא, אך הטל שאנו מבקשים בפסח נועד לתקן את הכל, להחיות את הנשמות ולהכין אותנו לקבלת התורה מחדש בשבועות.

בסופו של דבר, השילוב בין שתי התורות הוא המפתח: על ידי עמל התורה שבעל פה (הטל), אנו מזככים את עצמנו כך שנוכל לקבל גם את התורה שבכתב (הגשם) כמתנה מלטפת ומצמיחה, ובכך להפוך את העולם כולו למקום של ברכה וגאולה.

נסיה בת הילה

Little girl severely injured by missile in Bnei Brak. 

Many New Shiurim Including ...

 .. this !!

The Architecture of Erasure: Why the World Blames Israel for Everything

 The Architecture of Erasure: Why the World Blames Israel for Everything

One cannot scroll for five seconds in online conversations of left-wing people without being reminded that Palestine is the great moral cause of our time, and Israel is the catch-all culprit for every crime and catastrophe. The louder the blame becomes, the less anyone sees the real dangers closing in. Perhaps that has been the point all along.

What strikes me repeatedly in conversations about the Middle East is how completely Hamas vanishes from the moral universe these activists inhabit. Their worldview depends on a singular, rigid rule: Palestinians are eternal victims, and Israel is the only actor with agency. In this framework, Hamas is not treated as a real organization; it becomes a narrative prop, a placeholder stripped of intention or responsibility so that all moral weight can be shifted onto the Jewish state.

As the writer Dara Horn aptly noted in People Love Dead Jews: “The world only loves Jews when they are victims; it has no stomach for Jews who defend themselves.”

Under this fixed narrative, Hamas never uses hospitals as interrogation centers; rather, "Israel bombs hospitals." Hamas never hides behind children; "Israel kills children." Hamas never steals aid; "Israel starves Gaza."

Israel can and should be criticized like any other state, yet what we see today isn’t criticism—it is a reflexive reassignment of guilt, no matter who actually committed the act. Recent revelations capture this pattern with uncomfortable clarity. The Associated Press reported that women in Gaza were being pressured to trade sexual favors for aid by local Hamas officials who controlled distribution networks. Yet, within hours, videos circulated blaming Israel for the "humiliation" of Gazan women. Hamas vanished from the story as if by muscle memory, and Israel absorbed the outrage belonging to the perpetrators.

Then came the discovery of vast stockpiles of infant formula hidden by Hamas, even as The New York Times, TIME Magazine, and the UN accused Israel of "starving children" with virtually no mention of the terror group’s hoarding. This misdirection worked so effectively that Hamas stopped even pretending. They hijacked aid trucks in broad daylight while the world scolded Israel for blocking them. They ate lavish meals in stocked tunnels while Western crowds insisted Israel was the cause of famine.

As John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point, observed: “Israel has implemented more measures to prevent civilian casualties than any other nation in history, yet it is the only nation held to a standard of perfection that no other military is expected to meet.”

Internal Hamas documents now confirm that Gaza’s humanitarian system was never separate from the terror group. NGOs were not independent; they operated inside a parallel structure designed to control aid and deflect blame. Western governments treated NGO reports as neutral, even as appointed Hamas liaisons sat inside the very organizations producing the data. By the time this became public, the narrative had already taken on a life of its own.

We should have known better. We are an educated society with instant access to history, yet whenever antisemitism resurfaces, common sense is the first casualty. At present, the air is thick with its absence. If Israel wanted to kill civilians indiscriminately, Gaza would have been emptied in a week. Instead, roughly 97 percent of Gazans have survived a war fought in the most militarized civilian environment on earth. That alone is the rebuttal. But evidence means nothing when a moral worldview depends on archetypes: one people assigned the world’s sins while their enemies are absolved of theirs.

This mirrors the dynamics of "parentification" in dysfunctional relationships, where one partner becomes the perpetual adult responsible for everything, and the other becomes the perpetual child responsible for nothing. One carries the entire moral load; the other is exempt from accountability. Scale that psychology up, and you get modern anti-Israel activism.

We are living in a moment where political identity overrides moral reasoning. Hamas vanishes because acknowledging its agency would shatter the moral architecture of the narrative. Israel becomes the only moral actor in the story, held responsible not only for its own actions but for those of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and even ISIS. This is "splitting" on a societal scale: Palestinians must be pure, Israel must be evil, and anything that complicates that binary is rejected.

History shows what happens when societies fixate on Jews instead of the forces actually dismantling them. Europe’s worst collapses began when fear and frustration were redirected onto Jews while real threats gathered unchecked. That fixation has simply migrated from Jewish communities to the only Jewish state. As the late Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks warned: “The hate that begins with Jews never ends with Jews. It is a virus that destroys the host society.”

René Girard’s work on scapegoating explains this perfectly. When a society is overwhelmed by chaos or guilt, it unconsciously unifies itself by projecting its anxieties onto a single group. Today, that scapegoat is Israel. It is an impossible and irrational burden that reappears every century. In this universe, Jews are not the targets of hatred but its source. Every attack is dismissed as a "hoax." Every atrocity is laundered into a "false flag."

This creates a "double bind"—the "heads you win, tails I lose" structure. Israel exists in a system where any action, whether restraint or force, becomes proof of guilt. Any comment mildly sympathetic to Israel is met with accusations of being a "paid bot." When Israel’s contestant came second in Eurovision, it was a "Zionist plot." Had she placed lower, it would have been "proof the world hates Zionism." When the conclusion is predetermined, every outcome is recycled to prop up the same story.

The projection is staggering. AIPAC is cast as a shadowy puppet-master, yet Qatar runs one of the most aggressive and well-funded foreign-influence operations in U.S. history, pouring billions into universities and media. Israel is portrayed as manipulating information, while the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera—a state arm of a monarchy that hosts Hamas leadership—functions as the single most influential media empire shaping the global narrative.

This is the oldest defense mechanism: the aggressor disowns their violence by attributing it to the target. It is psychologically easier to accuse the victim than to confront the violence of your own side. Psychologists call this asymmetric agency bias: full agency is assigned to those perceived as powerful, while those framed as "oppressed" are granted a moral license for any atrocity.

A society that cannot correctly identify threats will not survive them. This is why, when a gunman scrawls antisemitic slogans on his rifle, the internet insists "Zionists added them." Why conspiracy networks claim Israel enacted a "Hannibal Directive" to murder its own citizens on October 7. The inversion is structural.

Israel is condemned as a "colonial project," yet the longest-running imperial enterprise in the region was the 1,300-year Arab-Muslim empire built on conquest and enslavement. That history is ignored while Jews—the indigenous people of the land—are cast as the architects of "racial domination." The accusation does not describe Jewish history; it describes the history of the accusers.

As Golda Meir famously said: "We will only have peace with the Arabs when they love their children more than they hate us.”

ISIS publishes maps of a global caliphate. Iran boasts of its "Shiite Crescent." Yet the only map that triggers global fury is Israel—a country that has repeatedly offered partition and relinquished land for the hope of peace. A society that scapegoats a tiny minority for the world’s chaos prepares for its own darkness. Once you decide that one people is the source of all evil, you will never see real evil coming.

כח החיים שבמחשבה

רגילות גדולה צריכים להתרגל, כדי להרגיש את עוצם כח החיים והישות של הכח המחשבתי, להכיר את העיזוז של הרעיון ואת השלטת החיים וחוסן המציאות של המחשבה, ולהבין על-פיה של הכרה זו, שכל מה שהמחשבה מתרוממת, מתעדנת ומתצחצחת, הרי האדם והעולם מתרוממים, מתעדנים ומתצחצחים. וכל צדדי המציאות הם תמיד למטה מכח המחשבה, עליותם וירידותם תלויים הם בעליתו וירידתו של הכח המחשבתי של האדם. ומזה יבא האדם להכיר את האושר הגדול שהוא מביא לעצמו ולעולם ע"י האלהיות של המחשבה. המחשבה הקשורה בהציור האלהי היא המחשבה היותר מעודנה, יותר עזיזה, גבוהה וחסינה שבעולם, ועז תקפה נותן הוא חוסן ועז לכל המפעלים. התנועות, ההוייות והחיים, כל הלימודים והחינוכים שבעולם, אינם כי אם כלים מכשירים את הכח המחשבתי שיהיה היוצא אל הפועל תדיר, במעמדו היותר עליון דהיינו הציור האלהי.


1. "רגילות גדולה צריכים להתרגל, כדי להרגיש את עוצם כח החיים והישות של הכח המחשבתי..."

ביאור: אנחנו רגילים להתייחס למחשבות כדבר חולף, חלש או "רק בראש". הרב זצ"ל אומר שצריך אימון ותרגול מנטלי מתמיד ("רגילות גדולה") כדי לשנות את התפיסה הזו. המטרה היא להגיע למצב שבו אנו מרגישים שהמחשבה היא כוח חי, ישות ממשית ובעלת עוצמה אדירה, בדיוק כמו כוחות פיזיים בטבע.

2. "...להכיר את העיזוז של הרעיון ואת השלטת החיים וחוסן המציאות של המחשבה..."

ביאור: המחשבה היא לא רק תגובה למציאות, אלא היא "שולטת" עליה. "עיזוז" פירושו כוח ועוז. הרב טוען שלמחשבה יש "חוסן מציאותי" – היא הדבר הכי יציב וממשי שיש. ככל שהאדם מעמיק ברעיון, הוא מגלה שהרעיון הוא המנוע שמניע את החיים עצמם.

3. "...ולהבין על-פיה של הכרה זו, שכל מה שהמחשבה מתרוממת, מתעדנת ומתצחצחת, הרי האדם והעולם מתרוממים, מתעדנים ומתצחצחים."

ביאור: זהו משפט המפתח של "האונטולוגיה של המחשבה": יש קשר ישיר בין איכות המחשבה לאיכות המציאות. אם המחשבות של האדם הופכות להיות נעלות יותר (מתרוממות), עדינות ומוסריות יותר (מתעדנות) ובהירות יותר (מתצחצחות) – זה לא משפיע רק על מצב רוחו, אלא משנה באופן אובייקטיבי את הווייתו של האדם ואת המצב של העולם כולו. המחשבה "מושכת" את המציאות אחריה.

4. "וכל צדדי המציאות הם תמיד למטה מכח המחשבה, עליותם וירידותם תלויים הם בעליתו וירידתו של הכח המחשבתי של האדם."

ביאור: המציאות החומרית (המעשים, האירועים, המצב הכלכלי או הפוליטי) היא משנית ("למטה") לכוח המחשבה. הרב מציע כאן היררכיה: המחשבה היא השורש, והמציאות היא הענפים. לכן, אם העולם נמצא בירידה או במשבר, השורש הוא ירידה ברמה המחשבתית-רוחנית של האדם. כדי להעלות את העולם, צריך קודם כל להעלות את המחשבה.

5. "ומזה יבא האדם להכיר את האושר הגדול שהוא מביא לעצמו ולעולם ע"י האלהיות של המחשבה."

ביאור: כשהאדם מבין איזה כוח עצום יש לו בידיים (או בראשו), הוא מתמלא באושר ובסיפוק. הוא מבין שהוא לא יצור חסר אונים, אלא שותף פעיל בתיקון עולם. "האלהיות של המחשבה" פירושה שהמחשבה האנושית היא ניצוץ מהמחשבה האלוהית שבראה את העולם, ולכן יש לה כוח יצירתי דומה.

6. "המחשבה הקשורה בהציור האלהי היא המחשבה היותר מעודנה, יותר עזיזה, גבוהה וחסינה שבעולם..."

ביאור: מהי המחשבה הכי חזקה? מחשבה שקשורה ב"ציור האלוהי" – כלומר, מחשבה על אלוהים, על שלמות, על טוב מוחלט, על הקשר שבין הבורא לנברא. מחשבה כזו היא החזקה ("עזיזה") והעמידה ("חסינה") ביותר, כי היא נוגעת במקור של הכול.

7. "...ועז תקפה נותן הוא חוסן ועז לכל המפעלים, התנועות, ההוייות והחיים..."

ביאור: כשאדם מחזיק במחשבה אלוהית ונעלה, הכוח של המחשבה הזו "נשפך" לתוך המציאות המעשית. כל המעשים שלו ("מפעלים"), התנועות והחיים היומיומיים שלו הופכים להיות חזקים, משמעותיים ומלאי חיוניות בזכות אותה מחשבה גדולה.

8. "כל הלימודים והחינוכים שבעולם, אינם כי אם כלים מכשירים את הכח המחשבתי שיהיה היוצא אל הפועל תדיר, במעמדו היותר עליון דהיינו הציור האלהי."

ביאור: הרב זצ"ל מגדיר כאן את מטרת החינוך והלמידה. למה אנחנו לומדים? למה אנחנו מתחנכים? לא רק כדי לדעת עובדות, אלא כדי "לאמן את השריר" של המחשבה. כל המערכות החינוכיות הן רק כלים שמטרתם להביא את האדם למצב שבו המחשבה שלו פועלת תמיד ברמה הגבוהה ביותר שלה – המחשבה על האלוהות ועל הטוב המוחלט.

סיכום:

הפסקה מלמדת אותנו שהמחשבה היא הכוח המניע של העולם. האחריות הגדולה של האדם היא לזכך את מחשבתו ולחבר אותה לערכים אלוהיים ונשגבים, ובכך הוא מרומם באופן אוטומטי את עצמו ואת היקום כולו.

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

On the Eve of Passover: Maintaining the Meaning in Matzah

It is no surprise to anyone that Pesach presents obligations that start long before the holiday itself does. However, it is not only the extensive household preparations, cooking, and cleaning that demand attention, but the 24-hour period before the seder specifically contains many halakhic regulations. As the seder nears, there is an additional ruling that is taught in the mishnah (Pesachim 99b): "On the Eve of Passover, adjacent to minchah time, a person may not eat until dark."


According to two major commentaries on the spot, Rashi and his grandson the Rashbam, this prohibition on eating is to preserve one's appetite for the eating of matzah, thus guaranteeing a hiddur mitzvah, a "beautification of the mitzvah," which is in general a Talmudic mandate (see Shabbat 135a).


However, it is far from obvious that eating matzah with a stronger appetite fits into the category of "hiddur mitzvah." There is a debate among the commentaries as to the parameters of "hiddur mitzvah," with some understanding that it refers only to the usage of physically beautiful objects in the practice of mitzvot, thus eliciting the admiration of onlookers and in turn enhancing the glory of God. To say, however, that hiddur mitzvah includes the performance of a mitzvah with maximal enthusiasm -- an enthusiasm that is likely imperceptible to anyone other than the individual himself -- adds a new layer of interpretation to the concept.


Indeed, this question was the subject of a correspondence between the Sochachover Rebbe, R. Avraham Bornstein, author of the Avnei Nezer, and his student R. Yoav Yehoshua Weingarten, author of the Chelkat Yoav. The Avnei Nezer (Responsa, Orach Chaim 433; also printed in the introduction to Resp. Chelkat Yoav) asserted that while hiddur is indeed generally a reference to aesthetically pleasing objects, there is another type as well, one in which a mitzvah action of a certain type is strengthened. In this case, the mitzvah is the act of eating, and as appetite strengthens that activity, it is considered a hiddur of that mitzvah. (Compare also Moadim UZemanim, III, 241. R. Eliyahu Baruch Finkel, MiShulchan R. Eliyahu Baruch, p. 5, suggests that the enthusiasm generated by the appetite emphasizes the theme of "cherut" in the fulfillment of the mitzvah of matzah.)


The notion that there is a value in cultivating a greater enthusiasm for the consumption of matzah is supported by a statement later on (107b) that Rava would drink wine on the Eve of Passover in order to stimulate his appetite. While some later authors (see Mikra'ei Kodesh, Pesach II, 46; Avnei Nezer, O.C. 448:7; Resp. Eretz Tzvi, Siach HaSadeh 4, p. 33) drew from this the conclusion that there is a value to consuming greater amounts of matzah than that which is mandated, others argue that this passage only involves the qualitative focus on the required amount (see Rif, 23a).


However, a statement on that same page actually undermines the above reasoning as the explanation for the prohibition of eating on the Eve of Passover, by providing a different reason. The Talmud there explains that the concern is that of achilah gasah, of becoming full in a manner that would interfere with fulfilling the mitzvah of matzah. Apparently, the concern is that any eating done after the point of satiety would not constitute "eating" in the halakhic definition, making the fulfillment of matzah an impossibility. Accordingly, this reason is adopted by the Ran, as well as Rabbenu David, who states that the Rashbam's interpretation is thus incorrect.


In fact, both interpretations are somewhat surprising. In general, as the Pri Megadim observes, rabbinic prohibitions are enacted only to protect Torah prohibitions, and not positive commandments. In this case, it would seem that the prohibition of eating on erev Pesach is protecting a positive commandment of eating matzah, and according to Rashi and the Rashbam, it is not even for the mitzvah itself but for an enhancement of the mitzvah.


Rav Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook (see Tov Ro'ei to Pesachim) derives from this case that the Pri Megadim is incorrect, and rabbinic enactments can be formulated for positive mitzvot. Even if that is so, this example is nonetheless a rare occurrence and is noteworthy.


To understand this prohibition further, it may be instructive to consider an additional prohibition that may or may not share its reasoning. Tosafot (Pesachim 99b s.v. lo yochal) records, in the name of the Talmud Yerushalmi, a prohibition against eating matzah on Erev Pesach. Rishonim differ as to the reason for this; according to some, such as the Rokeach and the Behag, it can be traced to verses in the Torah limiting the consumption of matzah or the korban Pesach to the nighttime. The Meiri, and a number of other rishonim, understand this as a means to protect the appetite for matzah that evening, thus apparently seeing this as an extension of the general avoidance of eating that will go into effect later in the day.


Maimonides (Hilkhot Chametz U'Matzah 6:12) understands this concept differently, explaining that matzah must be avoided on erev Pesach so that the eating of matzah that evening will be distinct and clear (hekker) as a mitzvah. It is instructive to connect this to the view cited by the Rama (O.C. 471:2), that this prohibition applies to children only once they reach the age of understanding the story of yetziat Mitzrayim that is related Pesach night. This is surprising; one would assume that it is only necessary to appreciate the eating of matzah itself. Taken together, these views suggest that matzah may not be eaten on the eve of Passover in order to highlight the role the consumption of matzah has in teaching the story of the exodus from Egypt.


As such, Rav Shlomo Cynamon suggests (Eish Tamid to Lev., p. 444) that we can understand why the Rabbis made an enactment to preserve one's appetite as Pesach approaches. The more one is eager to eat the matzah, the more he is emotionally connected to the Exodus experience, and the more complete his fulfillment of the imperative to place himself within that historical perspective.


If so, perhaps the two reasons found in rishonim not to eat on the afternoon of the eve of Passover can be understood as essentially the same idea. While some understood the concern of "achilah gasah" as did the Ran and Rabbenu David, to refer to one who is so overfull that eating is off-putting and thus halakhically meaningless, the Tosafot draw a distinction between two types of achilah gasah. They note a less extreme version, in which eating is still imaginable, but the enthusiasm for added food would be absent. If this is the achilah gasah relevant in this case, the concern is not materially different from that of Rashi and the Rashbam. The focus of both interpretations would be to enhance the experience of consuming matzah and thus root it more firmly in its role as a story-telling tool.


In this light, we can also consider the unusual situation of a rabbinic enactment to protect this positive mitzvah of matzah. It is possible to question the significance of matzah on Pesach. There is much written in the rabbinic literature about the negative imagery of chametz, leading the Radbaz (see Responsa, III, 977, and Metzudat David, mitzvah 107) to suggest that chametz really should have been forbidden all year round. Accordingly, matzah on Pesach could have been perceived as simply the non-chametz option for a meal; even the affirmative obligation to eat it might only be an active display of disdain for chametz. However, matzah is more than that; it was integrated into the experience of yetziat Mitzrayim, and we eat it on Pesach night to transport ourselves into that context. Insisting that we not only eat matzah dutifully, but with gusto and enthusiasm, underscores the positive message that matzah contains.


According to the Beit HaLevi (Parashat Bo), while matzah is a commemorative mitzvah, seemingly only meaningful after the event of yetziat Mitzrayim, in fact it was always a part of the Torah's framework (for example, Lot served matzah to his guests long before the Jews were enslaved in Egypt). God orchestrated the events of yetziat Mitzrayim in a way that incorporated matzah in a meaningful way that reinforced our connection to a mitzvah that was inherently significant.


There are many aspects to the symbolism of matzah, but one possible element is the assertion of control over one's circumstances; not allowing the effects of time to overtake and "leaven." The Jews who left Egypt were not simply liberated from bondage, but were transformed from powerless slaves controlled by their circumstances to agents who could assert control over their time and make it meaningful, a point Rav Soloveitchik noted in the significance of the first mitzvah to the Jewish people being the directive of "HaChodesh Hazeh Lachem." It is noteworthy as well that the general imperative of not allowing mitzvot to be neglected is derived rabbinically from the language of "u'shmartem et hamatzot" -- understood as, ein machmitzin et hamitzvot (see Pachad Yitzchak, Pesach ma'amar 1).


Matzah plays a crucial role in ensuring that Pesach is not only about running away from slavery, but about marching toward God and his Torah. Matzah is not only the absence of chametz, with all of its negative imagery, but it is a symbol of initiative and attention that was proactively inserted by Providence into the moment of our liberation from slavery to man and our availability for service to God.


A close attention to Maimonides' formulation of the eve of Passover restrictions reveals that there are actually three aspects. First, as noted above, is the prohibition of eating matzah, to distinguish the mitzvah that will come later. After that, he mentions the general avoidance of eating too much in the afternoon, so that one will have a strong appetite (similar to the phrasing of Rashi and the Rashbam). Third, he notes that the early chachamim would go farther, completely abstaining from food on erev Pesach, for the sake of extra endearment, "chavivut."


Is this last element, chavivut, just one more degree of attention to matzah, or is it perhaps a broader statement of relationship to the Torah as a whole? In some texts, Maimonides' language is rendered, "V'yiheyu matzot chavivin alav" -- the matzot should be endeared to him. However, in other texts, such as the Shabsi Frankel edition, the language is "V'yiheyu mitzvot chavivin alav" -- the mitzvot, in their totality, should be endeared to him.


The Avnei Nezer was one of the authorities noted above who recommended eating more matzah than is mandated. However, in his responsum, it is clear that he understands this as a value for mitzvot overall, as an expression of passion for God's service; the inverse of the stricture against packaging mitzvot together (ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot), which implies the mitzvot are a burden. Accordingly, he applies this value to other mitzvot, such as shofar and lulav. Nonetheless, the source for this value is found in Rava's eve of Passover efforts to cultivate his appetite.


If this is the case, the points converge: on the eve of Passover we are striving to display a comprehensive excitement for all mitzvot, while at the same time this is a Pesach-specific goal, intertwined with the commemoration of yetziat Mitzrayim. And indeed, this was the case at that moment in time. The Torah tells us (Ex. 12:34) that the Jews carried the unleavened bread "on their shoulders." Rashi notes that although they could have had their animals carry the load, they wanted to display their affection for what they were carrying: "mechav'vim hayu et hamitzvah." The Mechilta, Rashi's source, has the language "shehayu mechav'vin et ha-mitzvot." At this crucial moment of liberation, not only is matzah present, but a theme of passion for the totality of mitzvot is manifest.


The mishnah that teaches about preserving the enthusiasm for matzah ends with a directive about the four cups, ruling that even one who depends upon communal sustenance for his meals must not be provided with any less than needed to obtain four cups of wine. The Rashbam, commenting on that line, notes the rabbinic statement that the four cups parallel the four expressions of redemption (leshonot ge'ulah) the Torah uses to describe yetziat Mitzrayim (Shemot 6:6-7).


Some later works question why the Rashbam includes that point here, in this specific ruling. Perhaps it is simply the first opportunity to explain the message of the four cups; or perhaps he is emphasizing that as a tool of pirsumei nisa, the obligation of the cups requires the added effort of seeking charitable assistance to guarantee its fulfillment (see R. Uziel Yakobovitz, Birkat Moadecha, #149).


The Torah Temimah raises a different objection to the language of the Rashbam, and of other rishonim. He asserts that their reference to "leshonot ge'ulah" is a deviation from the original source, the Talmud Yerushalmi. There, the language is of four ge'ulot, rather than four expressions of ge'ulah. He insists this is an important distinction: the four cups are not merely a linguistic marker, they evoke four distinct stages of redemption, each one crucial to remember.


My grandfather, R. Moses J. Feldman, in his commentary Meshivat Nefesh, argued that this should not be leveled as a criticism against the rishonim. He brings an array of sources from Scripture, Midrash, and rishonim to prove that this is indeed what they mean to say and what the Yerushalmi is saying: the Torah uses multiple expressions specifically because there are distinct redemptions, and all must be acknowledged.


Perhaps this is the intent of the Rashbam's comment on the mishnah as well. We are taught that the needy must not be deprived of this mitzvah; not only should he be able to purchase wine, but "lo yifsechu lo mi'daled kosot." He must not have fewer than all four cups. The commemoration begins with "I will take you out of the burdens of Egypt," but it must make it all the way to "And I will take you to Me for a people, and I will be to you a God."


Thus, the mishnah closes as it begins, reminding us that yetziat Mitzrayim was not only an escape from Pharaoh, just as matzah is not only the avoidance of chametz. To remember what we are marching toward, and the excitement with which we push forward, is why we were redeemed in the first place, and it is what will forever reconnect us to that moment outside of time.


Empathy For Strangers Over Family

אני אוהב את הכל. איני יכול שלא לאהוב את כל הבריות, את כל העמים. רוצה אני בכל מעמקי לב בתפארת הכל, בתקנת הכל. אהבתי לישראל היא יותר נלהבה. יותר עמוקה, אבל החפץ הפנימי מתפשט הוא בעזוז אהבתו על הכל ממש. אין לי כל צורך לכוף את רגש אהבה זה, הוא נובע ישר מעומק הקודש של החכמה של הנשמה הא-להית.


Be very wary of any ideology which proclaims you must have the utmost empathy and loyalty to complete and total strangers on the other side of the world but needn’t have any responsibility or loyalty to your parents, spouse and most of all your unborn child if they inconvenience you.

Dickens famously mocked "telescopic philanthropy" through the character Mrs. Jellyby, who neglects her own children to focus on missions in Africa:

"She was a lady of very remarkable strength of character who... devoted herself entirely to the public... [while] her own family were entirely neglected."

The father of modern conservatism Edmund Burke argued that social health begins in the "little platoon":

"To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind."

C.S. Lewis warned that the devil tries to turn our malice toward our neighbors and our love toward the "remote":

"The great thing is to direct the malice to his immediate neighbours whom he meets every day and to thrust his benevolence out to the remote circumference, to people he does not know. The malice thus becomes wholly real and the benevolence largely imaginary."

The late philosopher Roger Scruton often spoke on "Oikophobia" (the fear or hatred of home/one's own):

"The person who loves humanity but cannot stand his neighbor is a familiar type; so is the person who spends his life for the 'oppressed' while being a tyrant to his own children."