לזכות אבי מורי ואמי מורתי שליט"א וכל יו"ח
לזכות אהובי רבי שמואל בנימין בן תשנה רחל לאה אשתו החשובה וכל יו"ח
לזכות אהובי רבי יהודה יעקב בן דינה חאשע אשתו החשובה וכל יו"ח
The truth is, that we can prove that there is a distinction between the din of "אתא ליד חצר" - coming into his PROPERTY unwittingly באיסור [meaning before יאוש], and "אתא לידו", coming into his HAND באיסור. When it comes into his property unwittingly, we can argue that there is no obligation to guard the object and no obligation to return it and therefore באיסורא אתי לידיה [which means according to Tosfos that in the case that it comes into his hand there is a חיוב to return it] has a completely different definition. Let's see: Regarding the principle of the Nemukei Yosef that even regarding one's property there is a concept of "באיסורא אתי לידיה", we can ask the following: In a case when the owner of the property himself found the object in his courtyard after the יאוש of the owner of the object, can he acquire the object? Apparently, according to what we wrote, that the reason that in his property there is no קנין is because he was obligated to return the object even though it came into his property unwittingly, if so the same should apply to when he lifted it with his hand, that he should not acquire it because, bottom line, he was previously obligated to return it!
ה. איברא דנראה להוכיח דחלוק גדר דין אתא ליד חצר באיסורא מאתא לידיה ממש, דבהגיע לחצר שלא מדעתו י"ל דליכא חיוב שמירה וליכא חיוב השבה, והבאאת"ל הוא גדר אחר לגמרי. דהנה ביסוד דברי הנ"י דאף בחצר איכא דינא דבאאת"ל, יש לחקור בגוונא דבעל החצר עצמו מצא את האבידה בחצירו לאחר יאוש הבעלים, אי מצי לזכות בה עתה בהגבהתו, ולכאורה לפמ"ש דטעמא דבאאת"ל בחצר לא קני הוא מפני דנתחייב בהשבה אפי' שלא מדעתו, א"כ הוא הדין דלא קני כשהגביה בידו, הואיל וסכ"ס נתחייב בהשבה.
However the Nesivos [262-1] said that he DOES acquire the object, for a different reason. Look there where he asked about the basic din that it is considered before יאוש as coming into the property of the owner of the property באיסור, why don't we say that the owner of the property doesn't want that his property acquire the object on his behalf with a קנין חצר?? We can't say that since it is a זכות for him to acquire the object, he acquires even without his knowledge, because it is NOT a זכות for him, since באיסורא אתי לידיה and he is obligated to return it. Because of this the Nesivos wrote that really, if the owner of the property picks up the object in his hand after יאוש, since until now he didn't want his property to acquire the object it is not considered "באיסורא אתי לידיה" because it was never "אתי לידיה" - came into his hand, and thus he may now acquire the object.
Those Rishonim who wrote [26a] that even in one's property there is a din of "באיסורא אתי לידיה", are talking specifically about a case where he didn't lift up the object afterwards and just wanted to acquire the object by means of a קנין חצר. They are discussing a case where one person comes to take possession of an item on a property and the owner of the property claims that it became his first, there we say that it is considered "באיסורא אתי לידיה". The reason is that since he revealed his desire that his property serve as a שליח to acquire on his behalf, therefore his property already became his שליח of acquisition from the beginning and acquires on his behalf before the יאוש of the owners. It emerges that in that case his property is like his hand and the קנין occurred before יאוש and באיסורא אתי לידיה. So wrote the Nesivos.
Truth be told, this סברא is illogical. Just because he wants his property to acquire on his behalf NOW [before the other fellow acquired it], that doesn't mean that he wanted his property to acquire for him earlier [before the יאוש of the owner]. So also asked Rebbi Akiva Eiger on the Nesivos: Why don't we say that until the יאוש of the owner, he doesn't want his property to acquire on his behalf because it is not to his benefit and after the יאוש when it is a זכות for him then he wants to be קונה? Such that it would not be considered "באיסורא אתי לידיה" [because there was never an obligation to return the object].
איברא דסברא זו אין לה מובן, דאטו משום דעכשיו רוצה שתקנה לו חצירו מוכרח נמי דרצה גם קודם לכן, וכן הקשה הרע"א (דו"ח השמטות על דף כ"ו. תוד"ה דשתיך, ד"ה ולזה) בפשיטות על הגמ' דאמאי לא נימא דעד היאוש לא רצה דליקני ליה חצירו דאין לו זכות בזה, ולאחר יאוש דהוי זכות עבורו יתחיל קנין חצירו ולא ייחשב באאת"ל ע"ש.
[The question of the Nesivos is predicated on the opinion in the gemara that the din that one's חצר can acquire on his behalf by means of שליחות and therefore we can ask that if the person doesn't want his חצר to be his שליח, it would not serve that function. But if חצר works "מטעם יד" - as an extension of his hand, then his question would not be problematic. For just as if one picks up a lost object and doesn't want to acquire it, he is still obligated to return it, because bottom line, it came into his possession. So too, if it came into his חצר he would have to return it, like it or not. So wrote Rebbi Akiva Eiger, who asked the question of the Nesivos and compares it to get. And regarding a גט it says earlier [12a] that a courtyard acquires a גט for a woman not as a שליח because it is to her disadvantage and one cannot cause a disadvantage to another with the other party's consent [אין חבין לאדם אלא בפניו] but rather it works as an extension of her hand and her hand acquires a גט even against her will. So we see again that if חצר works as a יד then it acquires even against her will.]
[ובעיקר קושיית הנה"מ מסתברא דאינה אלא אי חצר מטעם שליחות אתרבאי, ולזאת ק"ל דאי לא בעי למיקני א"כ אין החצר נעשה שלוחו, אבל אי חצר מטעם יד נראה דלא קשיא, דכמו במגביה אבידה בידו ולא בעי לקנותה מתחייב הוא בהשבה, הואיל וסכ"ס נכנסה האבידה לרשותו, כך הוא הדין בחצר דאי אתא לרשותיה קנאו בכל ענין אפילו בע"כ. (ואין סברא לומר דחצר שאני מידו ממש, ובחצר חשיב דאתאי לרשותיה רק אי בעי לקנותה, דהא סכ"ס גם בחצר אתאי לרשותיה ומ"ש מידו). וכן משמע מדברי הרע"א דהקשה ג"כ קושיית הנה"מ ומדמי לה לגט ע"ש, וגבי גט איתא לעיל י"ב. דחצר דקני גט לאשה אינו מטעם שליחות דאין חבין לאדם אלא בפניו, אלא מדין ידה הוא וידה קניא גבי גט על כרחה, אלמא דאי חצר מטעם יד קני בעל כרחיה].
Rebbi A"E answered the question of the Nesivos [how does the property acquire for him even against his will] as follows: Since the Torah obligated him to lift up the object and take it in order to return it, therefore, against his will he must be agreeable that his courtyard acquire on his behalf so that he should have an obligation to return it. Thus, his property acquires against his will. And even though we find that even with respect to a גט, which is normally acquired even against the woman's will, nevertheless she has the option of saying that she doesn't want her property to acquire it on her behalf, there is a distinction between the two cases. When it comes to a גט, even though her husband can divorce her against her will, nevertheless the women isn't obligated to take the גט and if she wants she can run away. Therefore, she can also say that she doesn't want her property to serve as her שליח to acquire the גט. But an אבידה is different. There it is FORBIDDEN to turn a blind eye and he MUST take it. So in that case the property acquires the object even against his will.
וברע"א יישב קושיית הנה"מ (כיצד זוכה לו החצר בעל כרחיה) באופן אחר, דהואיל וחייבתו תורה להגביה האבידה וליטלנה מדין השבה, א"כ בעל כרחו צריך להתרצות שיזכה לו חצירו שיהיה לו חיוב השבה וקני ליה חצירו בעל כרחיה. ואף דמצינו דאפילו בגט דמקני לה בע"כ מ"מ בידה לומר שלא יזכה לה חצירה, שאני התם דאף דהבעל מצי לגרשה בע"כ מ"מ האשה אינה חייבת ליטול הגט והרשות בידה לברוח ולכן יכולה לומר אין רצוני שתהיה החצר שלוחי, אבל באבידה דאסור להתעלם ומוטל עליו ליטלו גם החצר נעשית ידו בעל כרחו עכ"ד.
Now, even though this answer is difficult to comprehend, nevertheless what emerges with respect to our question about the owner of the property who picked up the object after יאוש, is that he cannot acquire it since his property already acquired it for him before the יאוש even against his will. Therefore, the rule of "באיסורא אתי לידיה" applies and he can no longer acquire it. And the סברא of the Nesivos that if he doesn't want to acquire it earlier then he can acquire it now does not hold water.
Bottom line, we learn from the Nesivos and Rebbi A"E that they both maintain that there is an obligation to return an object even if it came into his property without his knowledge [Rebbi A"E writes explicitly "he must be desirable that his courtyard acquire on his behalf so that he should have an obligation to return it"]. The Nesivos also agrees that when he reveals his intentions at the end that he wants his property to be his שליח [as opposed to when he lifted the object and wanted to acquire it that way] and acquire on his behalf, there is an obligation to return it even though it fell into his property without his knowledge and it is considered "באיסורא אתי לידיה" [which means that he is required to return it, as we have explained numerous times].
[עפ"י שיעורי הגאון רבי שמואל רוזובסקי זצ"ל]
