לזכות ר' יצחק יונה בן חנה שליט"א לבריאות איתנה יחד עם כל ב"ב
There is a machlokes in the medrash between R' Yishamel and R' Akiva. R' Yishamel says that every time Hashem told the Jews to keep a positive commandment they said הן - yes, and to every negative commandment they said לאו - no, we won't do it [על הן הן ועל לאו לאו]. R' Akiva argues and says that not only would they answer הן to the positive commandments but to the negative as well. What is the root of this dispute?
The Rogochover explains that there is a deeper philosophical dispute that is taking place here. R' Yishmael holds that the mitzvos devolve upon man. When he is told to do something he must do it - הן and when he is told to refrain he must refrain - לאו. The no-no's are העדר - empty of matter, reality and existence [in fact the Maharal characterizes gehenom as a place of העדר - a complete lack of existence]. There is no מציאות for איסורים. How can something evil have a metzius? Evil is nothing. הבל ורעות רוח. Just hot air. Hot air is completely negative. לאו.
R' Akiva differs with this assertion. There is no evil that can desecend from above. מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות [Eicha 3, 38]. אין רע יורד מלמעלה [Breishis Rabba]. [The Rambam expands upon this idea in Moreh Nevuchim]. Even no-no's are a מציאות and concrete reality and not just העדר. Thus, the Jews answered הן even on the no-no's. "Yes" implies existence and not lack thereof. The איסור does not just relate to the person but creates a new מציאות on the object. The object is transformed into an object of איסור. Not a negation of reality but a creation of a new reality called איסור.
This is the opinion of R' Akiva in many places.
MISHNAH [Bava Kamma 33a] IF AN OX [TAM] OF THE VALUE OF ONE HUNDRED ZUZ HAS GORED AN OX OF THE VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED ZUZ AND THE CARCASS HAD NO VALUE AT ALL, THE PLAINTIFF WILL TAKE POSSESSION OF THE [DEFENDANT'S] OX [THAT DID THE DAMAGE].
GEMARA. Who is the author of our Mishnah? — It is R. Akiva, as it has been taught: The ox
[that did the damage] has to be assessed by the Court of law [and he pays its value]; this is the view of R. Yishmael. R.
Akiva, however, says: The [body of the] ox becomes transferred [to the plaintiff]. What is the point
at issue? — R. Yishmael maintains that he [the plaintiff] is but a creditor and that he has only a claimof money against him [the defendant], whereas R. Akiva is of the opinion that they both [the plaintiff and defendant] become the owners in common of the ox [that did the damage]. [Soncino translation].
Writes the Rogochover: הרי דדין תורה עושה אותו דהוא שייך להניזק אף בלא קנין כלל - The Torah law creates a new reality where the ox belongs to the plaintiff with no need for a kinyan. It is not just a monetary obligation but a change in ownership.
A similar machlokes we find with respect to a שומר אבידה [B"K 56b]. The gemara offers two reasons why someone who finds and guards a lost object has the status of a שומר שכר - a paid custodian. According to one opinion, when guarding the object he is absolved from the obligation to give tzdaka. That is considered his "payment". According to the second opinion, since the Torah obligated him against his will, he has the status of a שומר שכר. This means that the Torah is creating a new reality whereby a person is considered as being a paid custodian even though he is not being paid.
R' Akiva also holds according to one opinon [Ksubos 29] that even when a couple is forbidden to marry by the force of a mere מצות עשה the kiddushin doesn't take effect. This is because the Torah mandates that דנשתנה המציאות שלהם ולא הוי בת קידושין - their reality changes and she cannot be married. [If the union is forbidden by force of a לאו or כרת it is much easier to say that the kiddushin doesn't take effect even without reverting to the "change in reality" logic].
See more in הגאון הרוגוצ'ובי ותלמודו page 42 and on.
