Professor George Shlesinger
In a letter of admonition to his eldest son, Ramban (Nahmanides) speaks of
"the quality of humilty, which is better than all things good."l
Ramban is by no means alone in rating humility or modesty as the
supreme moral quality. The following are some well-known examples which
support the view that this particular trait is the noblest of all virtues:
(1) Moshe Rabbenu displayed through his actions a wide range of virtues. Yet only one is singled out for explicit mention, modesty: "Now the
man Moses was very meek, more than all the men on the face of the earth"
(Num. 12:3).
(2) Hazal name but one among human characteristics that is indispensable for the acquisition of prophetic inspiration, humility.2
(3) With respect to all human qualities, the Rambam (Maimonides) advocates the "golden mean"-nothing too much, nor too little. He makes,
however, one exception: modesty has no limit-the more, the better.
At the same time, though, the concept of humility-unlike any other
virtue-seems to be involved in a number of perplexities and paradoxes.
First, if it is indeed the supreme moral rectitude, then it surely follows that
this characteristic ought most fervently be sought. Yet there is far greater
uncertainty concerning the nature of this than of any other moral quality. In
philosophical literature we find more than a dozen disparate accounts of
the notion of modesty. Can it be our duty to strive assiduously to acquire a
trait about which there are so many conflicting accounts?
Contrasting the trouble some dictionaries have in defining the term
"humility" with the relative ease with which they defined other moral terms
may provide a quick impression of the peculiar difficulties afflicting the
notion of humilty. For example, Webster's 9th Collegiate Dictionary gives
for the familiar term "compassion" the helpful definition "sympathetic consciousness of others' distress with a desire to alleviate it." Someone unfamiliar with the concept should unquestionably find this instructive. Then again
the definition of "generosity" which includes "liberality in giving" is also informative. On the other hand, the definition for "humble" goes "not proud
or haughty; not arrogant or assertive." The definition provides the antinomies of "humble" which may be of help to one unfamilar with the word,
but not to somebody ignorant of the very concept that word represents.
Imagine a visitor from an alien culture where the whole idea of "marriage" is unknown and in reply to his inquiry "What is a married man?" we say "A
man who is not a bachelor." In the case of "humble" Webster's does not do
any better.
Another oddity follows. It is very common in other areas of philosophy outside the domain of human virtues to come across a concept that
eludes our attempts to capture it through an adequate definition; nevertheless, under all actual circumstances we know for sure whether we have or
have not an instance of it before us. For example, the notion of understanding the sentence S, according to some, should be explicated as "being able
to enumerate the truth-conditions of S," according to others as "having the
ability to verify it," "being able to act in a manner S calls for," or even "capable of forming a mental picture corresponding to S." Now though I may
know no reason to prefer one analysis over another, still, when presented
with any of the vast number of sentences I fail to understand, I am capable
of determining in a split second that I do not understand it, and when presented with one of the few I do understand, I readily recognize it as such.
The concept of "humility" belongs to the relatively very small class
that form an exception to this general rule. Not only does no consensus
about the correct definition exist but in numerous cases where we have a
full physical description of a given act or a set of acts, it is impossible to determine whether we have before us a manifestation of humility or the lack
of it. For example, X may recount his skill and successes as a defense lawyer. Neither in the case where he is, in fact, a good attorney, nor in the case
where he is not, does it necessarily follow that he is deficient in humility. He
may be in financial trouble and desperately needs new clients. Consider Y,
who during a long conversation continuously describes his intellectual, professional and social achievements. His behavior could be the manifestation
of something far removed from haughtiness or arrogance: Y may suffer
from a serious sense of inadequacy, and his feelings of inferiority may require continual verbal boosting. Clearly only someone fairly well acquainted with X or Y, having observed their behavior under a variety of circumstances, could make a reliable assessment of what X's or Y's current behavior amounts to.
In addition, it is puzzling that humility-the presence or absence of
which in a given individual benefits or harms others relatively little-should
be so highly valued. There are good reasons, for instance, to condemn and
be wary of individuals who are cruel, violent, vindictive, dishonest, greedy
and so on, as they constitute a potential threat to one's well-being.
On the
other hand, while we may find the manifestation of excessive conceit irritating, even a person who is utterly devoid of all modesty seems to constitute
no serious menace to the material or mental comfort of others.
In the April 22, 1991 issue of The New Republic there was a major
article about Ramsey Clark, which describes Ramsey as "a man who carries
modesty to the point of arrogance." Readers probably varied in the degree to which they found this quip amusing, but certainly only a few felt totally
mystified as to its meaning. It would have been very different if the article
had said, "He carries courage to the point of cowardice" or "He carries
honesty to the point of duplicity." These descriptions are thoroughly
unclear. It is yet another indication of the unique nature of humility that it
can be practiced-theoretically at least-on any number of different levels.
Thus one individual may exhibit excessive vanity about having succeeded in
being humble about all his other virtues, while another, who has managed
to shed all vanity about his humility in general as well, may yet focus his
self-admiration on this very accomplishment itself.
To gain an idea how slippery our topic is let me cite some of the better
known theses on modesty.
Thesis 1: It has often been said that a modest individual is required not only
to refrain from boasting, but even to understate his true worth. Admittedly,
it is somewhat jarring to listen to someone sing his own praise. Indeed, King
Solomon cautioned, "Let another praise you, and not your own lips" (Pr.
27:2). Nevertheless, is it possible that speaking untruly is a necessary element in the high virtue of modesty? Does not belittling oneself dishonestly
amount to false modesty?
An advocate of Thesis 1 could claim support from Rashi (Bava Metzia 23b), who says that if one is asked whether he has knowledge of a certain Talmudic tractate, then even if he has, he should, out of modesty, deny
it.
Commentators have interpreted Rashi in different ways, but one thing
seems beyond dispute: Rashi is not making a universal recommendation.
He does not suggest that modesty forbids one to admit possessing any sort
of competence, skill, aptitude, knowledge, or of having contributed anything of value. He is referring to a single case, mastery of a sugya. One may
conjecture about the reason he limited himself to this one case, but many
possibilities exist. Perhaps in the context of the knowledge of a tractate,
perfection just does not exist as "there is no comparison between one who
has studied a passage a hundred times and one who has studied it 101
times." Thus the questioner may have intended to ask whether the person
had an adequate knowledge of a certain tractate, and this he may possess.
However, because of the ambiguity involved, Rashi advises giving a negative answer.
Thesis 2: Humility has sometimes been said to amount to the realization
that no matter what heights one has reached, one is still infinitesimal in comparison with the Almighty. Undoubtedly, it would be utterly foolish for
anyone to fail to realize his nothingness before Heaven. But it would seem
that merely avoiding being utterly foolish does not amount to the most
highly praised human quality.
Thesis 3: In the June 1989 issue of one of the leading philosophical monthlies, the Journal of Philosophy, Prof. Judith Driver, in her essay "The Virtues
of Ignorance'" suggests that modesty is "underestimating one's worth."
Note: not understating, which implies falsehood, but underestimating, which
amounts to an honest mistake.
Strangely enough, this latest suggestion harbors more difficulties than
the earlier ones it proposes to replace. First, we might ask, should we admire an exceptionally skillful heart surgeon who is convinced he is incapable even to treat properly an ingrown toenail? Surely such an individual would be responsible for the death of many whom he could have
saved. Secondly, we are bid to emulate virtuous individuals and to strive to
acquire qualities similar to theirs. How is one supposed to endeavor to outsmart himself and sincerely adopt false beliefs about his skills and achievements, whatever they might be?
Furthermore, assuming that in the context of humility there is no limit
as to where to stop, for the humbler the better, what attitude is to be recommended, for instance, for the world's leading mathematician? If he sincerely
believed that he were no more than an average expert in his field, Driver
would apparently heartily applaud him. However, would she be bound to
admire him even more if he acquired the belief that hardly any of his hundreds of publications contains a single valid result? Is it reasonable also to
assume that if the great mathematician managed somehow to convince himself that he is not quite sure what 5+7 might amount to, then he would have
to be held in the highest form of reverence for his heroic humility?
Thesis 4: Owen Flanagan, writing in the same journal in 1990, criticizes
Driver's position and advances instead what he calls the "nonoverestimation account." He claims that a modest individual is required only not to
overestimate his accomplishments and worth.
One is likely to find this interpretation beset with its own problems.
Consider the case of the engineer who, unaware that this has been done
long before, has after many years of effort discovered how to construct a
flying-machine. Being an unusually unassuming person, he finds sufficient
satisfaction in his "knowledge" of being the first individual in history to
build an airplane, and refrains altogether from publicizing his achievement.
The engineer may well be charged with shocking ignorance, but in spite of
his gross overestimation of his place in the history of technology, few
would wish to censure him for arrogance.
Now, let us suppose that our engineer lived in the 19th century. His convicton of being the first ever to put together successfully a flying machine, would then have corresponded to reality and thus he would not
have been guilty of oversestimating his accomplishment. At the same time
let us also suppose that after making his discovery he could think of nothing
else but the magnificence of his fertile mind, that he brought up the matter
in every conversation, refused to associate with and treated with contempt
anyone who could lay no claim to a comparable achievement. Most of us
would regard such an individual irksomely self-infatuated.
The first example indicates that nonoverestimation of oneself is not a
necessary condition. The last example demonstrates nonoverestimation is
not a sufficient condition for the exemplification of humilty.
[Tradition 1993]
