Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
It is considered one of the most egregious offenses a Jew can commit, even when violated inadvertently (Avot 4:4). Yet a proper definition of the concept of Chilul Hashem, asserted as a prohibition in the Torah portion of Emor, is elusive.
Contained within the conundrum is the puzzle of perception. Do we care what others think? There are many sources that indicate that we do, and the notion of "Chilul Hashem" is often invoked to call attention to what might draw attention in a negative fashion. At the same time, the Jewish Nation has been, from the outset, unabashedly counter-cultural. Abraham was called “the Hebrew” because of his willingness to stand alone against all trends and attitudes of the world around him.
The applications found in the Talmud and rabbinic sources of Chilul Hashem, and its positive correlate, Kiddush Hashem, seem to vary widely. Included among them are: the commission of any transgression, at least publicly (see Rabbenu Yonah to Avot); any behavior that will garner disrepute from onlookers; taking one's litigation to the civil authorities; and martyrdom, when necessary, is termed the ultimate in Kiddush Hashem.
One thread that may join these four categories is the language of chilul, which is rooted in the term chalal, or empty space. Desecration of the Name means to render something hollow. Still, there may be various subjects of that hollowness; R. Chaim of Volozhin (Nefesh HaChaim, shaar 3 ch. 8) understood that the offender makes the place in which he is found empty, as if the Shekhinah is not there.
It may be argued that it is the Torah itself that is being portrayed as lifeless, existing as a text but not being allowed to inform the actual behavior of the individual involved. Applied respectively to the above categories, this is manifest when one fails to adhere to the Torah's laws; in behavior that indicates that the Torah's precepts have not impacted his character, as perceived by onlookers; in one who may otherwise follow the laws of the Torah but draws a line when his money is involved, instead seeking the adjudication of external codes; and, conversely, the ultimate Kiddush Hashem would be one who gives his very life for the values of the Torah.
To take the definition further, Chilul Hashem is identified when there is behavior that is liable to create emptiness in others who observe that behavior and will be led into lowering their own standards. For example, Rashi (Shabbat 33a, sv chilul) describes “a great person who people learn from, and is uncareful with his actions, and thus causes younger people to demean the Torah because of him, saying that they know that there is no substance to the Torah and its commandments, and it emerges that the Name is profaned, its words are rendered ‘Chulin’ ”. Similarly, he writes in his commentary to Avot (4:4) that a Torah scholar who demeans himself in front of others, and because he is a scholar, others learn from him, causes God's name is profaned; they say this one who learned Torah, how corrupt are his actions, and they distance themselves in that way.
The Talmud (Yoma 86a) does take on the definition explicitly, but does so through examples, thus leaving the exact parameters to interpretation. “What are the circumstances of desecration of God’s name? Rav said: For example, when someone like me, if I take meat from a butcher and do not give him money immediately; … Rabbi Yochanan said: For example, someone like me, if I would walk four cubits without Torah and without tefillin [Rashi explains that is physically unable to perform these deeds, but onlookers will not be aware of that]; Yitzchak from the school of Rabbi Yannai said: Any one whose friends are embarrassed on account of his reputation, this is a desecration of God’s name. Rav Nachman bar Yitzḥak said: for example, when people say about him: May his Master forgive so-and-so for the sins he has done.”
The Tosafot Yom HaKippurim interpreted this passage as reflecting the drawing of others into sin, and saw the opinions as ascending in stringency: he understood them, respectively, to describe one who: influences others to learn from him to violate a prohibition; to neglect a positive mitzvah; or simply to behave disreputably.
Other commentaries saw the examples as descending in stringency, each setting a higher threshold for violation. To the Maharsha, they described: something that is not at all sinful, but witnesses may think it is sinful; something wrong because of circumstances beyond one’s control; or only that which actually elicits verbal condemnation. The Maharal (Derekh HaChaim 4:4, v’hearakhnu) ordered his interpretations similarly: when a Torah scholar is not careful about a small matter; a small matter which actually is technical neglect; or something that causes genuine embarrassment to other Torah scholars.
To the Ritva (Avodah Zarah 31a, s.v. heichi), the Talmud’s inquiry here is one of parameters rather than definition; the thrust of the Talmud’s question is: what is an example of something that is minor and yet could still be considered a Chilul Hashem?
To Maimonides, chilul Hashem and kiddush Hashem could be identified by the nature of one's commitment to the Torah's principles; the latter through pure devotion, and the former through gratuitous defiance. Thus, his formulation (Hil. Yesodei HaTorah 5:10) is “Whoever consciously transgresses one of the mitzvot related in the Torah, without duress, in a spirit of provocation, to arouse [Divine] anger, desecrates [God's] name. Therefore, it is stated (Lev. 19:12), regarding [taking] an oath in vain: "[for] you are desecrating the name of your Lord; I am God." If he transgresses amidst ten Jews, he desecrates [God's] name in public. Conversely, anyone who refrains from committing a sin or performs a mitzvah for no ulterior motive, neither out of fear or dread, nor to seek honor, but for the sake of the Creator, blessed be He - as Joseph held himself back from his master's wife - sanctifies God's name.
Maimonides' definition is reflected in a notable dispute of an unexpected nature, regarding the transgression of lashon hara. In the Talmud, it is implied that lashon hara is an expression of pure malice, not benefiting the speaker in any way, while devastating the subject. The speaker is compared to a snake who bites and poisons, without the benefit of at least eating his victim, as other predatory animals do (Taanit 8a, commenting on Ecc. 10:11). The Chafetz Chaim emphasized this element in his writings, (Chafetz Chaim, Introduction, Prohibitions #6) and thus asserted that more than other transgressions, lashon hara constitutes a desecration of God’s Name, as a sin reflective more of rebellion than of any personal motive. R. Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, known as the Chazon Ish, was quoted as saying that the Chafetz Chaim’s advancing of this claim was proof that the saintly author “never tasted the taste of lashon hara.”
(See A’aleh BaTamar,p. 36; for further questions on this, see R. Chaim Rappaport, in the journal Ohr Yisrael, XLVIII, pp. 230-232, and see also R. Nissim Karelitz, Chut Shani, pp. 333-334. See as well the detailed objection of R. Yaakov Edelstein, in KaMatar Likchi, vol. II, p. 102-104, who sides with the Chazon Ish against the position of the Chafetz Chaim, and interprets the Talmud’s statement accordingly. See also the comments of R. Yitzchak Hutner, Sefer Zikaron LeMaran Ba’al HaPachad Yitzchak, pp. 329-331. R. Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook had a similar objection to the Chafetz Chaim’s position on this point; see Bein Shnei Kohanim Gedolim, pp. 106-109. See also R. Yehonatan Rozler, He’arot Rigshei Chaim, pp. 23-25.)
In his Be’er Mayim Chaim section of that work, he adds another element to explain the unique desecration involved: In contrast to other transgressions; lashon hara is particularly subject to rationalization and self-justification. Accordingly, one who is accused of lashon hara, rather than ceasing his behavior, will continue and intensify it, so as to validate the original act. It thus emerges that this sin expands the more it is criticized, thus creating a greater desecration to God’s Name than do other sins. (See also R. Yaakov Avraham Marcus, in the journal Marpei Lashon, II, 32-38.) R. Mordechai Zvi Zilber, Zikron David, p. 29, offers another aspect, citing the Sefer Yereim, #6, and noting that a desecration of God's Name takes place when a serious transgression is treated frivolously, a reality that certainly applies to lashon hara.
Maimonides, in the following paragraph (5:11), adds something closer to the more familiar definition writing, “There are other deeds which are also included in [the category of] the desecration of [God's] name, if performed by a person of great Torah stature who is renowned for his piety - i.e., deeds which, although they are not transgressions, [will cause] people to speak disparagingly of him. This also constitutes the desecration of [God's] name”, adding examples such as “whose conduct with other people is not gentle and he does not receive them with a favorable countenance, but rather contests with them and vents his anger”.
When considering the holistic aspects of Kiddush Hashem, one might draw a linguistic connection to the general mandate of Holiness (Lev. 19:2). Nachmanides, in his biblical commentary, addresses the seemingly vague and redundant character of this directive. He asserts that it is a mandate to perceive the spirit of the law within its details, and to carry oneself with an attribute of holiness that does not depend on the sum of its parts. This is evocative of the impressionistic sanctification of God's name that is asked of the Jew through the totality of his behavior.
This may be relevant to understanding one particularly challenging aspect of the application of the chilul Hashem, the notion of acting differently than the halakhah requires because of Chilul Hashem. While going above and beyond demands is an appealing concept, in this context, it appears as if one is attempting to earn credit on behalf of the halakhic system through behavior that is not actually included in its requirements; this would seem to be both disingenuous and reflective of a lack of faith in the halakhah itself to earn its own respect.
This notion, however, may be explained as something quite the opposite of that, building off of Nachmanides' formulation. Just as one is obligated to extend his practice of Jewish law to incorporate the spirit as well, it may be recognized that, to the observer, the unappreciated complexities of the legal system may create a misimpression as to what the underlying values are. In those cases, the call of the moment is to emphasize the values, even if they would manifest themselves in behavior that is not clearly a part of the obligatory system.
In these cases, the need to consider the impression upon observers does impact behavior. When the trends of the moment are in clear conflict with the values of Halakhah, the Kiddush Hashem mandate would not call for simple conformity; to the contrary. In those cases, upholding the halakhic value despite its unpopularity is the true Kiddush Hashem, while jettisoning it to earn the favor of others would be the Chilul Hashem.
By the same token, the fulfillment of a mitzvah, regardless of how it is perceived, would not in itself be a Chilul Hashem. Nonetheless, the method of fulfillment may indeed constitute a Chilul Hashem if it disregards principles of behavior that are inherently worthy of consideration. For example, public prayer would not constitute a Chilul Hashem even if an observing population regarded such actions with disdain. However, if this prayer was conducted through the appropriation of a public space without consideration of the needs of others, or, worse, in open disregard of those needs, or of property rights, a Chilul Hashem would indeed result. It is also possible that behavior that is overtly bizarre, even if it has been prompted by halakhic considerations imperceptible to reasonable observers, may constitute a Kiddush Hashem that may become an overriding consideration. (See the discussions in Resp. MiMizrach Shemesh II, 31; Birkat Avraham, Berakhot 19; Nekudat Ohr, III, 179-185.)
The idea that an individual may carry a liability for Chilul Hashem, even when it is perpetrated inadvertently, is one that requires some explanation; it seems unjust to blame one for that which they do without intention. The recent marking of Pesach Shenimay provide a relevant framework.
The concept refers to a replacement opportunity described in the Torah for those who were prevented from participating in the Paschal sacrifice on its proper date, including for reasons of ritual impurity. The principle is taught in response to inquiry from individuals who are indeed ritually impure, through involvement in the funeral needs of an individual who would otherwise have been abandoned (see Sukkah 25b). They plaintively ask, “Why should we be left out?” (Num. 9:7).
On the surface, the question is hard to understand. While they may consider themselves unfortunate to have missed the opportunity, real life constantly involves such disappointments as when circumstances simply do not allow one to participate. If that is the case here, the question seems to have its own immediate answer.
Some suggest that their question actually contains a deeper implication. When one is forced by circumstances to miss out on a meritorious act, it may be perceived that some spiritual lack contributed to Heavenly interference with their obtaining this merit (see R. Gedalyah Schorr, Ohr Gedalyahu). They were therefore reassured that no such spiritual deficiency existed, and they were indeed entitled to a later opportunity.
Further, missed opportunities or worse, mishandled opportunities, may stem not from concealed spiritual inadequacy, but rather from a neglect of character that is indeed directly attributable to the individual, even if the mistake of the moment is inadvertent. The mandate of Kiddush Hashem is an overarching, holistic one that does not wait for the point of decision making. It demands preparation and forethought, the investment of time and attention in the development of a character that will behave, even subconsciously, in a fashion that is a credit to his faith and his people. When this effort is lacking, the unfortunate results that ensue are indeed the fault of he who embodies them (see Rabbenu Yonah to Avot); he will not be able to ask of the unrealized Kiddush Hashem, “why was I left out?”
The Talmud’s discussion of Chilul Hashem continues to elaborate: Abaye said: As it was taught in a baraita that it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God” (Deut. 6:5), which means that you shall make the name of Heaven beloved. How should one do so? in that he should read Torah, and learn Mishnah, and serve Torah scholars, and he should be pleasant with people in his business transactions. What do people say about such a person? Fortunate is his father who taught him Torah, fortunate is his teacher who taught him Torah, woe to the people who have not studied Torah. So-and-so, who taught him Torah, see how pleasant are his ways, how proper are his deeds. The verse states about him and others like him: “You are My servant, Israel, in whom I will be glorified” (Isaiah 49:3). But one who reads Torah, and learns Mishnah, and serves Torah scholars, but his business practices are not done with integrity, and he does not speak pleasantly with other people, what do people say about him? Woe to so-and-so who studied Torah, woe to his father who taught him Torah, woe to his teacher who taught him Torah. So-and-so who studied Torah, see how harmful are his deeds, and how despicable are his ways”.
A precise definition of Kiddush Hashem may indeed be elusive; however, it can be plainly said that we know it when we see it. So, too, does everyone else; and that, ultimately, is the point.
