Li-zchus -
R' Moshe Yehuda Hanus
R' Shmuel Stein
R' Chaim Schreck
R' Eytan Feldman
R' Avromi Sommers
For much success in all they do together with their families!!!馃槉馃槉
The Mishna in Pesachim [21a] says:
讻诇 砖注讛 砖诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪讗讻讬诇 诇讘讛诪讛 诇讞讬讛 讜诇注讜驻讜转 讜诪讜讻专 诇讙讜讬 讜诪讜转专 讘讛谞讗转讜 注讘专 讝诪谞讜 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗转讜 讜诇讗 讬住讬拽 讘讜 转谞讜专 讜讻讬专讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讘讬注讜专 讞诪抓 讗诇讗 砖专讬驻讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗祝 诪驻专专 讜讝讜专讛 诇专讜讞 讗讜 诪讟讬诇 诇讬诐:
For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also feed it to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds; and one may sell it to a gentile; and it is permitted to derive benefit from it. After its time passes, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread. With regard to the manner of removal of leavened bread.
诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讘讛诪讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讞讬讛 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 讘讛诪讛 讚讗讬 诪砖讬讬专讗 讞讝讬 诇讛 讗讘诇 讞讬讛 讚讗讬 诪砖讬讬专讗 拽诪爪谞注讗 诇讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗
The Gemara continues to read the mishna precisely. The mishna states that one may feed his leavened bread to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach about the case of domesticated animals, and why do I need it to teach about non-domesticated animals as well? The halacha should be the same for both cases.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach us both cases, as had it taught only about domesticated animals, one would have said that it is permitted feed them because if the animal leaves over some leavened bread one will see what is left over and dispose of it. However, with regard to a non-domesticated animal, if it leaves over any of the leavened bread, it hides it to save for later. Therefore, one could say that it is not permitted to feed it so close to the time when leavened bread is prohibited.
We see from this Gemara that if one gives chometz to an animal and the animal leaves some of it over - it is still considered the possession of the person and he is liable for owning chometz. From here the Beis Halevi [1-24] proved that even though 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讚注转 is 讛驻拽专, that is only true if he doesn't care about what happens to the object. But if he throws a 讻诇讬 from the roof and wants the 讻诇讬 to smash i.e. he is still connected to the object via his desire for something to happen to it - it remains his until his intentions are fulfilled.
With this understanding we have new insight into the Gemara that says that if one throws his 讻诇讬 from the roof and somebody standing below STEPPED INTO THE PITCH and CLOBBERED the 讻诇讬 before it falls he is 驻讟讜专 because he is in effect breaking a 讻诇讬 that is about to be broken and hasn't really caused the owner any undue harm. In Talmudic parlance "诪谞讗 转讘讬专讗 转讘专"!! But WAIT!! There is ANOTHER reason he should be 驻讟讜专! That is because the 讻诇讬 was rendered 讛驻拽专 when heaved from the roof??
The answer jives nicely with our principle: Since the owner wanted to the 讻诇讬 to be broken on the ground, it remains in his possession until that happens. So if the person on the ground breaks it, he would be liable if not for the fact that 诪谞讗 转讘讬专讗 转讘专.
In the words of the Beis Halevi:
讜讘讝讛 诪讬讜砖讘 诇谞讜 讚注转 讛讟讜专 讘讞讜"诪 住讬' 专住"讗 砖讻转讘 讚讗讘讚讛 诪讚注转 讛讜讬 讛驻拽专 讜讛拽砖讜 注诇讬讜 诪讛讗 讚讘讘"拽 讚祝 讻"讜 讚拽讗诪专 讝专拽 讻诇讬 诪专讗砖 讛讙讙 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜砖讘专讜 讘诪拽诇 驻讟讜专 诪"讟 诪谞讗 转讘讬专讗 转讘讬专 讜驻讬专砖 专砖"讬 砖诐 讝专拽 讻诇讬 讘注诇 讛讻诇讬 讜诇讛讟讜专 讛讗 诪讬讚 砖讝专拽讜 讛讜讬 讛驻拽专 讜讘诇讗讜 讛讱 住讘专讗 讚诪谞讗 转讘讬专讗 转讘专 驻讟讜专 讜讙诐 讚讗诐 讘讗 讗讞专 讜讞讟驻讛 诪讛讗讜讬专 讬讛讬讛 砖诇讜. 讜讛讜讻讬讞讜 诪讝讛 讚专砖"讬 讞诇拽 注诇 讛讟讜专 讜注讬讬' 讘专讗"砖 讘"拽 砖诐 诪讛 砖讛讬拽砖讛 注诇 专砖"讬. 讜讘讗诪转 谞讬讞讗 讚讛讟讜专 诇讗 讻转讘 讻谉 专拽 讘谞讜转谉 讻诇讬诐 讘专"讛 讚诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛 讻诇诇 诪讛 砖讬转讞讚砖 讘讛谉 讜诪砖"讛 住"诇 讚谞注砖讛 讛驻拽专 讗讘诇 讘讝讜专拽 讻诇讬诐 诇砖讜讘专诐 讚专讜爪讛 讘砖讘讬专转谉 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讬砖 诇讛讘注诇讬诐 讗讬讝讛 专爪讜谉 讘讛诐 诪砖"讛 拽讜讚诐 砖谞注砖讛 专爪讜谞讜 讜诇讗 谞砖讘专讜 注讚讬讬谉 讛诐 砖诇讜.
With this understanding in hand [or in mind] we can also explain a Gemara in Sanhedrin [48a at the bottom]:
讛讬讜 讗讘讬讜 讜讗诪讜 诪讝专拽讬谉 讘讜 讻诇讬诐, 诪爪讜讛 注诇 讛讗讞专讬诐 诇讛爪讬诇谉
If the father and the mother of the deceased were throwing garments onto their late son’s bier so that they would be buried along with him, it is a mitzva for the others present to save those garments from being lost.
The logical part of my brain [seemingly, in my case, a very small percentage] jumps in and asks - what is the problem?? Why should people have to save these garments?? The are in the category of 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讚注转 and thus 讛驻拽专??
AHHHHH!! But now we understand!! Since the parent wants the garments to be buried with the son and thus forbidden for benefit, until that happens they are not rendered 讛驻拽专!!
IN the words of the Master:
讜讻谉 诪讬讜砖讘 讘讝讛 讙"讻 诪讛 讚讛拽砖讜 注诇 讛讟讜专 诪讛讗 讚住谞讛讚专讬谉 讚祝 诪"讞 讛讬讜 讗讘讬讜 讜讗诪讜 诪讝专拽讬谉 讘讜 讻诇讬诐 诪爪讜讛 注诇 讗讞专讬诐 诇讛爪讬诇谉 讚诇讗 谞注砖讜 讛驻拽专 讻讬讜谉 讚诪转讻讜讜谞讬诐 诇讗住讜专 注诇讬讜 讛讻诇讬诐 诪砖"讛 拽讜讚诐 砖谞讗住专讜 讛讜讬 砖诇讛诐 注讚讬讬谉. 讜讛讜讗 住讘专讗 谞讻讜谞讛 讜注讻"驻 讞讝讬谞谉 诪讛讗 讚讘"拽 讚讘讝讜专拽 讻诇讬 诇砖讘专诐 拽讜讚诐 砖谞砖讘专讜 讗讬谞诐 讛驻拽专:
Let's go for a trifecta!!
With this principal we can also resolve a question of Tosfos [Bava Basra 138a 讚"讛 讻讗谉]:
The Gemara [bottom of 137b] says:
讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讛诇讛 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讛谉 拽谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诪讚 讜爪讜讜讞 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one writes a document granting his property to another, and the other person says: I do not want it, he acquires it, and this is the halacha even if he is standing and shouting in protest that he does not want it. And Rabbi Yochanan says that he does not acquire it.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 诪诪诇 讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬
Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: And they do not disagree with each other.
讻讗谉 讘爪讜讜讞 诪注讬拽专讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讜转拽 诪注讬拽专讗 讜诇讘住讜祝 爪讜讜讞
Here, in Rabbi Yochanan’s statement, it is a case where he is shouting in protest at the outset. As soon as he is given the deed of gift he states that he does not want it. In this case, he does not receive the property. There, in Shmuel’s statement, it is a case where he is initially silent when he receives the deed of gift, and is ultimately shouting in protest that he does not want it. In this case he acquires the gift before he protests, so it is his.
Says the Rashbam:
讻讗谉 讘爪讜讜讞 诪注讬拽专讗 - 诪转讞诇讛 讻砖诪住专 诇讜 讝讛 讗转 讛砖讟专 讛转讞讬诇 爪讜讜讞 讛诇讻讱 诇讗 拽谞讛 砖讗讬谉 诪讝讻讬谉 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讚讞讜讘 讛讜讗 诇讜 讚讻转讬讘 (诪砖诇讬 讟״讜:讻״讝) 砖讜谞讗 诪转谞讜转 讬讞讬讛 讜讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 [讘讗诇讜 讟专讬驻讜转] (讞讜诇讬谉 讚' 诪讚:), 讜讛谞讜转谉 注爪诪讜 诇讗 转讞讝讬专 诇讜, 砖讛专讬 住讬诇拽 注爪诪讜 诪讛诐 讗诇讗 讛驻拽专 讛诐 讜讻诇 讛诪讞讝讬拽 讘讛谉 讝讻讛 讘讛谉 讻讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讘讻专讬转讜转 讘转讞诇转 驻专拽 讛诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 (讚祝 讻讚.) 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛谞讜转谉 诪转谞讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 讛诇讛 "讗讬 讗驻砖讬", 讻诇 讛诪讞讝讬拽 讘讛 - 讝讻讛 讘讛, 讜讗住拽讬谞谉 讛转诐 讻专讬砖 诇拽讬砖:
The Rashbam says that if he protested from the beginning, he did not acquire because one does not acquire against his will. Even so, the giver removed himself [from his property], and it is hefker; This is like Reish Lakish, who said in Kerisus (24a) that if one gave a gift to his friend, and the latter said "I do not want it", whoever seizes it first acquires it.
Asked the famous Tosafist Rabbeinu Peter [!!]:
讜注讜讚 拽砖讛 诇讛专''专 驻讟专 讚讗诪专 讘讛讙讜讝诇 (讘''拽 讚祝 拽讟讝.) 讙讘讬 讞诪专讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 讚讗讚注转讗 讚讗专讬讗 讗驻拽专讬讛 讗讚注转讬讛 讚讻''注 诇讗 讗驻拽专讬讛
It says in Bava Kama (116a) that a lion accompanied the caravan of Rav Safra. Each night, a member of the caravan gave his donkey to the lion, and the lion ate it. On Rav Safra's night, the lion did not eat it. He made a kinyan on his donkey. The Gemara says that really, he did not need to, for Rav Safra made his donkey hefker for the lion, but not for others;
讜讗''讻 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 拽讜讚诐 砖讘讗讛 诪转谞讛 诇讬讚讜 讗诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讛驻拽专 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 砖讬讞讝讬专讜 诇谞讜转谉 讚讗讚注转讗 讚诇讬拽讘诇 诪讬谞讬讛 拽讗 讬讛讬讘 讜诇讗 砖讬讛讬讛 讛驻拽专 诇讻诇
If so, according to Reish Lakish, before the gift came to his hand, why is it hefker? We should say that it returns to the giver, for he gave it with intent for the recipient, but not that it should be hefker for everyone!
Answers the Beis Halevi: There is a difference between the two cases.. Rav Safra's intention was solely that the lion eat the donkey. Since it was not eaten, it automatically reverts back to the possession of Rav Safra. But in the Gemara in Bava Basra, the intention of the person giving the gift was to allow his friend to acquire it. Since this intention was fulfilled, the object becomes 讛驻拽专. Like we said, in a case where the person's intentions are actualized, the object becomes 讛驻拽专.
With great brevity, writes the Beis Halevi:
讚注转 讛专砖讘"诐 讘讘"讘 讚祝 拽诇"讞 讚讛讗 讚讗诪专 专"诇 讘讻专讬转讜转 讚祝 讻"讚 讚讛谞讜转谉 诪转谞讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 讛诇讛 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讛 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘讛 讝讻讛 讚讗讬讬专讬 讘爪讜讜讞 诪注讬拽专讗...... 注讜讚 讛拽砖讜 讛转讜住' 注诇 讛专砖讘"诐 诪讛讗 讚讘"拽 讚祝 拽讬"讜 讙讘讬 讞诪专讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 讚讗诪专讬' 讗讚注转讗 讚讗专讬讛 讗驻拽专讬' 讗讚注转讗 讚讻"注 诇讗 讗驻拽专讬' 讜讻诪讜 讻谉 谞讗诪专 讚专拽 讗讚注转讗 讚讛诪拽讘诇 住讬诇拽 专砖讜转讜 讜诇讗 讗讚注转讗 讚讻"注?
讜讛谞专讗讛 诇讬砖讘 讚注转 讛专砖讘"诐 讚住"诇 讚讗驻讬' 讗诐 诪砖诇讬讱 讚讘专 诇讗讬讘讜讚 专拽 讗诐 讬砖 诇讜 讗讬讝讛 专爪讜谉 讜转讻诇讬转 讘讗讬讘讜讚讜 诇讗 谞注砖讛 讛驻拽专 讜拽讜讚诐 砖谞注砖讛 讜谞讙诪专 专爪讜谞讜 讛诐 砖诇讜 注讚讬讬谉.
AWE-SOME!!!
But it is not so simple....
Maybe the principal of the Beis Halevi does not emerge from the Gemara in Pesachim because there we are discussing an animal that belongs to the person, plus he is in his own domain [专砖讜转]. In such an instance, the food remains in his possession if the animal doesn't eat it. But if the animal would belong to someone else and he would be in a domain that does not belong to him, then maybe the food would be rendered 讛驻拽专 - even though his intention [that the animal consume the food] was not fulfilled.
Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz ztz"l bolstered the assumption that the animal belongs to him based on the Yerushalmi which says [according to the Pnei Moshe] that the latter part of the Mishna is teaching that after the time that one is no longer allowed to derive benefit from chometz, he may not feed it to an animal that belongs to him - which implies that he may feed it to an animal that is 讛驻拽专. This would mean that the beginning of the Mishna which permits him to derive benefit from the chometz is [also] talking about a case where the animal belongs to him. ONLY THEN would the chometz remain in his possession. Otherwise - it would become 讛驻拽专!!
Rav Chaim also noted that the answer the Beis Halevi gave to the question of Tosfos on the Rashmam is not compelling. The Rashbam could be talking about where the person gave this object to his friend by means of 讝讻讬讛 注"讬 讗讞专 - someone acquired on his behalf and he then refused to acceopr ownership [see the '注讬谉 讬爪讞拽 讗讘谉 讛注讝专 住讬' 讗' 讗讜转 讗 who also says that the Rashbam is talking about a case of 讝讻讬讛 注"讬 讗讞专]. ONLY in such a case do we say that the object becomes ownerless because the 诪注砖讛 讛拽谞讗讛 - the act of transferring ownership, was effective from the standpoint of the giver. But in the case of the donkey of Rav Safra where this wasn't the case, it remained his. So the Rashbam could really not be a source for the principal of the Beis Halevi - at least not in a compelling way.
What do YOU think????/
What do YOU think????/
