Rabbi Eliezer Berkovitz z"l
While the three types of inference deal with determining the unknown in the factual instance, in other words in real life, the purpose of the remaining four rules of interpretation is to explore the unknown X in the text. These are exegetical rules, which can, however, readily be turned into analytical rules of logic. The first deals with contradictions in the Bible and is called “shneh ketuvim” — “two verses” (which contradict each other). Since the Teachings are true, they cannot contain any contradictions; the truth cannot stand in contradiction to itself. If the proposition A is B is correct, then it cannot be true that A is not B. This is the postulate of contradictions, with its corresponding exegetical rule: If contradictions are found in the Bible, then they must be resolved. However, resolution is only possible as a result of distinction — establishing a difference between two passages which apparently contradict each other. This is a rule which the Talmud follows in countless instances.
The most important of the exegetical rules is the last one, which bears the Talmudic name of “davar ha-lamed mi-inyano” — “a conclusion (something learned) from its context.” This rule takes us “deep down into the very innermost heart of the Torah, because it shows us that in fact, many things which appear superficially to be outwardly just strung together in a disjointed or separate fashion, deep down turn out to be inextricably intertwined with each other.” (Schwarz) Deriving an “inference from the textual context” is the “syntactic examination” of the Biblical word; “…because the individual word has one meaning if it is taken out of its context, and another if it remains in the framework of its sentence; and because similarly the individual sentence has one meaning on its own, and another if it appears as a link in a self-contained chain” (Schwarz). The same applies to entire sections and chapters; in order to completely understand a Biblical saying, the “setting,” the “milieu,” is always of great importance.
One of the most frequent formulae in these rules is the “hekesh,” the comparison or analogy, which results from a juxtaposition in the text. An example: “… it is taught: Rabbi Meir used to say: What is meant by the verse: ‘According to their word, a decision is to be reached on every dispute and every leprosy’ (Deut. 21:5)? Now what do disputes and leprosy have in common with each other? — Rather disputes are compared with leprosy: just as leprosy (must be examined) during the daytime, as it is written: ‘On the day on which it appears,’ (Lev. 13:14) so disputes are (adjudicated) only during the daytime … Similarly, leprosy is compared with disputes: just as disputes are not (adjudicated) by relatives, so leprosy must not be (examined) by relatives.” (Sanhedrin 34b.)
This inference from the textual context can be readily turned into a logical rule (Schwarz). The textual juxtaposition draws attention to an internal analogy.
As a result of the logical laws which contain the seven hermeneutic rules, the Bible has in the course of Jewish history proved itself to be “living teachings” which can be consulted anew at any time and in any situation. The exegetical rules have expanded the Bible, making it more profound. They have shown that every generation can find the solution to its problems in the Bible. And in the process, the dogma of the eternal nature of the Teachings has become a historical truth.
3. “S'vara” — the principle of “common-sense”
The principle of “s’vara” (s’vara = opinion) constitutes a triumph of the Talmudic method in solving unknown cases in accordance with the rules of the Torah. S'vara establishes the apparently self-evident but weighty principle: “Common sense prevails".
In certain instances questions arise to which the exegetical rules cannot provide any answers: that is to say, when the Teachings contain nothing similar. For example, there is a clear-cut halachah: If somebody is threatened by death unless he kills a particular person, he may not save his own life by murdering a third person. The Talmud asks (Pesachim 25b): How do I know this? (What is meant is: A murder is indeed a sin, but in the case of mortal danger, it is in other cases permitted to violate a provision of the Law.) And the answer is: It is a s’vara (that is, common sense tells one). The following is recounted as an authority: A man came before Rava and said to him, “The ruler of my city ordered me, ‘Go and slay So-and-so. If you do not, I will slay you.’” Rava replied, “Let yourself be slain rather than slay. What makes you think your blood is redder than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder.”
This precept, which does not appear anywhere in the Bible, is implemented as if it were explicitly included in the Bible. It constitutes the foundation for one of the seven exegetical rules with which a verse in the Torah is explained, in order to deduce the intention of the law-giver from this disposition, not foreseen in the Bible, in a case described by him in person. This view, based on s’vara, prevails as the view of the Bible, and is just as “known” as if it were explicitly expressed somewhere in the text. Basically, it is even better known; the expression is often used in the Talmud: “Why should I (use) the verse (in order to say something)? After all, it is a s’vara!” (e.g., Bava Kama 46b) Or the frequent question: “How do I know it?” is answered: “If you wish, it is a verse (of the Bible, from which this follows), and if you wish (that is, if the verse does not convince you), it is a s’vara.” (e.g., Sanhedrin 30a) What follows from the s’vara may not be in the Bible, since it is known even without the Bible, and therefore it does not need first to be taught by the Bible. Contained in the text, it would be superfluous. The s’vara has the same binding force as the Teachings revealed on Mount Sinai.
However, all of this is a consequence of the nature of the Teachings themselves. The only reason that the Teachings are applicable is because they are the truth. S'vara is also truth, and hence must also be applicable. In this chain of reasoning too, however, what is perceived is the application of one of the exegetical rules of the Talmud — the a fortiori inference in the kal va-homer. The difference is that the kal va-homer always infers from the individual case of the Teachings to another individual case; while here an inference is drawn from the Teachings as a whole to the s’vara, as follows:
The Teachings are truth
The s’vara is truth
Therefore, the s’vara is teachings.
Therefore, the conclusion is: The s’vara is not applicable if it is not identical with the Teachings, that is, if it conflicts with them. Not because the truth needs additional support in the Teachings, but because the conflict of a s’vara with the Teachings is proof of the error in the s’vara. The Teachings are objective truth; in contrast s’vara, “common sense,” is subjective, and hence liable to error. The Teachings constitute the negative check on the s’vara; that which conflicts with the Teachings cannot be the truth. (This idea of the identity between teachings and truth, from which the “Biblical validity” of the s’vara follows, is incidentally the central idea of Maimonides’ philosophy. Maimonides is concerned, not with the reconciliation of belief and knowledge, but with the following insight: All knowledge which has a right to truth is Torah. For example, it is in this sense that he includes mathematics too, in Torah. S'vara is Torah — this Talmudic idea dominates Maimonides’ philosophical system.)
Constituting an unanticipated enrichment of the Torah, the principle of s’vara is of major importance in the history of the development of the Talmud.
