The Torah’s prohibition against embarrassing others draws from two distinct biblical sources: the injunction of “do not bear iniquity” (Lev. 19:17), addressing embarrassment in the course of giving rebuke, and the general prohibition of ona’at devarim (Lev. 25:17). Tracking and analyzing these sources, and how they combine to create the intensity of this transgression, is essential to applying its parameters.
The foundational rabbinic statement of ona’at devarim, the infliction of pain through words, appears in the mishnah (Bava Metzia 58b):
Just as there is a prohibition against “ona’ah” in buying and selling, so is there “ona’ah” in statements, i.e., verbal mistreatment. One may not say to a seller: “For how much are you selling this item?” if he does not wish to purchase it. If one is a penitent, another may not say to him: “Remember your earlier deeds.” If one is the child of converts, another may not say to him: “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”, as it is stated: “And a convert shall you neither mistreat, nor shall you oppress him” (Exodus 22:20).
There are a number of theories as to why two sources are needed to address one prohibited act. The Tashbetz understands that one violates “do not bear iniquity” when the embarrassment happens as part of rebuke, and ona’at devarim when it happens as an effort specifically to humiliate. Why a special prohibition is needed for humiliation in the course of rebuke is not immediately clear; however, some insight may come from a comment of R. Shlomo Astruk (in Midrashei HaTorah, beginning of Kedoshim), cited by the Chida (Nachal Kedumim to Lev. 17:5). He suggests the reference to “bearing iniquity” regards the reality of causing the target to sin more, rather than less, through the act of rebuke itself. This could happen if the rebuke is overly harsh, triggering a defensive, counterproductive reaction from the target, all the more so if the rebuke actually inflicts humiliation.
Another possibility, as will become clear, is that not all understandings of ona’at devarim will automatically include embarrassment. A third possibility is that the two prohibitions address two different aspects of experience, and are not always both co-extensive: ona’at devarim prohibits the infliction of emotional distress, while “do not bear iniquity” addresses the stripping away of one’s dignity in front of others (see also Responsa Chikrei Lev, III, 80, who understands that ona’at devarim exists separately as not every violation involves humiliation, while “do not bear iniquity” is also required even if all humiliation is ona’at devarim, as it intensifies the transgression).
This dual structure allows for conclusions such as embarrassment in private being prohibited (see Sefer Chasidim, 628), while in public being a cause for deprivation of one’s place in the World to Come, or of the latter being specifically for one who commits the act habitually.
Parameters of Ona’at Devarim
There is significant debate as to what types of inflictions of emotional distress violate the prohibition against ona’at devarim. From the commentaries of Rashi to the Talmud and the Torah (Lev. 25:17), it seems that the anguish has to be caused intentionally, as ona’at devarim is identified as a transgression that is “massur la-lev”, subject to being concealed by pretenses of ignorance.
Maimonides in one place in his code (Hil. Teshuvah7:8) mentions intentionality, while elsewhere (Hil. Mekhirah 12:12) he does not. The Chafetz Chaim(Petichah, lavin 13) notes that in Sefer HaMitzvot(prohibition 251), he defines the prohibition as involving content that the target cannot endure, leading some to conclude that there are two versions of the prohibition: that which is objectively anguishing, which does not require intent, and that which is less so, which becomes defined by intent.
The Chafetz Chaim himself indicates that a violation occurs even without intent, although he refers specifically to one who offends because he has allowed himself to become habituated to such insensitivity. R. Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Takanat HaShavim, p. 48a) writes that even inadvertent ona’at devarim requires atonement.
Further, it is possible that ona’at devarim refers specifically to an act of deception, anguishing that masquerades as innocence. In addition to this also being consistent with the “massur la-lev” classification, it also may fit better with the prohibition of ona’at mammon, to which it is linked linguistically and explicitly by a mishnah. The latter prohibition, which involves one side of a transaction either overcharging or underpaying, is premised on the victimized party being deceived; if ona’at devarimalso involved deception, the connection between the two is more evident.
In fact, the translation of the word ona’ah is somewhat of a mystery and directly impacts the issue. To some (see Sha’arei Teshuvah, 3:24), the word connotes tza’ar, or anguish, as used in a different form elsewhere in the Bible (Isaiah 49:26). R. Samson Raphael Hirsch renders the word as exploitation of weakness: in the case of the monetary version, in order to cheat another; in the case of ona’at devarim, an exploitation of personal sensitivity. To others, it is related to the word mirmah, which is associated with deception. The root ohn has related meanings in a number of biblical verses (Numbers 23:21, Ps. 5:6, 7:15, Prov. 17:4).
R. Yekutiel Graus, in his multi-volume work tracing the etymology of language that affects Jewish law (Millim Shel Halakhah, I, p. 68), offers his own theory of the structure of the word ona’ah. He observes that the word ohn has two opposite meanings, strength and power on the one hand, weakness and frailty on the other. The form ona’ah, he explains, in combining the two opposites into one, connotes an individual becoming stronger through causing weakness in another.
R. Moshe Kaufman (Zera Chaim, to part 1, klal 6:1, #2), author of a commentary on the Chafetz Chaim, suggests a variation on the usage of “deception” in defining ona’ah and explaining the link between the two prohibitions. In this formulation, the connection is that ona’at devarim involves disparaging people specifically with accusations that are in some way inaccurate or lacking in merit. In that sense, it is also linked to the prohibition of lashon hara, an association rooted in the writings of Rabbeinu Yonah. Even though that latter transgression is often understood to refer to disparaging individuals with a factual statement, it is not the case that they are actually true in the complete sense of the word, but rather they are unfair, misleading, or incomplete in some way.
Similarly, the examples presented in the mishnah, in which an individual is tarred because of misdeeds that have been done by others or that have already been accounted for, represent unfair disparagement. By contrast, he suggests, an accusation that is well founded would not constitute an act of ona’at devarim. R. Shmuel Wosner (Responsa Shevet HaLeviVIII, 309:1) takes the opposite to be the case, citing the Knesset HaGedolah that one has to be more careful regarding ona’at devarim that involves the truth than with that which is false: as a general rule, the embarrassment that will come from a true accusation will be greater than a false one, although every situation has its own variables.
Another definition is cited by the Lashon Kol HaRamaz(quoted in Otzar Mefarshei HaTalmud to Bava Metzia) that identifies ona’ah with stealing, including stealing money through deception, or “stealing” someone’s dignity.
Talmudic Examples and the Question of Deception
Beyond the examples in the mishnah, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 58b) lists additional violations of ona’at devarim: suggesting to someone that their sins are the cause of their misfortunes, or sending someone in need of merchandise to a vendor that does not sell those items. Some have interpreted these examples as cases in which it is possible to hide the disparagement behind a pretense of goodwill.
For example, R. Yissachar Eilenberg, in his biblical commentary Tzedah LaDerekh (Lev. 25:17), understands the original verse in this manner. Accordingly, he explains the examples regarding bringing up past transgressions as involving one who acts as if he is warning about imitating past bad behavior, while in reality he is simply trying to disparage. Similarly, as R. Menachem Teksin (Orach Yesharim, Bava Metzia 58b) notes, evoking the past can be falsely presented as an exhortation to appreciate the blessings of the present, when in reality there is a more sinister intent.
Likewise, the Maskil L’David, in his biblical commentary, assumes if the intent of the prohibition was to address simple insults it would have used a more basic language. Accordingly, he presents an elaborate model of what is happening when the offender brings up the past of a repentant individual: he is pretending to do so as a protection, recalling the past and how easily one can fall back into those patterns. In reality, his message is, “you will never be fully accepted”; the more insidious hope is that the target will despair, return to his sinful ways, and leave the offender as the only righteous person to be admired.
Associating this prohibition specifically with deception would also add a level of meaning to the phrase ona’at devarim in that it could be rendered not just “affliction through words”, but “affliction that is particular to words”, in the sense that physical pain can only be administered in a direct manner, while words, through their power to deceive and disappoint, are capable of inflicting anguish of a sharper nature.
A precedent for this model could be the approach of the Maharal of Prague to lashon hara. His position, disputed by the Chafetz Chaim and others, is that this prohibition does not apply in the presence of the subject, because he understands lashon hara to be an offense defined by the misuse of speech. Speech is distinct in that it can wreak harm from a distance, while physical violence requires proximity. When the target is present, speech is only one of many ways to confront him, and thus the particular label of lashon hara is not applied.
A major example of ona’at devarim through duplicity would be “concern trolling”, which, according to one definition on urbandictionary.com, refers to “a person who, under the guise of ‘concern’ makes negative, condescending, or rude statements to another”. An example would be pretending to be worried about someone’s health in order to shame and humiliate them.
To determine that ona’at devarim requires deception leads to a surprising conclusion: it would then be possible that incidents of humiliation of others, in fact, probably most such incidents, would not be violations of this prohibition. On the one hand, that may explain why an additional prohibition (“you shall not bear iniquity”) is necessary to cover such cases, but it still seems an unlikely position to take.
Indeed, R. Shmuel Kalai accommodates this objection in his responsa (Mishpetei Shmuel 119): while the sources do indicate that ona’at devariminvolves deception, they do not mean to rule so exclusively, but rather to teach a more expansive lesson. A transgression takes place even when there is the possibility of claiming innocence, which also softens the impact on the victim. All the more so then, when an open verbal assault takes place, there is certainly a transgression occurring.
Similarly, R. Shmuel Wosner assumes that ona’at devarim includes two aspects: deceptive oppression, and also straightforward disparagement, as he understands to emerge from the examples of the mishnah. Practically speaking, the position that all infliction of anguish violates ona’at devarim is held by many authorities.
Maimonides’ Additional Example, and Rashi’s
Maimonides (Commentary to Mishnah, Bava Metzia 4:10; Hil. Mekhirah, 14:12) adds an example that is not included in the mishnah: one who poses a question to someone on a subject he is not learned in, leading to his embarrassment when he is unable to answer. It is unclear why, and upon what basis, Maimonides provided a case beyond the several already available in the mishnah. One suggestion offered is that this is to highlight the commonality of situations in which the appearance of innocence can conceal an intent to demean.
R. Aharon David Grossman (VaDarashta V’Chakarta al HaTorah, I, pp. 298-300) furthers the questions on Maimonides’ example by noting that it is unremarkably common practice to ask contemporary rabbis questions of Jewish law without regard to their current study, and without fear of inflicting embarrassment. Does this imply a rejection of his position?
Building on a possible Talmudic source, he offers the following practical application: it is certainly acceptable to ask rabbis questions from any area of Jewish law. What is inappropriate, despite frequently occurring, is posing the question, and then after receiving an answer, responding with various counterindications or contradictory rulings. That may indeed result in the rabbi being embarrassed at his inability to resolve these questions, or even if he is able to provide resolutions, at the appearance that they are forced answers. The proper path, rather, is to present all of the factors known to the questioner upfront, so the rabbi may consider them all together.
Rashi, in his biblical commentary, adds another example not previously listed: one who knowingly gives bad advice to another. Some questioned the source for this addition, and further noted that this offense is seemingly covered by another prohibition, “do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind”, which the Rabbis understand broadly, to include many circumstances of capitalizing on others’ disadvantage.
In addressing the second question, R. Aaron Levine (Moral Issues of the Marketplace in Jewish Law, pp. 400-401) offered the following suggestion: one who gives another bad advice, which is accepted by that person, causing him misfortune, indeed violates the “stumbling block” injunction. However, if the individual does not take the advice, due to his realizing that it is not offered in good faith, and is instead insulted by this underestimation of his intelligence, ona’at devarim has been transgressed.
The Threshold of the Offense
Regarding the degree of the offense, and whether every slight qualifies as a transgression, in some of the rishonim the transgression is described specifically as attacks that the target cannot endure, or cannot find relief from. The Rama (Darkei Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 420:5) quotes from an earlier authority a hierarchy of insults, with some (for example, “thief” or “wicked”) reckoned as ona’at devarim and attaching greater consequences than others (for example, “dog”) requiring a simple apology. One suggestion to understand this distinction is that insults that couldn’t possibly be true, while disrespectful, do not rise to the level of ona’at devarim, in contrast with those that may actually cast genuine aspersions and thus inflict actual anguish. The need for multiple examples, it is suggested, is to display how the offense is in the effect created, rather than any one specific action; not all slights rise to that level.
The Maharal of Prague (Chiddushei Aggadot, Bava Metzia 58b) observes something he considers unexpected in the ordering of the examples. If there is something offensive in inquiring about an item that one does not intend to buy, it then appears that the threshold for hurtful language is quite low. As such, the later examples, tying an individual to past sinful behavior, are far more cutting, and should be obviously prohibited.
Accordingly, he develops a more complex theory. The nature of this prohibition is to treat the other individual as if he is nothing. To interact with a merchant with no regard to that individual’s own interests, merely as a tool for one’s own curiosity, apparently rises to that level. One might have thought, however, that referencing past misdeeds might not do so, as they reduce a person’s stature, but preserve the possibility that their current behavior might be worthy. The lesson, he explains, is that even this level of diminishing one’s fellow qualifies as a prohibition.
Inquiring About Merchandise
The Talmud’s example regarding merchandise inquiry has yielded multiple interpretations, in addition to the above notion of disregard for the vendor, and with them various practical applications. The Rashbam (Pesachim 112b) understands the issue to be that one is diverting the vendor’s time without any potential benefit for him, and possibly depriving him of the opportunity to sell to someone else. The Meiri also worries about a loss to the vendor, but for a different reason: if one inquires about the price of an item, and then declines to purchase it, those nearby who overhear the exchange will draw the conclusion that the item is overpriced, an unfair impression, as the inquirer never was prepared to purchase.
The Ra’avad (Commentary to Torat Kohanim, Behar, ch. 4) has a distinct understanding, positing that the inquirer is seeking to establish status with the vendor, as a potential customer, but doing so under false pretenses, as he has no intention at all of purchasing. This interpretation would seemingly overlap with what is generally understood as genevat da’at.
The most common understanding, however (also noted by the Meiri), is that the issue is the disappointment that is generated when the vendor, believing he is about to make a sale, ultimately does not. Inflicting this painful emotion is ona’at devarim. If so, however, one might ask: how is one ever permitted to inquire about an item unless he will definitely purchase it; otherwise, the risk of such disappointment will always be present. What emerges then (in addition to the possibility that ona’at devarimexcludes unintentional or nondeceptive offenses) is the standard that ona’at devarim develops from unnecessary words or deeds that disregard the sensitivities of the other. When, for example, the regular process of commerce requires steps that can lead either to satisfaction or disappointment, such necessary practice would not constitute ona’at devarim.
The Sefer Chasidim (#311 and #1069) applies the prohibition bilaterally, writing that one with merchandise must be careful not to indicate that he is prepared to sell if in fact he has no intention to do so. This application, in equating the two parties, is emphasizing the “disappointment” understanding.
A Concluding Suggestion
In considering all of the above applications, with their broad range of scope and severity, it may be possible to suggest an additional definition of the prohibition, and the linkage between ona’at mammon and ona’at devarim.
In the case of the former, where it is assumed that there is fraud involved when a seller overcharges the purchaser, an objection could theoretically be raised. While the buyer may not be aware that the item is commonly available for less, that arguably does not constitute actual deception. One could have asserted “caveat emptor”, that it is the purchaser’s responsibility to educate himself on the current state of the marketplace, and that the seller should be absolved of any guilt associated with misrepresentation. Apparently, the Torah is teaching here a higher standard of interpersonal responsibility: it is not sufficient that one party is not actively deceiving the other; rather, it is the obligation of each party to adopt the needs of the other, and strive for a transaction that is mutually beneficial, concerned not only with one’s own gain, but also with maximizing the benefit to the other.
Following this approach, a similar statement may be applied to ona’at devarim. Not every example that is taught in this context represents an egregious or intentional assault on the feelings of the other. However, the standard demanded by the Torah is more than simply avoiding such overt offenses; it is to adopt the sensitivities of the other as a consideration equal to one’s own. Failure to do so is to separate oneself from the other; it is that distancing, perhaps, that is the essence of ona’ah.
