לזכות אבי מורי ואמי מורתי שיחיו
לזכות חיילי צה"ל שה' ישמרם ויצילם
Says the Gemara [Kiddushin 62a-b]
בעא מיניה רב אסי מר' יוחנן אמר פירות ערוגה זו תלושים יהיו תרומה על פירות ערוגה זו מחוברים פירות ערוגה זו מחוברים יהיו תרומה על פירות ערוגה זו תלושים לכשיתלשו ונתלשו מהו א"ל כל שבידו לאו כמחוסר מעשה דמי....
Rav Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yochanan: What is the halakha if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed; or: The attached produce of this garden bed should be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed,not now but when they will be detached; and the produce was subsequently detached? Rabbi Yochanan said to him: Anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action. Since he could theoretically detach the produce at this very moment, teruma can be separated from it....
מתקיף לה ר' אבא בר ממל אלא מעתה הנותן פרוטה לשפחתו ואמר הרי את מקודשת לי לאחר שאשתחרריך ה"נ דהוו קידושין הכי השתא התם מעיקרא בהמה השתא דעת אחרת
Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: If that is so, and anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action, one who gives one peruta to his Canaanite maidservant and says: You are hereby betrothed to me after I emancipate you, so too will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to emancipate her? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, the Canaanite maidservant initially had the legal status of an animal, i.e., she is not subject to betrothal at all, whereas now she has an independent mind. Once she has been emancipated she has the status of a Jew and is not considered the same person at all. Consequently, the attempted betrothal is certainly considered lacking an action.
ואלא הא דאמר ר' אושעיא הנותן פרוטה לאשתו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי לאחר שאגרשיך אינה מקודשת ה"נ לר' יוחנן דהוו קידושין נהי דבידו לגרשה בידו לקדשה
The Gemara asks: But that which Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to one who gives one peruta to his wife and says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after I divorce you, she is not betrothed, so too according to the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to divorce her? The Gemara answers: Although he has the power to divorce her, does he have the power to betroth her against her will?
Wrote the Avnei Miluim [43-1]:
"וראיתי בחידושי ריטב"א ז"ל נהי דבידו לגרשה בידו לקדשה פי' שהרי אין בידו לקדשה עכשיו עד שיגרשנה והיא מחוסרת מעשה גמור משא"כ בפירות מחוברין דמצי למיתלשינהו ובתלישה גופה נגמר המעשה עכ"ל. ולכאורה נראה שהוא מחלק בין מעשה רבה למעשה זוטא וקרי לגירושין מעשה רבה ולתלישה מעשה זוטא, ואינו מובן דשוים המה במעשה ועוד דכל שבידו לאו מחוסר מעשה הוא כלל".
The Ritva explains that "he doesn't have the power to marry her now until he divorces her and she lacks a מעשה גמור - a complete action. Whereas when it comes to attached fruits he can detach them and with the detachment the מעשה is finished." Apparently he is distinguishing between a significant action and a smaller action. Divorce is in the former category while detaching produce is in the latter category. This is hard to understand because they are both equally "actions"? And also, as long as one has the ability to do something - "בידו" - it is not called מחוסר מעשה - lacking the necessary action?
The Telzer Rosh Yeshiva, Rav Yosef Leib Bloch ztz"l, explained that what the Ritva meant was that when one can perform a מעשה and thereby make from a דבר שלא בא לעולם a דבר שבא לעולם, that is called "בידו"! But when he can only make it a דבר שבא לעולם via a new חלות [change in halachic status], that is not called בידו. So when it comes to divorce which is a חלות [which the Ritva calls a מעשה גמור], that is not called בידו. But detaching fruits which causes no חלות is considered בידו.
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Rashi writes:
Does he have the power to marry her if he divorces her? Maybe she won't be agreeable.
Asked Rav Bloch: This Rashi is a wonder! She accepts the money and agreed to the conditions. What makes us suspect that she will change her mind afterwards? How is this different from where he gives her money to marry her after 30 days where she is married because he can marry her now if he wants and we don't assume that she will change her mind?!
The Rashba wrote that that since it depends on both of them - תליא בדעת שניהם - it is considered מחוסר מעשה - lacking a necessary action. That ALSO doesn't make sense! How is that different from where he gives her money to marry her after 30 days when it is also תליא בדעת שניהם and yet they are married. See what the Rashba answered.
Another question: The Rashba wrote about someone who marries a woman with ערלה [which is אסור בהנאה] and איסורי הנאה, that it is not called "בידו" to turn them into אפר [ash, making them מותר בהנאה] because when he burns them they are considered a new entity and that is not what he tried to marry her with originally, so it doesn't work.
Why doesn't the Rashba instead say that since it is תליא בדעת שניהם, they both have the option to change their minds before he turns the איסורי הנאה into אפר, the Kiddushin is invalid?!
OOOHHHHHH does Rav Bloch have a mehalech to answer all the questions!!! 😊
