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The severity with which the Torah treats embarrassing others, equating it in the Talmud’s terms with bloodshed, greatly complicates the experience of public Torah reading, specifically upon the not-uncommon occurrence when the reader should make a mistake. Whether or not the reader should be corrected is a matter upon which early rabbinic sources differed. The Talmud Yerushalmi (Megillah 4:5) poses the question, with the commentary Korban HaEdah explaining that the issue is the embarrassment; the conclusion apparently is that one should. By contrast, the Midrash (Shir HaShirim Rabbah, parshah 2) indicates that even significant errors should not be corrected; the verse “v’diglo alay ahavah, and his banner of love was over me” (Song of Songs 2:4) is brought as support, with the commentary Etz Yosef explaining that God is forgiving of the distortions because of his love for the Jewish people (diglo, his banner, can be altered to read v’dilugo, his omission; even his mistakes are taken in love).
In the literature discussing this issue, the concern for embarrassment is intermixed with other factors, including the likelihood that correction would cause confusion and lead to additional mistakes and would be counterproductive. More drastically, there is the fear that the negativity of the experience would lead to permanent effects on the religious faith and commitment of the reader. Additionally, the debate is impacted by varying positions regarding to what extent mistakes invalidate the reading as a whole.
The question persisted into the codes and beyond, as the HaManhig (Hil. Shabbat, p. 160-161 in Mossad HaRav Kook edition, quoted in the Tur, OC 142) rules not to correct, except for a mistake that distorts God’s Name, while Maimonides (Hil. Tefillah 12:6) disagrees. Some suggest approaches to reconcile the two, including distinguishing between different kinds of mistakes, and emphasizing the importance of appointing capable readers beforehand, while taking a more forgiving attitude after the fact, or distinguishing between those who casually are derelict in preparation and those who are trying their best (see Bach; Beit Yosef, citing Mahari Chaviv; Terumas HaDeshen, pesakim 181; Eishel Avraham of Butchach; Arukh HaShulchan, 142:3).
While the attempts to harmonize the two clashing opinions may contain varying degrees of plausibility, there is a fundamental connection between the views. Their phrasing suggests they are less about disagreement regarding either the severity of the prohibition of embarrassment, or the actual presence of embarrassments. Rather, they are about what mistakes invalidate the reading and would thus justify such interpersonal risks.
The Shulchan Arukh rules that one who makes a mistake even in one letter must be corrected (see Bi’ur HaGra, #1, who emphasizes the severity of this position; but see also Bi’ur Halakhah 142:1), while the Rama and the Magen Avraham note that this should only be true when the mistake changes the meaning. This position represents a consensus middle view on the issue, requiring corrections in some cases while allowing mistakes of lesser significance to be overlooked to prevent embarrassment.
There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the whole institution of having a set Torah reader, as opposed to the original practice that anyone called for an aliyah would be expected to read, was itself established to prevent embarrassment of those who were unprepared to read. However, it can also be argued that this change meant that those tasked with reading understand that the expectations placed on them would be higher.
Further, there are some varying understandings regarding this institution of a set reader. In the presentation of the Rosh (Piskei HaRosh, Megillah 3:1), the issue is that mistakes in the reading would disqualify the congregation from fulfilling their obligation, and the one reading the aliyah might be insensitive to this problem and believe himself qualified. Accordingly, those in charge would simply not call such people to the Torah, which would lead to quarreling. Two premises emerge from this reading: one, that the enactment was to prevent quarreling, rather than embarrassment; and two, that mistakes of this nature indeed invalidate the reading, a position seemingly in line with Maimonides’ strict stance requiring correction.
The debate continued in the modern era in the pages of the journal Techumin. R. Yonatan Raziel (vol. XXXV, pp. 463-470) prioritized the prohibition against embarrassing people, recording that he showed his conclusion to R. Nachum Rabinowitz, who agreed. In the following volume (vol. XXXVI, pp. 309-311), R. Ephraim Beztalel Halivni took issue with his conclusion, noting that there are instances in public prayer when corrections are clearly necessary, and it is untenable to maintain that the humiliation issue is fundamentally different in those cases. Rather, it must be that when the corrections are unnecessary, that is an impingement on the dignity of the individual, but when they are called for, the priority is simply to handle it in as sensitive a manner as possible. For a comprehensive discussion of the positions with a detailed recommendation regarding policy, see R. Moshe Rosenberg, in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, pp. 5-44.
This issue, in a sense, is a microcosm of some of the broader questions surrounding the prohibition of embarrassing others. If indeed there is an equivalence drawn between that transgression and homicide, given that this prohibition is explicitly invoked by rishonim regarding correcting Torah readers, it would seem that no mistake in the reading can justify such an egregious violation. As such, the issue would seem to be one of a binary choice: if embarrassment is agreed to be present, no degree of error would justify a correction. If it isn’t, then many corrections of all types could be much more readily prompted.
Indeed, this is the framing of authorities such as R. Shem Tov Gagin (1885-1953) (Keter Shem Tov, I-II, pp. 287-288), who concluded that all corrections must be done at a later time in private. At that point, it is possible to strongly exhort the reader as to the importance of adequate preparation and to convey that he would otherwise be replaced in his role. Many assume that this is also the intent of the Rama, who writes that a mistake that does not change the meaning should not invoke a correction and re-reading but simply a rebuke (“go’arin bo”), presumably this takes place in private (see, for example, Resp. Afarkasta D’Anya, II, OC 23).
However, it is possible to dispute the binary formulation in a number of ways. One is to posit, as noted above, that the comparison to homicide cannot be regardless of degree; rather, the point is that a certain level of humiliation may prompt such comparisons, while lesser embarrassments would not necessarily be included. As such, much room would be allowed to both assess and reduce the level of embarrassment in each situation.
Alternatively, it might be posited that humiliation in the genuine sense is not present here at all, but there is still the broader concern of ona’at devarim. Regarding that prohibition, necessity is a definitional factor; as such, the question of the significance of any particular error becomes more understandable as the criterion.
One example of the evaluation of the elements in this issue, as expressed by R. Yair Weitz (in the journal Be’erot, VI, Adar 5786, pp. 149-170) following a thorough review of literature, is the decision that a bar mitzvah boy whose emotions and self-esteem are particularly vulnerable should be given particular latitude and sensitivity, and the lenient opinions should dominate.
Whatever the conclusion may be, the discussion surrounding this commonly occurring issue highlights some of the competing considerations that impact the practicalities of this prohibition, including when communal standards are compromised and obligations undermined, as well as to what extent it is reasonable to assume that one who takes on the responsibilities of a communal role accepts the public exposure that accompanies that choice. The careful balance between maintaining communal standards and protecting the dignity of the individual is evident throughout the deliberations.
