Rabbi Zweig
“…that he not be like Korach and his assembly, as Hashem spoke about him through Moshe”(17:5)
The Talmud derives from this verse that a person who is a “ba’al machlokes”, an agitator as was Korach, violates a precept and deserves tzora’as. Why is tzora’as, the punishment generally reserved for one who speaks lashon hara, the appropriate penalty for an agitator?
Rabbeinu Yonah, based on the Talmud Yerushalmi, rules that it is permissible to speak lashon hara against a person who is a ba’al machlokes. What is the quid pro quo that permits such behavior?
Disagreement is not necessarily negative; the majority of the body of halacha as we have it today is comprised of conclusions based upon arguments found in the Talmud. It is possible to have a harmonious coexistence with a person, yet disagree with his ideas and perspectives. A ba’al machlokes is a person who goes beyond disagreeing with another individual’s ideas or perspectives; he feels it impossible to coexist with the individual with whom he disagrees. The ba’al machlokes’ perception is that “this town is too small for the two of us”.
All of Bnei Yisroel are one entity and have a potential for harmonious coexistence. The Maharal explains the reason for this is that we have a shared reality, for we emanate from the same source, i.e. Hashem. Perceiving Bnei Yisroel as one reality is indicative of belief in the Unity of Hashem. Therefore, on a deeper level, a ba’al machlokes who cannot have a shared existence with someone, is lacking in his “emunah”, his belief in the Unity of Hashem. He views Bnei Yisroel as separate individuals, and refuses to see the individuals as part of a collective whole. This myopic view is shared by the ba’al lashon hara, who focuses on one deficiency within a person, refusing to view the entire reality of the person. Viewing the person as a whole would temper the negative characteristics which the ba’al lashon hara has found. However, he refuses to do so, choosing to focus on the person as separate parts rather than one entity. This explains the quid pro quo of why it is permissible to speak lashon hara about a ba’al machlokes; since the ba’al machlokes chooses to view people as separate parts rather than as parts of a whole, he himself can be dealt with in such a manner.
When seeing someone with a physical disfigurement, a person tends to focus on the disfigurement rather than looking at the whole person. Tzora’as, therefore, becomes the logical punishment for both the ba’al machlokes and the ba’al lashon hara, for tzora’as is a blemish on a visible part of a person’s body. This causes everyone to focus on the blemished area, rather than on the entire person. The punishment reflects the sin; the ba’al machlokes and ba’al lashon hara focused on a part of a person or a person as a part, rather than on the whole, and therefore, they are treated in a similar manner.
1.Sanhedrin 101a
2.Sha’ar Shelishi #58
3.See Gevuros Hashem #39
