Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
The commandments regarding Amalek are, undoubtedly, among the most challenging in the Torah. This statement is true on many levels, first and foremost in the difficulty it reflects in understanding the morality of the Torah commanding what appears to be the elimination of an entire nation. Interwoven with that question are significant ambiguities as to the parameters of the commandments, the relationship of the directives to each other, and the resolution of conflicting themes in the biblical narrative and instruction, as well as in later rabbinic texts. All of this may leave the sincere student of Jewish law and philosophy deeply unsettled in the quest to both engage with the commandments on an intellectual and philosophical level, and in their application to contemporary practice.
It must first be stated clearly and without qualification that the commandment to exterminate the nation of Amalek has no application in the modern era. This remains true even when considering and analyzing the various perspectives that emerge from the commentaries and halakhic authorities, and is not subject to modification. Nothing considered here will in any way change that.
Any suggestion to the contrary is not only deeply irresponsible but contravenes basic principles of Jewish practice. We are profoundly cautious in all matters of uncertainty, and never risk violating major biblical mandates without a clear and unambiguous direction; this is all the more so when human life is involved and the costs of a mistaken application are as devastating as they would be in this case.
Perhaps surprisingly, this point is actually emphasized by the haftarah for Parashat Zakhor, in which King Saul loses his position due to his failure to fulfill the imperative against Amalek. This would seem to stress the importance of carrying out that commandment; however, the Chafetz Chaim (Al HaTorah, pp. 129-130)perceived a different message embedded in the story. Since Saul did not fulfill any religious imperative in his military activity, those who he did kill were needless victims of a campaign that had no justification. Accordingly, Saul carried moral liability for their deaths, as his incomplete action disconnected it from any religious imperative. Apparently, this is the subject of Samuel’s accusation, “what you did was evil in God’s eyes” (I Sam. 15:19). What emerges, then, is a cautionary message from this haftarah that supplements the remembrance of Amalek preceding it: any mistaken application of the commandment to fight Amalek will leave the actor fully liable for all the harm inflicted in the process.
Thus, to restate, there is no basis or license for any contemporary individual or group to take any action in claiming to fulfill the mandate to exterminate Amalek. With that important introduction stated, it is nonetheless not appropriate to simply ignore the commandments regarding Amalek and to consider them irrelevant historical relics. First, to do so is to neglect the responsibility to understand and respect the Torah’s messages; second, it would render meaningless the obligation that does apply and that characterizes this coming shabbat, i.e. the mandate to remember Amalek’s attack against the Jewish people. As such, a careful balance must be maintained between emphasizing the above warnings absolutely, while also striving to appreciate the commandment’s historical parameters and conceptual underpinnings, and their relevance to the contemporary era.
The modern inapplicability of the commandment to exterminate Amalek would be sufficiently established by the fact that there is no longer any correlation between contemporary national identities and those of biblical times (with the exception of the Jewish people), thus nullifying all commandments that relate to such identities. The Talmud attributes this to the impact of Senacherib’s actions, and presumably at this point other forces of history have contributed to this reality. The Minchat Chinukh (604:5) confirms that this equally makes the designation of Amalek impracticable.
However, even prior to those demographic transformations, there is significant unclarity as to the parameters of this commandment, and the evidence of its practice in the literature is scarce. Even the episode related in the haftarah, regarding Saul’s confrontation with Amalek, is ambiguous as to its significance. While it appears he was acting towards a fulfillment of the biblical commandment, there is also basis to see his mandate as containing ad hoc instructions that may not reflect the commandment outside of that context. Given the various disputed points and qualifications, it is fair to say that according to the significant majority of interpretations and opinions, there never was a commandment for any individual Jew to kill any individual Amalekite.
Many authorities maintain that the commandment was only addressed to the Nation of Israel as a collective, not to individuals to take into their own hands (such as Maimonides, as interpreted from a number of indications, and R. Saadiah Gaon, per R. Y.F. Perlow), and in fact it is suggested that this is why the remembrance of Amalek requires a minyan, to represent the population that is charged with the commandment (Keren Orah to Berakhot ch. 1).
Further, as later authors note, logic indicates that this commandment would only apply on a national level, given that the context is the removal of the threat of Amalek as a collective; nothing would be accomplished should any individual take the matter into his own hands, and target any Amalekite individual (see Avnei Shoham[Shlomowitz], #124). Indeed, as R. Moshe Teitelbaum asserts, there is no indication that at any point in history, any Jews attempted to be “stringent” for such a possibility, even when Amalekite identity would have been discernible (Yismach Moshe, Deut., p. 119). R. Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim UZmanim, II, 163) takes the point even further, noting that even King David did not attempt to complete Saul’s unfinished mission, and suggests that by that point they had dispersed to such an extent it was no longer feasible to address the nation collectively. As such, any killing of individual Amalekites would have no religious purpose whatsoever; presumably, it would constitute simple homicide.
The exclusion of individual Jews from any commandment to fight Amalek is extended further through the position held by many that a king is necessary for the mandate to be operative (Sefer Yereim, 435; and see Smag, l”t 226, Nachmanides and R. Bachya, to Ex.). Some suggest that the fact that Saul was deposed as king for his failure was connected to his neglect of a specifically royal duty (see Resp. Oneg Yom Tov, introduction, part 6).
To go further still, some authorities maintained that the commandment would only become active in messianic times (see Smag, lo taaseh, cited in Hagahot Maimoni, Melakhhim, 5 #1). The Radbaz (Hil. Melakhim 5:5) challenged this, invoking the episode with Saul. However, as noted, it is possible that Saul’s mission was a separate mandate directed specifically at him.
In fact, that possibility hints at an even more restrictive nature to the commandment. R. Yitzchak Zeev Soloveichik, the Brisker Rav (stencils, P. 62, # 108), notes that the fact that Saul did receive a personal directive is curious, given that the general commandment already existed. He posits, accordingly, that any action taken against Amalek must only be at the instruction of a prophet.
In doing so, he not only radically limits the scope of the commandment, but also addressed a central difficulty in the Torah’s phrasing of the Amalek mandate. In its initial reference (Ex. 17:16) the war against Amalek is described as one that God Himself is waging. As such, the notion that it is a commandment on the Jewish people, as indicated in the later reference (Deut. 25:19), seems to raise a contradiction. Accordingly, he asserts that the war is indeed God’s alone; it becomes the responsibility of humans only when God specifically involves them, through His prophetic agents. (See also the discussion of R. Yehudah Shaviv in the journal Ohr HaMizrach, issue 130-`131, p. 346ff).
The above points, collectively, place extreme limitations on human involvement in the commandment to eliminate Amalek, even were there to be identifiable members of that nation; not to mention the absolute negation that comes with the demographic mixture. Nonetheless, even if the commandment were to be deemed entirely theoretical, the theory itself continues to pose a moral conundrum, if the Torah is commanding killing people based on genetic or racial characteristics. However, further examination indicates that this unlikely to be the case.
The dominant voice on this issue is Maimonides, and his opinion is widely cited in later literature and emerges as largely representative. As he explains in his code (Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1-5, and 6:4), the war against Amalek is predicated on the assumption that they are at war with the Jewish people. Should they be willing to make peace, however, this commandment would no longer apply.
Maimonides’ view indicates that while Amalek is viewed collectively, this is still a result of active threatening behavior. Being of genetic descent from Amalek does not doom one to execution; it is possible to leave the designation that the Torah condemns.
There are a number of elements to this crucial point. It would be significant enough to assert that any Amaleki individual has it within his power to leave that group and save himself. Maimonides is going further in a number of ways. First, it is possible for the entire group to save itself, through behavioral change, even while retaining the Amaleki identity.
Further, Maimondes makes it clear that an Amalekite may even convert out of that status and join the Jewish people (Hil. Issurei Biah 12:17), although on this point there is some dispute. Before addressing that dispute, it must be stressed that conversion to Judaism is not required for personal salvation; all that is necessary is acceptance of the seven Noahide laws, the basic principles of morality. As the Kessef Mishneh notes, that acceptance itself removes the Amalekite status and confers innocence and amnesty upon that individual.
The Brisker Rav (writings on the Torah, comments to Samuel) felt that Maimonides’ position is not only compelling logically, it is evident textually as well. For this he returns to the instruction to Saul that he had considered so significant: “Go and destroy the sinners (ha-chata’im), Amalek” (I Sam. 15:18). Apparently, that description, “sinners”, is integral to the command; if it changes, the command ceases to be in effect. (See R. Yisrael Finkelstein, Torah Ohr, pp. 553-554, on the question of whether making peace could suffice even without acceptance of Noahide morality).
The question of conversion to Judaism is impacted by what seems to be conflicting implications in the earlier rabbinic literature. The midrash (Mekhilta to Ex.) appears to flatly contradict Maimonides on this point, relating that God himself took an oath that the descendants of Amalek may never be accepted as converts. It explains accordingly the episode in which King David kills an Amalekite convert who comes to him and informs him that he has killed Saul; apparently, despite his conversion, he retains his Amalekite status and deserved that fate.
Maimonides is unconcerned by that particular question, in that he provides his own explanation for David's actions, one that is more consistent with the biblical text. In his view, the convert was executed because of what he did to Saul. Normal protocol would not allow for an execution based on one's self-incrimination, and here Maimonides comments that this was either an extrajudicial case-specific ruling, or an example of royal discretion (Hil. Sanhedrin 18:6).
The opening statement of the midrash, however, poses a bigger challenge to Maimonides’ position. There is what appears to be a conflicting statement in the Talmud, which relates that the great grandson of Haman taught Torah in Bnai Brak (Sanhedrin 96b, Gittin 57). Apparently, despite his lineage, he was accepted as a convert. (Rashi’s comments to Isaiah, 44:4, also makes reference to converts from Amalek.)
R. Chaim Yosef David Azulai, the Chida, in a number of his writings, asserts that there is simply a dispute among rabbinic authorities on this issue, and Maimonides accepted the position of the Babylonian Talmud as more authoritative than that of the midrash.
Others offer various suggestions to reconcile the conflicting texts. The Megilat Sefer offers that the restriction may only apply to marrying within the Jewish people, but the conversion out of Amalekite identity may be effective. This may be compatible with a comment of R. Shlomo Alkabetz in his Manot HaLevi, who questioned the reference in Megillat Esther (8:17) to “many conversions” taking place, apparently despite those converts being Amalekites. He accordingly suggests that perhaps these people converted “on their own”, without the acceptance of a rabbinical court. This, however, poses the question of what value such a conversion contains; perhaps a distinction along these lines maybe applied. (See also Gilyonei HaShas to Gittin and Birkat Yechezkel al HaTorah for different approaches.)
Others suggest that perhaps the recorded conversions, including Haman’s grandson, were validated only after the fact, having been converted in a rabbinical court that did not know their lineage, and the restriction applies to a ban on accepting converts from Amalek to begin with (R. Chaim Pe lagi, in novellae to Sanhedrin; Emek Brakhah). However, it seems, based on the above, that the opposite approach would be more understandable; since the hope is for Amalekite individuals to abandon that identity, one would expect that the rabbinical court should be eager to receive such converts. However, perhaps there would be a concern of insincerity; while those who had already converted and displayed their commitment would be allowed to retain that status.
The Chazon Ish (YD 157:5, EH 156:5) offers a different suggestion, which may be compatible with that last point: perhaps Amalekites who have been involved in attacking the Jews militarily may not be accepted as converts. However, those who have no such history could indeed be accepted. In this fashion he explains the midrashic rejection of the Amalekite convert that King David killed, as he was returning from a war against the Jews. (See Resp. B’Mechokek Mishantam #11 for a more complex development of that idea; see alternatively the discussion in Resp. Minchat Eliyahu, I, 36).
The Avnei Nezer (Resp,. OC 604) comments on the notion of conversion as a possibility in an illuminating fashion. He posits that it is less surprising that the “seven nations”, also condemned by the Torah, should be allowed to convert; In that case, the issue is the potential harm they could inflict upon the Jewish people, and if they were to remove that concern, it is logical they should be accepted. However, he assumes, the issue with Amalek, if it is indeed passed from one generation to the next, seems to be deeper, suggestive of an inherent hatred that it is of a permanent nature. To this, he suggests that one must recognize that the very concept of condemning Amalek, despite the general principle that children are not punished for the sins of their fathers, is itself such a departure from standard policy that one who would choose to convert deserves special consideration, as he has displayed that he should not be included within this unusual designation.
What emerges is a strong consensus that the status attached to Amalek is a function of behavior rather than genetics. However, this then creates its own question. If it is possible for an Amalekite to change his status to something else, what of the reverse? Would it be possible for those who are not descended from Amalek to assume that status due to their behavior?
This was indeed the suggestion of R. Chaim (Brisker) Soloveichik. He made a textual observation, noting that Maimonides does not make reference to the demographic switch that canceled national identity when writing about Amalek. This indicates that in contrast to the other national identities addressed in the Bible, Amalek may still exist. (See R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Kol Dodi Dofek, n. 23). Apparently, a contemporary nation that adopts the behavior of Amalek would also assume that status. R. Yehudah Gershuni (Kol Yehudah, p. 634) notes that there is a precedent for this interpretation in the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 2:6, per some commentaries there) that indicates that Haman himself, that notorious Amalekite representative, was actually not the biological son of “Hamdata” and his ancestors, but adopted their behavior, and thus is labeled accordingly.
Some are concerned about the implications of this interpretation, worried that one may attach the Amalek label to contemporary individuals and take physical action against them. However, it should be abundantly clear from all of the above that this would be completely unjustified, together with the insurmountable challenge of confidently assessing such status to a degree that would satisfy all conditions. What is more significant about the interpretation, however, is its reinforcement of the key idea that the Amalek status is a function of behavior rather than genetics.
That itself should guard against any unwarranted action, because by its very nature it could only be applied to those actively engaged in behavior that earns that status. In fact, given that such realities would already trigger a response of self-defense, one wonders what the added lesson here is, a topic addressed by later authors that does not impact its central message. (See R Yehudah Shaviv, Techumin, IX, pp. 207-208).
While this can have no practical implication regarding the war against Amalek, it is significant towards understanding the commandment that remains operative, that of remembering Amalek. If we are directed in no uncertain terms to place special focus on this remembrance, and we indeed devote the Shabbat before Purim to that mandate, it would seem necessary that an effort be made to understand specifically the nature of the behavior that Amalek embodied and that earned their condemnation.
It seems appropriate to assert that the definitional behavior of Amalek is what is now known as terrorism. The commandment to remember Amalek is fulfilled specifically through a public reading of the later reference in the Torah (Ki Tetze) rather than the earlier one (Beshalach; there is a dispute as to whether that reading is also acceptable for the commandment). Consider what information is conveyed in that brief passage (Deut 25:17-19): “he surprised you at the rear, when you were faint and weary, and cut down all the stragglers”,
This is terroristic behavior, ignoring any code of conduct or laws of war. This is further evident from consulting the rabbinic literature and commentaries: Amalek is identified specifically for their non-productive, pointless cruelty (see Kiddushin 82a, per Nachmanides, Deut. 22:6, and note Tosafot Yom Tov Kiddushin 4:14, who notes that they were undeterred by the inevitable consequences); they ambushed the Jews, creating a circle around them to trap and kill as many as possible ( Midrash Tanaim, Ki Tetze, interpreting “karkha”); they would kidnap people and kill them in captivity (Mekhilta D’Rashbi to Beshalach; they would cut off body parts (Tanchuma Ki Tetze 9:1see also Ba’al HaTurim, Num.2:31); they spied on the Jews, to learn their locations and kill them (Ohr HaChaim, Deut 25:17); they would learn the Jew’s names and lure them out by calling them out by name and then kill them (see Pesikta Rabati, ch. 12, Yalkut Shimoni and Tanchuma to Deut.) As R. Yaakov Chaim Sofer points out, these behaviors are alluded to in the verse itself “that which Amalek did to you” – how they did it – “ on the path”, exploiting the journey itself (Tov L’Hodot, I,ch. 4-5). To our great anguish, all of these behaviors are agonizingly familiar to us from recent events.
The essence of terrorism is a complete abandonment of any functional definition of morality. Amalek is described in these verses as “not fearing God”. This reflects the core of their scheme: a rejection of the moral system that God commands for the world, and of the nation that is to carry His message. It is this ideology that prompts God to declare that His throne will forever be incomplete if it is present in the world; it is completely incompatible with His mission for humanity.
The midrash, commenting on a biblical verse, labels Amalek a letz, a word often translated as “clown”. Certainly, this is not the first imagery that comes to mind in reference to Amalek. R. Yitzchak Hutner (Pachad Yitzchak, Purim, 1) explains that it is a reference to cynicism, to the devaluing of all that is important. Amalek's mission was to neutralize the influence of the world's moral messengers, the people of Israel, to remove their importance, the ultimate act of cynicism and of immorality.
The Malbim emphasizes that there was no conceivable military goal for Amalek, no land to conquer or territory to defend. (See also Arukh HaShulchan, Hil. Melakhim, 71:4). The whole point was the political statement itself, expressed through unimaginable cruelty,
This ideology, that of the terrorist is a threat to the very concept of civilization itself. The war against Amalek is not an act of punishment, but rather of preservation of humanity. This fact explains why a change in behavior can impact the status, which is not the case for those sentenced to punishment; and why it may include even those not yet of age to be legally accountable for their actions, as it is about preventing the danger rather than inflicting a punishment. Amalek must be removed as a lesson to all other nations that such ideology is unacceptable (see Abravanel, Deut. 25:17; Ralbag II Sam. 1:27); it is the essence of evil and the opposite of God (see Nachmanides. Ex. 17:16 ).
Also extremely striking to consider that there is a passage in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 99b) that implies that Amalek has an actual grievance against the Jewish people, whether genuine or exaggerated. The matriarch of that tribe, Timna, had wished to join the forefathers of the Jews, but for whatever reason, they rejected her. The Talmud even states that the anguish the Jews have undergone at the hands of Amalek is a consequence of that apparently wrongful rejection. The true implications of this passage deserve serious investigation, but the very fact of its existing alongside the Torah’s commandments regarding Amalek teaches its own lesson: whatever the grievance and whatever the cause, the methods and mindset of the terrorist are always unacceptable.
We do not in the modern era have the license or the mandate to harm anyone under the banner of Amalek. But we are commanded to remember always the ideology of Amalek, to internalize and to teach the world that the methods and the mindset of the terrorist must always be rejected absolutely; that no context or cause can justify them, and no reward or encouragement can come to those who embody these characteristics. Through our own internalization of this message, and transmitting to the world, may we soon see the day when God’s throne may be complete and His message be heard throughout the world.
