In recent years, the divisions in Israeli society have been growing. Ideological, political, and philosophical debates occasionally spill over from the conceptual level into the personal sphere, and God forbid, they could turn into a real rift. To our dismay, we are witnessing an escalation of the discourse from different sides of the spectrum - right and left, religious and secular, supporters and opponents of drafting yeshiva students, etc. Sometimes each side is convinced that they are saving the people of Israel and that the most important and critical thing is for their opinion to become the determining policy. When a person thinks this way, it's no wonder that there is no unity.
The Gemara in Yoma (9b) tells us, "But the Second Beis Hamikdash, when they were engaged in Torah, mitzvos, and acts of loving-kindness, why was it destroyed? Because there was baseless hatred within it, to teach you that baseless hatred is equal to three transgressions: idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed." The Second Beis Hamikdash was destroyed due to baseless hatred, despite the study of Torah and the observance of commandments. The lesson is that it is not enough to perform mitzvos or even acts of kindness; if interpersonal and national connections are torn, we are in serious trouble.
However, the claimant will argue, "I have no choice, I believe the other person is wrong and their opinion will harm the Torah/the people/the country." Does a difficult ideological disagreement necessarily have to lead to a personal rift, God forbid? In the face of the current division, we are required to return to the rabbinic model of "disagreement for the sake of Heaven," which "is destined to endure" (Ethics of the Fathers 5:17), as exemplified in that Mishnah by Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai. This model does not call for avoiding ideological disagreements, but rather shows how they can be maintained in "perfect ideological academic freedom" and without "muzzling," while still preserving genuine love and unity.
The Mishnah in Yevamos discusses profound halachic disputes regarding the boundaries of forbidden relationships, where the rulings of Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai were sometimes completely contradictory. It should be emphasized that this is a halachic dispute regarding incestuous relationships, which are among the 33 severe sins in the Torah. We should also mention that the laws of incest also affect mamzerus (illegitimacy). We would expect each side to be very careful to stay away from the other, so as not to inadvertently fall into the prohibition of bastardy.
However, if we examine the Mishnah there (13b), we will discover that it states, "Even though these forbid and those permit, these disqualify and those qualify, Beis Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beis Hillel, nor did Beis Hillel from Beis Shammai." First, we learn from this that despite the halachic disagreements in central Torah bodies (such as forbidden relationships), mutual interpersonal love remained strong despite differences in rulings.
However, would we think that Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, God forbid, sinned against the prohibition of mamzerim? How is it possible that these people married each other, since even though a certain woman is permitted to her husband according to one opinion, and consequently her children are legitimate, she can be considered forbidden to her husband according to a second opinion, according to which her children are mamzeirim? If so, how could a daughter from community B marry a son from community A, since even though he is considered kosher in community A, according to the opinion of many of their rabbis, he might be a mamzer? Rashi (s.v. "did not refrain") explains to us,
"אפילו הכי לא נמנעו בית הלל מלישא נשים מבית שמאי לפי שהיו מודיעים להם אותן הבאות מן הצרות ופורשים".
Beis Shamai would inform Beis Hillel where there is a problem of mamzeirus and they would not get married in such instance.
Let's consider this: in order for Beis Shammai to inform Beis Hillel which Jew, considered kosher by Beis Shammai, is a mamzer according to Beis Hillel, Beis Shammai would have needed to indicate in their genealogical records in advance who is disqualified not only according to them but also according to Beis Hillel (lest their descendants marry into the Beis Hillel). This is such deep respect for the opposing view that not only do they personally accommodate the opponent, and not only do they inform him in real-time who, according to their view, is disqualified (even though according to the informant, he is qualified), but they even record in advance in the genealogical books who is disqualified according to the opposing side's view. Such deep respect for the other side's method creates an interesting outcome - not only did the ideological disagreement not lead to interpersonal conflict, but it actually strengthened trust.
How can one reach such a high level? How can one believe that the other permits incest and yet, in our genealogical records, state the person's status even according to the other side? Isn't there cognitive dissonance here?
The answer, as I understand it, is that at the core, there is no contradiction. If a person acts out of a desire to argue or out of jealousy and competition, even if these are hidden, and tries to justify their behavior as correct, then there will be a contradiction between believing the other person is completely wrong and having such deep respect for their opinion. However, if the intention is, as defined in the Mishnah in Avot, "for the sake of Heaven," in the deepest and most righteous sense of the word, then expressing my halachic opinion is part of serving God, and deeply rooted respect for the other scholar's right to express their opposing opinion is also another part of serving God.
The Torah, the very Torah that the parties study, interpret, and dispute the boundaries of its laws, the very Torah that commanded "and you shall speak of them" and "a mamzer shall not enter the congregation of the Lord," is the very Torah that commanded לא תתגודדו "you shall not be fractured and separate." The only way to fulfilll these three commandments together – to learn Torah and consequently sometimes arrive at conflicting halachic opinions among the sages, not to marry mamzerim, and not to become two separate peoples – was for each side to keep the information about those who are disqualified even according to the other side.
Even today, one might believe that the good of the people and the country is A or, alternatively, B. It's excellent that there's a range of opinions. But, all this must be done "for the sake of Heaven," with the intention being God's will and the good of the people and the country. God's will is also that we do not form groups within groups, and the good of the country is that we live in unconditional love and unity, so that we do not, God forbid, even come close to the terrible mistake that occurred in the Second Temple.
הרב עו"ד אלדד יונה
