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The discourse opens by addressing a fundamental dispute regarding the enumeration of the Mitzvah (commandment) of the Goel Hadam. The Ramban (Nachmanides) classifies the obligation of the Redeemer to kill the murderer as a distinct positive commandment. In contrast, the Rambam (Maimonides) views it not as an independent Mitzvah, but as a detail within the broader framework of Misas Beis Din (court-mandated execution).
This legal distinction is rooted in a textual redundancy found in the Book of Numbers (Bamidbar), Chapter 35:
Verse 19 (Pasuk Yud-Tes): “The avenger of blood himself shall slay the murderer; when he meets him, he shall slay him.”
Verse 21 (Pasuk Chaf-Aleph): “...the avenger of blood shall slay the murderer when he meets him.”
The repetition of the instruction to kill the murderer forces the classic exegetical question: If Verse 19 establishes the mandate, what does Verse 21 add?
II. The Conflict of Sources: Sifrei vs. Braisa
The shiur highlights a tension between two Tannaitic sources regarding how these verses are interpreted, specifically concerning a scenario where no biological Goel Hadam exists.
The Sifrei utilizes Verse 21 to teach that if there is no Goel Hadam, the execution proceeds regardless (“Mikol Makom”). The Sifrei derives this counter-intuitively from the very words “Goel Hadam,” implying that the role is essential even if the specific relative is absent.
The Braisa (Sanhedrin 45b) derives a specific requirement for the Beis Din (court) to appoint a surrogate Redeemer if none exists. However, the Braisa derives this from the phrase “Bi’figo bo” (”when he meets him”), distinct from the Sifrei’s derivation.
This creates a difficulty: How can the Sifrei use the specific title “Blood Redeemer” to imply that anyone can perform the execution? How can we reconcile the contradiction between the Sifrei—which says that if there is no Goel Hadam he is killed anyway but not by a Goel Hadam—and the Braisa which states that a surrogate Goel Hadam is appointed? Furthermore, why does the Braisa cite Verse 21 as the source of the Mitzvah, and not the earlier Verse 19 [which, in fact, the Rambam cites]? And why does the Rambam omit the law of the Braisa that a surrogate Goel Hadam is appointed?
III. The Conceptual Resolution: The Dual Identity of the Goel
The core chiddush (novel insight) of the class proposes that the Goel Hadam possesses a “double identity,” sanctioned by the two separate verses.
Identity A: The Avenger (Verse 19). This verse establishes the right and obligation of Nekama (vengeance). This is a personal status rooted in family honor and emotional closure. The Goel acts as a private individual settling a blood debt.
Identity B: The Court Executioner (Verse 21). This verse establishes the Goel as a Shliach Beis Din (agent of the court). Here, the Torah integrates the Redeemer into the formal judicial process. He is not merely taking revenge; he is the arm of the law carrying out a Misas Beis Din.
IV. Reconciling the Anomalies
This duality elegantly resolves the textual and legal contradictions:
Understanding the Sifrei: When the Sifrei looks at Verse 21, it sees the establishment of the Judicial role. Therefore, the Sifrei argues that the execution is ultimately an obligation of the court (Chiyuv Misas Beis Din). Since it is a court function, the specific identity of the executioner is secondary to the outcome. If the biological Goel is missing, the “Goel function” (the execution) must still be carried out by another.
Understanding the Sifrei: When the Sifrei looks at Verse 21, it sees the establishment of the Judicial role. Therefore, the Sifrei argues that the execution is ultimately an obligation of the court (Chiyuv Misas Beis Din). Since it is a court function, the specific identity of the executioner is secondary to the outcome. If the biological Goel is missing, the “Goel function” (the execution) must still be carried out by another.
Understanding the Rambam: The Rambam refuses to count the Goel Hadam as a separate Mitzvah because, fundamentally, Verse 21 subsumes the Goel under the category of court executions. While Verse 19 grants him the right to vengeance, Verse 21 codifies his action as state justice.
The Practical Difference (Nafka Mina): The practical application of this duality arises when there is no relative to act as Redeemer. If the definition were only “Vengeance” (Verse 19), the absence of a relative would mean the execution could not happen. However, because Verse 21 establishes the Goel as an agent of the court, the absence of a relative triggers the court to appoint a surrogate. The surrogate fulfills the Court’s requirement (Verse 21), even though they cannot fulfill the Personal requirement (Verse 19).
The Sifrei derives from the repetition of the words Goel Hadam that the Goel Hadam also serves as a representative of the court. The practical result is that if there is no Goel Hadam, anybody can carry out the death sentence.
V. Conclusion: “Yagdil Torah V’yadir”
The Braisa does not derive this dual purpose from the extra mention of Goel Hadam. So even though there is no practical difference in the outcome—either way he kills the murderer—the Torah repeated it for academic purposes. In Yeshiva terms: just to extract the lomdus (conceptual study). The appointment of the messenger is ultimately derived from bi-figo bo.
The Practical Difference (Nafka Mina): The practical application of this duality arises when there is no relative to act as Redeemer. If the definition were only “Vengeance” (Verse 19), the absence of a relative would mean the execution could not happen. However, because Verse 21 establishes the Goel as an agent of the court, the absence of a relative triggers the court to appoint a surrogate. The surrogate fulfills the Court’s requirement (Verse 21), even though they cannot fulfill the Personal requirement (Verse 19).
The Sifrei derives from the repetition of the words Goel Hadam that the Goel Hadam also serves as a representative of the court. The practical result is that if there is no Goel Hadam, anybody can carry out the death sentence.
V. Conclusion: “Yagdil Torah V’yadir”
The Braisa does not derive this dual purpose from the extra mention of Goel Hadam. So even though there is no practical difference in the outcome—either way he kills the murderer—the Torah repeated it for academic purposes. In Yeshiva terms: just to extract the lomdus (conceptual study). The appointment of the messenger is ultimately derived from bi-figo bo.
