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I. Introduction and Textual Anomalies
The lecture focuses on Deuteronomy 16:18-20, specifically the commandment to appoint judges and the prohibition against accepting bribery (shochad). The speaker constructs an exegetical framework aimed at resolving several textual and philosophical contradictions regarding the nature of Jewish jurisprudence.
A. The Internal Contradiction in Rashi
The commentator Rashi presents a seemingly contradictory interpretation of the prohibition against bribery.
The Theoretical Prohibition: Rashi first states, "Do not accept a bribe... even to judge truthfully" (lishpot tzedek). This implies that the prohibition stands regardless of the outcome; even if the judge intends to—and does—issue the correct verdict, the act of taking money is forbidden.
The Psychological Inevitability: Immediately following this, Rashi quotes the verse "for bribery blinds the eyes of the wise," explaining that it is impossible for a judge not to be psychologically swayed by the bribe. This suggests the prohibition exists because a correct verdict becomes impossible once money changes hands.
The Dilemma: If corruption is inevitable (point 2), why does Rashi posit a scenario where one judges truthfully (point 1)?
B. The Redundancy and Semantic Shift between Exodus and Deuteronomy
The lecture notes that the Torah prohibits bribery in two separate instances, using different terminology:
Exodus 23:8 (Parshat Mishpatim): "And you shall not take a bribe, for bribery blinds the sighted (pikchim)."
Deuteronomy 16:19 (Parshat Shoftim): "And you shall not take a bribe... for bribery blinds the eyes of the wise (chachamim)."
The Dilemma: Why is the commandment repeated, and what is the significance of the semantic shift from pikchim (those who see/are clever) to chachamim (those who are wise)?
C. The Case of King Solomon
The Talmud (tractate Rosh Hashanah) recounts that King Solomon (Kohelet), the "wisest of all men," attempted to judge cases based on "heart" or intuition, without witnesses or formal warnings (hasra'ah). A Heavenly Voice (Bat Kol) intervened, correcting him by citing the verse, "At the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established." The lecture questions why Solomon believed he could bypass procedural law and rely on superior intuition.
II. Core Thesis: Process vs. Outcome
The central resolution to these anomalies lies in distinguishing between the result of a legal judgment and the process of reaching it.
A. The Means as an End
Citing the Kotzker Rebbe on the verse "Justice, justice shall you pursue" (Tzedek Tzedek Tirdof), the lecture argues that the pursuit—the means—must be as just as the outcome. In secular or utilitarian views, a judicial proceeding is merely a mechanism to determine who is right; if one can determine the truth via intuition or "x-ray vision," the process is unnecessary. However, the Torah view posits that the judicial process itself—the interrogation, the analysis, and the cognitive toil—is a specific commandment (mitzvah).
B. The Transition from Wilderness (Midbar) to Land (Eretz Yisrael)
The lecture proposes a historical-metaphysical distinction between the generation of the Wilderness and the generation entering the Land of Israel:
The Wilderness (Miraculous Order): In the desert, existence was governed by miracles (hanhaga nisit). Moses and the judges often adjudicated via prophecy or divine inspiration (Ruach HaKodesh).
The Land of Israel (Natural Order): Entering the land signaled a shift to the natural order (derech hateva). This necessitated a shift from prophetic knowing to intellectual labor (yegi'ah).
III. Synthesizing the Arguments
A. Resolution of Pikchim vs. Chachamim
The semantic shift reflects the transition from the Desert to the Land:
Exodus (Mishpatim / Desert Context): The text uses Pikchim (sighted/clever). This refers to the immediate, intuitive clarity available in a miraculous environment—an "open-eyed" perception akin to an X-ray. Even when one sees the truth instantly (prophetically), bribery is forbidden because it corrupts the spiritual purity of the judge.
Deuteronomy (Shoftim / Entry to Land Context): The text uses Chachamim (wise). Wisdom involves intellectual struggle, deduction, and "give and take" (shakla v'tarya). In the natural world of Eretz Yisrael, judges must use their intellect. Bribery is forbidden here because it creates a bias that inevitably corrupts the cognitive process required to reach the truth.
B. The Error of Solomon
King Solomon possessed such profound wisdom that he functioned on the level of the "sighted"—he could intuitively perceive the truth without witnesses. He believed that because he knew the "bottom line" truth, the procedural formalities were superfluous. The Heavenly Voice corrected him, establishing that in the normative Jewish legal system, the process of investigation (witnesses, warning) is part and parcel of the mitzvah. The "toil" of judgment is required, regardless of the judge's intuitive capacity.
C. Resolution of Rashi’s Contradiction
Rashi’s two comments address the two aspects of the judicial requirement:
The Formal Mitzvah (The "Even If"): Rashi’s first comment ("even to judge truthfully") aligns with the Mishpatim/Pikchim perspective. Even if a judge is a genius or intuitively knows the truth—meaning the bribe will not actually change the verdict—taking the money is forbidden because it taints the process of justice, which must be executed with integrity.
The Practical Reality (The "Blinds the Eyes"): Rashi’s second comment aligns with the Shoftim/Chachamim perspective. In the natural world where judges must rely on intellectual toil, accepting a bribe creates an unconscious bias ("blinds the eyes") that forces the intellect to rationalize a false verdict to align with the bribe.
IV. Conclusion and Ethical Implication (Mussar)
The lecture concludes by expanding this legal theory into a broader spiritual lesson.
The Primacy of Toil: In Judaism, the value of study and observance is not found in the ease of the result (the "bottom line"), but in the labor (ameilus) of the attempt.
Intellectual Humility: One should not envy those with "quick minds" who grasp concepts instantly. The divine reward and spiritual accomplishment are commensurate with the effort exerted to understand, not the speed of understanding.
Becoming vs. Being: Just as a judge must go through the process of judgment rather than just announcing the verdict, a person must go through the process of self-refinement. The goal is not just to "be" righteous (tzadik) as a status, but to engage in the continuous, difficult work of becoming righteous.
