Tuesday, March 31, 2026

Skeptic Meets Momentary Disappointment

BROOKLYN, NY — Local skeptic Ari “The Lion-Pikores” Lefkowitz announced on Monday that he had finally formulated the ultimate logical “gotcha” that would dismantle 3,300 years of Jewish tradition once and for all.

"I can’t wait to unleash this on my podcast and other social media forums" said Lefkowitz, adjusting his blue-light glasses and admiring his new tattoo. "It’s going to absolutely blow the minds of everyone still clinging to an ancient desert Mesorah. They’ll never recover from this one. Finally, we can all stop worrying about shatnez and whether the blech was left on the stove, because the entire foundation of the Torah will have been definitively proven false. They won't have to bother eating matza this year and can feast instead on a Big Mac and fries with a milkshake for dessert."

Lefkowitz was last seen perusing X (formerly Twitter) and r/exjew, looking for the right opportunity to drop his bombshell on Jews worldwide. A knockout of a פירכא on Yiddishkeit.

UPDATE: Upon posting his argument, Ari discovered that his "revolutionary" insight was not, in fact, new. It was actually the already asked in Sefer Iyov [as understood by the Malbim], Chazal, the Rambam, the Kuzari, the Ramban, Rav Yosef Albo, and many others since. The Maharal has two whole chapters dealing with it. 

"Yeah, I guess I should have opened a sefer first and saved us all some time," Lefkowitz said, sadly looking at his lukewarm artisanal oat milk latte. "It turns out my 'insurmountable contradiction' is actually a basic kasha to which anybody with basic knowledge of Jewish thought could provide no less than six answers."

At publishing time, Lefkowitz seemed momentarily discouraged about his intellectual crusade, but suddenly shouted, "Wait! I’ve got it! A contradiction between the archaeological record and the size of the kazayis! AHA!! This will destroy them!" before making a rushed waddle back to his dual-monitor setup to start a new Reddit thread.

The Great Supermarket Controversy: Testing the Limits of Mekhirat Chametz

In a previous post, the practice of *mekhirat chametz* (the sale of leavened products to a non-Jew before Passover) was explored and defended. The argument rested on an understanding of the Torah’s intent behind the prohibition of owning chametz: since the Torah’s primary concern is that chametz not be eaten, the requirement to remove it from one’s possession functions as a safeguard against the risk of consuming it absentmindedly. On this basis, the Jewish people have embraced *mekhirat chametz* as a declaration that there is another force equally capable of keeping one away from the chametz: the prohibition of theft. The individual homeowner who sells his chametz, and then scrupulously avoids touching it throughout Passover because it legally belongs to another, is giving powerful expression to the integrity of monetary relationships.


The question that arises, then, is what happens when the seller has no intention whatsoever of leaving the chametz alone. The individual homeowner’s sale, whatever questions it generates, is within the lines of halakhic legitimacy. A far more contested scenario is the sale of the inventory of stores (supermarkets, liquor stores, grocery chains) that continue to operate throughout Passover, selling chametz to all comers. The debate this practice has generated is contentious, and cuts to the heart of what *mekhirat chametz* is really about and what the halakhic system is willing to tolerate in the name of minimizing transgression.


The Objections


The difficulties with such a sale are significant, and they operate on multiple levels simultaneously.


A store owner who sells his inventory to a non-Jew before Passover, and then opens his doors on Passover morning and sells chametz to every customer who walks in, is doing something that looks nothing like a valid sale. The *ha’aramah* objection to *mekhirat chametz* in general (the term refers, alternatively, to halakhic evasion or to a legal sham) would seem to apply here with particular force. There is no pretense of actually separating from the chametz. The chametz never leaves the premises. The owner handles it, prices it, stocks it, and profits from it throughout the holiday.


A second, and more than merely technical, problem sits alongside the first. Assume for a moment that the pre-Passover sale was valid, that ownership genuinely transferred to the non-Jewish purchaser. In that case, the store owner who continues to do business with the chametz is not merely evading the spirit of the law. He is committing *gezel*, theft, against the person who now legally owns the merchandise. The very rationale offered in defense of individual *mekhirat chametz*, that the prohibition of theft is what keeps the Jew away from the chametz, is here inverted: the sale, if real, creates a prohibition of theft, and the store owner is violating it openly with every transaction.


The two objections thus mirror the two poles of the broader *ha’aramah* debate: on one hand, the sale is a sham, wholly outside the spirit of the law; on the other hand, if it is not a sham, the owner’s conduct is an active violation of ownership rights. Either way, the situation is deeply problematic. (It should be noted that the objection is not limited to overt chametz dealers; some authorities have disqualified the *mekhirat chametz* even of any individual whose general behavior indicates he does not personally respect the relevant religious principles; see *Mo’adim L’Simchah*, p. 176. The situation of the merchant is, however, more extreme, both because of the public nature of the non-observance and because the commerce specifically undermines the claim of having sold the chametz to another.)


The Voices of Stringency


Given these objections, it is no surprise that a significant number of major authorities completely rejected the validity of such sales, ruling not merely that they were inappropriate but that they were null and void, leaving the chametz fully prohibited. Among those taking this position were the *S’dei Chemed* (*ma’arekhet chametz u’matzah*, 9:35), *Resp. Maharam Shik* (OC 205), R. Tuvia Goldstein (*Resp. Emek Halakhah*, II, 36:3), *Resp. Uri V’Yishi* 121, *Resp. Shevevei Eish* (OC, III, 12:5), and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, as quoted in R. Eliyahu Shlesinger’s *Mo’adei Kodshekha* (p. 216). Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik was also among those who completely disapproved of such sales.


The stringent position offered its own counter-argument to the lenient technical claims that have been presented. The standard defense of *mekhirat chametz* in these circumstances holds that a seller’s insincerity, even when established by later actions, cannot retroactively cancel the rights of a buyer. The stringent authorities responded that when the insincerity is blatant and evident to the entire world, as it is when a store has been publicly open on Passover for years running, this is categorically different. The situation parallels the case of *Matnat Beit Choron* discussed in the Talmud (*Nedarim* 48a): a man had taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving any benefit from his son. When the son wished to make a wedding for his own son, he sought a maneuver that would allow his father to attend the wedding. To circumvent the vow, the son transferred his property to a friend, with the transparent understanding that the transfer had no real-world effect and existed only to allow the father to make use of it for the wedding. The Talmud rules that such a transfer is treated as null, because the subsequent behavior of the parties makes the original insincerity manifest. Here too, where a store’s doors open on Passover morning just as they do every other day of the year, the owner’s earlier “sale” is similarly exposed as having never reflected genuine intent.


R. Moshe Shternbuch (*Resp. Teshuvot V’Hanhagot*, I, 288) combined both objections, invalidating the sale because of the continuing commerce and additionally noting that since there is no valid *bittul* (nullification) of the chametz, the sale falls short even of the standard defended by the *Bekhor Shor* regarding ordinary *mekhirat chametz*.


*Resp. Pri HaSadeh* (II, 124) inverted the logic of the *Chatam Sofer*, who had argued that the main consideration validating *mekhirat chametz* is the removal of the Jew from engagement with the chametz, noting that in this case the Jew is openly conducting business with the chametz, thus eliminating the very foundation of the sale’s legitimacy.


Notably, even the *S’dei Chemed*, despite his stringent ruling, did not follow his position to its full logical conclusion of declaring the chametz completely forbidden in all benefit after Pesach. Rather, he limited the prohibition to selling to other Jews, explaining that while the more stringent position would be more logical, it is less likely to be observed, and he therefore opted for the lesser evil (*ha-ra b’miuto*).


The Sanzer Rebbe and the Opening for Leniency


Notwithstanding these formidable objections, there were significant authorities who found at least some basis for the validity of such sales. In many respects, the question is not fundamentally different from that of allowing any non-observant Jew to participate in the communal *mekhirat chametz*, a person who may not take the sale seriously and may in fact continue to consume his own chametz during Passover. The arguments in both directions tend to travel together.


The most widely cited responsum on this question was authored by R. Chaim Halberstam of Sanz (1793–1876), known as the *Divrei Chaim* (*Resp. Divrei Chaim*, II, OC, 46). He addressed the scenario of a completely non-observant Jew who regularly sold his chametz before Passover but was traveling one year when the time came, and sent a message to his non-Jewish wife instructing her to arrange the sale *lifnim* (superficially, for appearances) so that he not be given trouble afterward. (The analysis of related aspects of this situation is further developed in *Resp. Avnei Nezer*, OC, 337, and *Resp. Yashiv Yitzchak*, XXVII, 11–14.)


R. Chaim Halberstam was asked: given the seller’s explicit insincerity, is such a sale still valid? Perhaps, he explained, this seller believes the sale is only superficial because the chametz returns to him after Passover; in other words, he misunderstands the nature of the transaction. If he were made aware that the requirement is a genuine transfer of ownership before Passover, he would presumably agree to such a sale. On this basis, the sale should be considered valid, and his chametz is permissible after Passover.


While R. Chaim did not directly address the question of the seller consuming his own chametz over Passover, given the seller’s non-observance and non-Jewish spouse, this was presumably taken for granted. (This is noted explicitly in *Resp. Chelkat Ya’akov*, OC 194.) The core of his ruling, that the owner would consent to a genuine sale if he properly understood it, was endorsed by many subsequent authorities.


Later authors connected this reasoning to a Talmudic principle (*Bava Batra* 48a) that was explained in a striking way by Maimonides (*Hil. Gerushin* 2:20): that a bill of divorce can under certain circumstances be coerced from a recalcitrant husband, despite the formal requirement of his consent, on the grounds that his inner will is to comply with divine law, no matter how much his statements and actions suggest otherwise. The overwhelming practical and spiritual benefit to the store owner, preserving his chametz’s value and minimizing his technical violations, points to a clear, objectively desirable outcome, and thus this can be considered his true underlying desire. (See *Chelkat Ya’akov*, ibid., in detail; *Mo’adim L’Simchah*, IV, pp. 176–178; and R. Yitzchak Zilberstein, *Chashukei Chemed*, *Pesachim* 10a. R. Zilberstein also considers an additional approach, based on a comment of *Rashba*, *Shabbat* 18b, s.v. *gigit*, that invokes the possibility of *Beit Din* communally declaring property ownerless when doing so will prevent the populace from sinning, an approach first suggested, albeit cautiously, by R. Yehoshua of Kutno, *Resp. Yeshuot Malko*, OC 36.)


A Spectrum of Lenient Positions


Even among those who found some validity in such sales, the range of positions was wide, reflecting different calibrations of the *ha’aramah* debate:


**Position A: The sale is completely valid, effective *ab initio*, and morally acceptable.** This view rests on three premises. First, a transaction between two parties is governed only by its explicit terms; a seller’s insincerity, even when clearly established by later actions, cannot cancel ownership rights already acquired by a buyer. (R. Binyamin Aryeh Weiss, *Resp. Even Yikarah*, *telita’ah*, 127, goes further, stressing that even if both parties subsequently agree to cancel an effective sale, it remains in force until they actually complete the formal process of retransfer.) Second, even a non-observant seller may be presumed to prefer the more acceptable classification for his behavior — this is actually expressed as a general Talmudic principle (*Chulin* 4a) that even one willing to sin does not abandon what is permitted in order to indulge in the prohibited. Third, the store owner should not be considered a thief against the non-Jewish purchaser, either because that purchaser consents to the ongoing commerce, or more justifiably, because he will simply deduct the value of all sales from the assessed value he is ultimately paying. All three points are endorsed by R. Moshe Feinstein in multiple responsa (*Resp. Iggerot Moshe*, OC I:149; II:91; and IV:95).


R. Yitzchak Leibes (*Resp. Beit Avi*, I, 3) initially challenged this position, drawing on Talmudic passages such as the *Matnat Beit Choron* case, where subsequent actions are used to determine earlier intent. He ultimately suggested, however, that this retroactive principle is not invoked when doing so would require labeling the individual a sinner retroactively — which itself reflects the presumption of minimal possible transgression.


**Position B: The sale is valid after the fact, but concededly outside the spirit of the law.** This view accepts the technical validity of the sale while acknowledging that the arrangement fails to meet any reasonable standard of the prohibition’s spirit. It is valid, and the parties involved are not thieves, but no one should be comfortable describing it as an ideal fulfillment of the law’s intent.


**Position C: The sale is technically valid, but the store owner is committing theft.** This position accepts only the narrow technical point that a seller’s later actions cannot retroactively void an effective sale; it rejects, however, the claim that the ongoing commerce is innocent. The store owner is selling merchandise that legally belongs to someone else, and this constitutes *gezel*, plain and simple. (The question of whether the sale is a net spiritual detriment to the store owner, in that it renders him a thief, or whether there are instead alternative understandings that prevent this, is the subject of a detailed exchange between the author of *Resp. Chelkat Ya’akov* and his sons, whose glosses are appended to the responsum.)


The Communal Rabbi’s Dilemma


What emerges from this spectrum is that even the lenient authorities do not view the store owner’s situation as remotely ideal. The disagreement is not over whether the arrangement is praiseworthy but over whether it has any legal standing at all, and whether the net communal benefit of partial compliance outweighs the costs of legitimizing a deeply compromised practice.


This is where the question of communal rabbinic responsibility enters. A passionate advocate for the lenient position was R. Ya’akov Breisch of Zurich (*Resp. Chelkat Ya’akov*, ibid.), who argued not only that such sales were permissible but that facilitating them was an *obligation* of the rabbinate, in order to minimize sin whenever possible. Dismissing suggestions in the Talmud that there is no responsibility to save intentional sinners from their transgressions, he advanced multiple arguments that this situation presented a distinct opportunity that religious leadership was required to pursue.


R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, shared this view (*Sha’arei Halakhah U’Minhag*, II, 195, and *Shulchan Menachem*, OC II, 228). He offered a multi-leveled argument for the value of such sales, even while consistently stressing that these stores should not be operating on Passover at all. He went further, maintaining that one of the positive accomplishments of such sales was to raise public consciousness of the concept of Passover and the prohibitions regarding chametz.


On the other side, R. Breisch’s responsum was written to R. Shlomo Schneider of Monticello, NY. In a volume of R. Schneider’s own writings (*Resp. Divrei Shlomo*, II, 123), the full exchange is preserved, including R. Schneider’s original inquiry citing numerous stringent authorities, and a follow-up in which he added later literature and concluded that it is impossible to set an absolute rule. Time, place, and rabbinic judgment must determine whether such sales are advisable, or whether instead, as he put it, “a passive approach is preferable.”


R. Moshe Feinstein, despite his full confidence in the technical validity of the sale, similarly acknowledged that a local rabbinic authority may decide that such sales are not advisable and should act according to his conscience. The question of what is best for the community is separate from the question of what is technically permissible.


After Passover: The Consumer’s Question


For the observant consumer, the entire debate then shifts to a different question: may one purchase chametz from such a store after Passover?


Here too, the range is wide. R. Feinstein maintained that there is no reason whatsoever for the customer to refrain from purchasing; R. Ovadiah Yosef appears to endorse this view in *Chazon Ovadiah: Prozbol* (p. 237), as does R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (*Halikhot Shlomo, Pesach*, 7:9). At the other extreme, the Vilna Gaon, consistent with his general opposition to all temporary chametz sales, forbade the purchase of any chametz that had been subject to such an arrangement.


R. Shternbuch (*Resp. Teshuvot V’Hanhagot*, I, 288) advanced an additional argument for prohibition: the rabbinic penalty on chametz owned by a Jew over Passover is designed specifically to discourage such ownership, and allowing this chametz to be freely purchased and consumed afterward would do the opposite, encouraging sinful behavior rather than discouraging it. He further cited a Talmudic passage (*Beitzah* 17b) that a *ha’aramah* is treated more severely than intentional sin, because the intentional sinner recognizes his misdeed and there is hope he will change course, while the one engaged in *ha’aramah* believes he is acting permissibly and is thus both unlikely to correct himself and likely to mislead others. (This is the interpretation of Rashi to that passage, which has broad relevance to the overall debate about halakhic evasion.)


Two Extensions: The Complete Sale and the Sale Without Consent


It is worth noting, before concluding, that the supermarket scenario can be shifted in either direction.


In the direction of greater permissibility: if a Jewish store owner were to sell not merely his chametz inventory but his entire business interest, including all profits over the course of Passover, to a non-Jewish partner, this would satisfy essentially all of the objections. Arguably, such an arrangement is as justified as, or more justified than, the individual homeowner’s personal chametz sale, given the pressing livelihood considerations involved. (See *Shulchan HaLevi*, *Chametz U’Matzah*, 18–19.)


In the opposite direction, the leniencies, once accepted, create their own momentum. Some authorities, motivated by the desire to minimize Torah violations to the greatest degree possible, have suggested that chametz can be sold through an agent even without the store owner’s knowledge, and some have gone further still, maintaining this can happen even over the owner’s explicit objection. These extreme positions rest on a maximalist formulation of the premise that every Jew, at some level, is amenable to the spiritually correct path, whether they know it or not; and therefore, since the store owner’s violations will be minimized if the chametz is considered sold, his consent can be presumed. (Even this premise is highly questionable, however, as the “benefit” of avoiding chametz violations may be offset by incurring the sin of theft from the actual buyer.) (See the discussions in *Ratz K’Tzvi: B’Ma’agalei HaShanah*, 13; *Resp. Be’er Halakhah*, OC 19; *Resp. Even Pinah*, 30; *Resp. Shavei Tziyon*, 11; and *Avnei Shoham*, 55.)


A related but more sympathetic scenario involves an individual who falls into a coma or is similarly incapacitated as Passover approaches, with chametz in his possession. Several authorities maintained that in such a case an agent may sell the chametz on the owner’s behalf. The argument is significantly stronger here than in the case of the store owner: there is no ongoing commerce with the chametz, the sole motivation is to prevent the chametz from becoming permanently forbidden, and if the individual had a clear religious position and a history of selling chametz in prior years, consent can be reasonably presumed. (See *Resp. Chatam Sofer*, EH I, 11; *Pitchei Teshuvah*, YD 320:6; *Resp. Binyan Av*, IV, 21; *Mo’adei Kodshekha*, 46; *Resp. Yashiv Yitzchak*, XXXIX, 33; *Resp. Shevet HaKehati*, IV, 127; *Choshen L’Ma’aseh*, 36.)


A final, related question involves the mass inclusion of individuals in communal chametz sales, such as the practice of the Israeli chief rabbinate, without their explicit participation. Normally, one may acquire property on behalf of another without their knowledge under the presumption that this constitutes a *zekhut* (benefit) for that person. But this rule generally cannot be extended to *selling* another’s property, since that cannot be presumed beneficial or desirable for the owner. Chametz presents a special case, many argue, because the onset of Passover will render the chametz worthless entirely, while the sale preserves its value; in that circumstance, the sale is objectively a benefit even from the owner’s perspective. (This point, though questioned by some later authorities [see *Resp. Teshurat Shai*, 443, and *Resp. Avnei Nezer*, OC, 336 and 347, who limits its scope], was affirmed by *Magen Avraham*, OC 436:11, and discussed at length in *Sdei Chemed*, ibid., 9:2.)


The harder question is how far this logic extends. Selling chametz on behalf of one who was attempting to arrange a sale but was prevented by circumstances is one thing. What about including those who, due to non-observance or ignorance, would never have thought to sell their chametz at all? For such a person, declaring the sale a “benefit” requires focusing exclusively on a spiritual dimension that the owner himself does not acknowledge or value. And the practical challenges are formidable: how would the chametz be assessed? How would any information be conveyed to the purchaser? What if multiple rabbis attempted to sell the same chametz? Would this authority belong to the official rabbi of a locale, or its rabbinic court? (*Resp. Divrei Malkiel*, IV, 18, considered these problems disqualifying, while acknowledging that great authorities permitted. See *Resp. Be’er Yitzchak*, OC, 1 and 2; compare *Resp. Panim Me’irot*, II, 52. R. Moshe Shternbuch, *Mo’adim U’Zmannim*, III, 269, ruled that the rabbi should include these categories in the sale.)


To some authorities, these obstacles were indeed insurmountable. To others, the absence of any preferable alternative indicated that these sales, however compromised and questionable they may be, were worth pursuing. Some took the position even further, arguing that an individual loudly proclaiming his disinterest in the sale can nevertheless be included.


Conclusion

The debate over supermarket chametz sales is, in many ways, the crucible in which the broader tensions of *ha’aramah* are most sharply revealed. The collective effort to balance the integrity of the law, religious sincerity, and genuine concern for the spiritual and practical challenges of the Jewish people continues to play out in the exchanges of the ongoing halakhic debate. There are no easy answers here, only the enduring question of how far the law can be adapted in the name of minimizing transgression, and at what point the adaptation itself becomes the problem. It takes wisdom, sincerity, and spiritual and interpersonal responsibility to know the difference.

The Paradox Of Self Hate

"There is a lot of narcissism in self-hatred".

Why?

1. The "Spotlight Effect" (Hyper-Self-Focus)

Both the narcissist and the self-hater spend the vast majority of their time thinking about one person: themselves.

The narcissist thinks: "Everyone is looking at me because I am amazing."

The self-hater thinks: "Everyone is looking at me because I am a failure."

In both cases, the individual assumes they are the center of everyone else’s universe. To believe that a room full of strangers is judging your every move requires a high level of self-importance. It is the belief that you are the main character in everyone else’s story.

2. Reverse Grandiosity ("The Worst" is still "The Most")

Narcissism is characterized by a need to be exceptional. For some, if they cannot be the best, they find a sense of identity in being the worst.

If you say, "I am the most flawed person in the world," or "I am uniquely broken," you are still claiming a "special" status.

To the self-hater, their flaws are not just common human mistakes; they are catastrophic, unique, and more significant than anyone else’s. This is a form of inverted grandiosity.

3. The Illusion of Omnipotence (Control)

Self-hatred often involves taking a narcissistic amount of responsibility for things you cannot control.

If a friend is in a bad mood, the self-hater thinks, "It’s because of me. I ruined their day."

This assumes that you have the power to dictate other people’s internal states. It is a subtle form of ego—the idea that you are so influential that you are the cause of all the negativity around you.

4. The Dismissal of Others’ Perspectives

A narcissist ignores other people’s feelings because they only care about their own. A self-hater often does the same thing by rejecting compliments or love.

When someone says, "I love you" or "You did a great job," and the self-hater thinks, "No, you’re wrong, I’m actually terrible," they are essentially saying their own internal perception is more accurate than anyone else’s.

By refusing to believe others, the self-hater prioritizes their own "internal script" over the external reality provided by loved ones.

5. The "Ideal Self" vs. the "Real Self"

Psychologically, self-hatred is often the ego’s punishment for not being "perfect."

The narcissist creates a "False Self" that is perfect and demands the world acknowledge it. When a person with self-hatred fails to live up to their own impossibly high standards (their "ego-ideal"), they turn on themselves.

The hatred isn't directed at the person; it’s the ego's rage that the person is "merely human" rather than the god-like version they feel they should be. The anger comes from a place of entitled perfectionism.

Summary

The quote suggests that healthy self-esteem is actually quiet.

A person with healthy self-esteem doesn't think about themselves very much at all—they are focused on the world, other people, and their work. Narcissism and self-hatred are both "loud" internal states that keep the individual trapped in a mirror, unable to look past their own reflection.

The Loss Of Silence

"כל ימי גדלתי בין החכמים ולא מצאתי לגוף טוב משתיקה". 

"All of humanity's problems stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone."

"Noise is the most impertinent of all forms of interruption, for it is not only an interruption, but also a disruption of thought."

"The quieter you become, the more you are able to hear."

"We live in a world that is losing its capacity for silence. And because it has lost its silence, it has lost its capacity to hear what matters."

There is a strange, modern sickness in the way we colonize every silent corner of our lives with sound. From the checkout line to the waiting room to being put on hold on a phone call, we have declared war on stillness. We are a culture that has grown terrified of its own echo.

This compulsive need to fill the void with music or podcasts is a defense mechanism for the modern soul. Silence is no longer a neutral space; it is a mirror. When the music stops, the "stuff" of the self begins to rise: the jagged edges of memory, the quiet hum of regret, the questions we aren't ready to answer. By drowning out the world, we are attempting to drown out ourselves.

We act as if silence is a vacuum that must be filled, rather than a sanctuary to be inhabited. We reach for our phones not out of a love for music, but out of a fear of what we might hear in the hush. If we could only stop running, we might find that the quiet isn't a threat—it's the only place where we can actually be found.

The Ritual of the Scapegoat: The Psychodynamics of Global Anti-Israel Fervor

Something in the current global anti-Israel fervor feels qualitatively different from ordinary political disagreement. The tone is not merely moralistic but affectively charged, theatrical, and compulsive. Protesters weep and chant slogans untethered from practical reality, displaying levels of emotional arousal more characteristic of personal trauma than public debate. It looks less like persuasion than expression—and catharsis.

"The crowd is always rather poorly influenced by reasoning, and can only be reached by representations of an extreme character." — Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind [seemingly describing a Trump rally].

Many of these protests express a style that prizes emotional demonstratability and collective amplification. At its most intense, the atmosphere takes on a "bacchanalian" quality—a shared escalation of feeling in which emotional intensity itself functions as evidence of moral truth. The more one feels, the more one is perceived as right. In this framework, affective display is not merely a reaction; it is a virtue.

Within this climate, a "protective charge" takes shape. Outrage becomes a way of enacting care, of defending the vulnerable and placing oneself on the side of innocence. The result is a shared closeness forged through urgency. It is not accidental that highly charged slogans like “baby killers” rise to prominence; they collapse a complex geopolitical conflict into a moral drama that activates primal instincts. Once framed in such terms, the defense of innocence begins to justify almost any means.

"The line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being." — Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

Beneath this sense of intimacy lies a deeper dynamic: power is experienced as cold, imposed, and fundamentally unjust, and is therefore rejected rather than engaged. This rejection is then displaced outward. Israel is not engaged as a specific nation-state, but as a symbolic object onto which resentment, rage, guilt, and shame are deposited. Israel is cast as hyper-masculine—powerful, bounded, and emotionally restrained—while the Palestinian cause is rendered as both noble and infantilized: pure victims, yet also romanticized as primal and instinctual. The conflict is divided into villains and innocents, with “freedom fighters” cast as redemptive, even Herculean figures.

Such moral sorting is often formalized through the language of “settler colonialism,” which has become the dominant frame in activist discourse. In practice, this framework gives ideological form to a deeper psychological pattern: the recasting of authority as illegitimate imposition and of vulnerability as moral innocence. Israel is cast as an extension of Western power, while the opposition is positioned as indigenous and therefore morally pure.

"Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil." — Eric Hoffer, The True Believer

Treating a people as both romanticized and incapable of agency serves a specific purpose. Infantilization excuses violence; romanticization ennobles it. Together, they create a moral exemption that would never be granted to a fully responsible adult. This kind of moral sorting is psychologically soothing. It permits aggression without guilt and compassion without real engagement. The intensity of the outrage begins to look less like conviction and more like emotional gratification.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the movement’s treatment of power. Aggression is celebrated when reframed as “resistance.” Violence is rendered noble when described as instinctive or reactive. Accountability is treated as an imposition. Rage replaces judgment; intensity stands in for truth.

"Everything that is unconscious in ourselves we discover in our neighbor, and we treat him accordingly." — C.G. Jung [or, כל הפוסל במומו פוסל].

Seen through this lens, a jarring phenomenon comes into focus: the willingness to excuse or soften the reality of truly oppressive regimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. The appeal is not that such regimes are just, but that they are positioned in opposition to a greater perceived evil. Once moral judgment is organized around alignment, opposition itself becomes a virtue. Actions that would otherwise be condemned are recast as defensive. What matters is no longer what is done, but to whom it is done.

A double standard governs how strength is judged. Ordered, self-possessed strength is condemned as oppressive, while reactive strength is romanticized as authentic. Israel, and the Jewish people more broadly, come to symbolize not just power, but structure, order, and limits. This becomes intolerable in a culture that increasingly elevates feeling over restraint. The desire for strength does not disappear; it is simply redirected, attaching to figures cast as the "underdog," where strength can be admired without discomfort.

For some, the conflict functions as a stage for unresolved dynamics with authority. Israel takes on the role of the "Father"—experienced as cold, withholding, and unjust. The reaction is not simply political opposition but emotional revolt. The rejection of Israel becomes a socially acceptable way to reject the concept of authority itself.

"The object of persecution is more than an object; it is a mirror." — Thomas Merton

Another layer is the appeal of self-condemnation. For many in the West, far removed from real danger, activism becomes a way to perform moral seriousness. Unprocessed guilt around power, history, and inheritance seeks relief. When it cannot be metabolized internally, it is displaced outward. Accusation becomes a form of discharge. By locating wrongdoing elsewhere, the self is momentarily relieved of its own burden.

These patterns echo long-standing anti-Jewish tropes. Jews have occupied a uniquely unstable position in the Western imagination: at once powerful and vulnerable, insider and outsider, particular and universal. This makes them unusually available as objects of projection. Israel inherits this role on a global scale, becoming a concentrated symbolic object onto which broader anxieties are projected.

"Antisemitism is not a phenomenon of information but a phenomenon of transformation." — Abraham Joshua Heschel

None of this amounts to an argument against criticizing Israeli policy. Legitimate criticism is specific, bounded, and grounded in reality. What distinguishes the current moment is the absence of those limits. When criticism turns into fixation, and outrage into ritual, something deeper is at work.

One reason for this disproportionate intensity lies in where Israel sits culturally: Western but not Christian, ancient yet modern, vulnerable yet strong. It embodies traits of perceived power that unsettle a culture organized around grievance. Its refusal to apologize for existing makes it a uniquely potent target. What is being reacted to is not only what Israel does, but what it signifies: boundary, authority, and persistence.

Most participants are not consciously aware of these dynamics. When underlying emotions are stirred but not examined, they intensify. Contradictions multiply. The response becomes repetition: louder chants, harsher language, and growing certainty. What looks like political passion often reflects an internal struggle; what appears as moral clarity is frequently a simplification that protects feeling from scrutiny.

In this light, the anti-Israel obsession reads less as a reckoning with history than as a ritual of bonding and release—rage shared, closeness simulated, and the self left largely unexamined.

The Anti-Zionists Unite In Boston

In some ways, February 12 feels like a year ago. There was no Iranian war. Israelis were enjoying a break from bomb shelters.

The world wasn’t fascinated with the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite these new realities, last month’s “Conference on the Jewish Left” at Boston University still feels relevant. It was a lively showcase for non-Zionist thinkers and activists, with Peter Beinart, the movement’s celebrity, there to rally the faithful.

It is telling that these "thinkers" gather in the safety of Boston while their brothers and sisters all over Israel are under fire. To hold a "non-Zionist" conference while the Jewish state faces an existential threat from the IRGC and its proxies is more than a political disagreement; it is a betrayal of Areivut—the traditional Jewish principle that all Jews are responsible for one another. They are playing with fire in a library while the house is burning.

It began awkwardly.

“You’ve got some nerve,” the grey-haired man scolded the college sophomore. It was 8:45 a.m., the coffee hour, a bit early for aggression. Still, heat was emanating from the older man. “You know there’s a genocide happening,” he lectured. The only thing separating boomer and Gen Zer was an Israeli flag draped over a folding table.

As metaphors go, it was fairly obvious. In fact, the whole thing seemed almost scripted. This was the “Conference on the Jewish Left” at Boston University, where anti-Zionism (and its variants) were given full, and full-throated, expression.

I told the student, Eduardo, that he had a long day ahead. “Yeah, I know,” he smiled. In fact, Eduardo had already gotten an earful from another sour boomer. “Such Zionist nonsense,” the man raved, while his wife tugged pleadingly on his elbow. “That nonsense has no place in the Jewish world.” It was a strange scene—the family seder from Hell—only the wicked son was pushing seventy. “You have a nice day,” Eduardo smiled, unfazed.

Eduardo is the true hero of this story. Carrying the Magen David and the blue-and-white flag into a den of those who wish to dismantle his people’s sovereignty takes a spine of steel. The "sour boomer" scolding him represents the Galut (Exile) mentality—the cowering Jew who believes that if he only denounces the "bad Jews" (the Zionists) loudly enough, the world will finally love him. Eduardo knows better: Jewish pride isn't about seeking permission to exist.

What did Eduardo—slender, handsome, with a silver star of David dangling from his necklace—hope to accomplish? His small booth, with its crisp Israeli flag, was already drawing scolds and cranks.

“We’re just here to share our perspective, like everyone else,” he said with a verbal shrug.

Twenty feet away, a white-haired woman from Jewish Voice for Peace eyed him warily.

To be honest, I felt a little out of place, too. An academic conference, in Boston, in midwinter, hadn’t been on my agenda. Still, I’d come voluntarily, hoping for insight. I wanted to make sense of an off-kilter Jewish world.

In New York, Jews rallying for Mamdani. On college quads, “Seders for Palestine.” On X, wild posts of “Death to Israel” by a writer for the Jewish Lives series. And on, and on. At times the liberal Jewish world seemed to be fracturing. The rifts were generational, ideological, almost existential.

We are witnessing the rise of the Erev Rav (the Mixed Multitude) within our own ranks. When a "Seder"—the ritual celebrating our liberation from slavery to become a nation in our own land—is co-opted to support those who would re-enslave or eliminate us, the ritual is no longer Jewish. It is a pagan imitation. Traditional Judaism is rooted in the land, the people, and the law. You cannot extract the "Zion" from the Jew and have anything left but a hollowed-out husk of universalist slogans.

In this atmosphere, the Boston conference felt like a bellwether, a sign of changing times. And who knows, I thought. It might be memorably strange.

“Anyone can register. Even Zionists!” Shaul Magid, a Harvard professor, wrote on Facebook.

He added a winky-face emoji next to “Zionists.”

It was a cold, clear morning, and the student union—a large brutalist building off the campus’s main artery—was already buzzing. In the vending hall, a Syrian student in a brown hijab was selling keffiyehs. Around her, Rabbis for Ceasefire chatted with Jewish Voices for Peace. There was free coffee, free brochures, and free “free Palestine” stickers.

Next door, in the crowded ballroom, an eager Peter Beinart was on stage, hitting all the familiar notes about Zionist perfidy. Beinart speaks quickly, swallowing syntax, yet he can also downshift into normal cadences—say, when discussing Jewish fears. At such moments, he takes the gentle, forbearing tone of a first-grade teacher toward a student afraid of scissors.

It’s alright, he seemed to say, you can relax. One young woman, a recent college graduate, wasn’t relaxed. After Beinart spoke, she rose nervously, reading from her smartphone. “Does this history”—she invoked the Holocaust—“not strengthen the case for self-determination and sovereignty?”

Beinart fidgeted with his microphone, then nodded warmly: I understand you. “It took me a long, long time to break with that [logic],” he said, calmly explaining that Israeli violence caused Palestinian violence. The key was ending “group supremacy.” Then peace and safety would follow.

Beinart’s "logic" is the ultimate victim-blaming. To suggest that Jewish sovereignty is the cause of Arab violence is to ignore 1,400 years of dhimmitude and the pogroms of 1929, 1936, and 1947—all before a single "settlement" existed. Beinart has traded the safety of his people for the "warm nod" of the academic elite. He treats the Holocaust not as a lesson in the necessity of power, but as a burden to be discarded so he can be "liberated" into the arms of our enemies.

Afterward, a youngish man approached the woman, whose name was Erika. “He didn’t really answer your question, did he?”

It was a difficult time for Beinart, the day’s headliner. In November, he spoke at Tel Aviv University. The event went smoothly, but the response was brutal: Beinart was pilloried, rebuked by the movement’s commissars for engaging with Zionists. Chastened, Beinart apologized. If he ever addressed Israelis again, it would be “without violating BDS guidelines.” He promised to do better.

His mea culpa provoked widespread derision. “This isn’t moral clarity; it’s fear wearing the mask of conscience,” a woman wrote on X, identifying herself as a trauma psychologist with experience treating cult members. “What you hear isn’t a free person speaking,” she wrote. “It’s someone who obeys because losing the group frightens them more than losing themselves.”

Inevitably, the Tel Aviv debacle came up in Boston. Beinart, 54, has a coltish energy, and he retains his old liberal habit of speaking freely. “When I got invited to Tel Aviv University, that instinct for me kicked in in a very big way,” he said. But he had crossed “this virtual picket line” and been scolded “in public and in private.” On stage, he thanked his rebukers.

“People have been very tolerant of me,” he said.

Watching a Jewish intellectual grovel and apologize for speaking to other Jews at a world-class Jewish university is pathetic. This is the "Picket Line" of the self-hating. By adhering to BDS, Beinart isn't fighting for "justice"—he is participating in the economic and academic strangulation of his own kin. This is the behavior of a man who has lost his soul to a cult of anti-Zionism.

Meanwhile, the conference was humming along. When it began, three years ago, a relatively small audience gathered in a converted hockey arena on campus. This year’s main venue was the 12,000-square-foot ballroom, a fairly large (in every sense) upgrade.

Beinart’s opening act was Jeremy Menchik (“It’s like mensch”), the event’s excitable planner and impresario. One of his 100 jobs—besides running the conference—is describing what, exactly, it is. An academic assembly? A strategy session?


At times, it sounded like group therapy. “We’re gonna have 350 people in a room saying, You’re not alone,” he said last year. This year, he promised both safety and excitement. There would be debates (civil, of course!). Dialogues would be “a little spicy.”

I tracked down Menchik, who was everywhere at once, and thus easy to find. Where were the debates? “Yeah, so, um,” he said. “There are a lot of them.” Had he invited any Zionists? “They all said no,” he said. Actually, one Zionist organization said yes. It was leading a workshop called “Confronting Genocide.”

Generally speaking, no one minded “genocide” (the word), but some scholarly nerves get frazzled easily. “We’re scholars. This isn’t advocacy,” Magid insisted before a 2025 conference. But it was a hard stance to maintain. “Are we disinterested scholars? My answer is no,” Magid announced during Brown University’s conference on Jewish non-Zionism.


In 2025, the Boston conference prompted a similar argument. It happened in our modern agora—the Facebook comments section. “These confabs feel like a small circle around a campfire,” one professor wrote, claiming to speak from concern. “I do find myself in agreement,” wrote a Yiddishist: “this is more of an in-group activist event than an academic conference.” Another scholar found it “performatively clannish.”

I tried again with Menchik, whose smile was tightening by the second. Why so few Zionists? “It wasn’t a political choice,” he assured me, pointing out that “not everyone wants to come to Boston in February.” It seems the cold had only affected Zionists.

This was all getting a bit silly. After we spoke, I dug up the video of the 2024 Boston conference. There was Menchik, in his beige suit, spelling things out: “How can the Jewish left . . . make concrete contributions to the project of Palestinian liberation?” He cheered the Columbia students “demonstrating for Palestinian liberation.” (This was in February, before they invaded a university building, smashing windows and pummeling security guards.)

“It may truly be a transformational moment,” Menchik predicted. “Like 1968.”

In truth, nearly every speaker in Boston was part of the broader Palestinian solidarity movement. Some worked with Academics for Peace, which works to “shift public opinion on Israel/Palestine”; others with Concerned Jewish Faculty & Staff, which supports “legitimate criticism of Zionism.” Menchik, who works with both, had just appeared before a Massachusetts commission, where he complained about angry Zionists harassing leftists. Later, he accused the commission itself of “actively bullying non-Zionist Jews.”


Fortunately, there were no Zionist bullies around. On stage, Arielle Angel, the outgoing editor of Jewish Currents—the flagship periodical of the young anti-Zionist left—was commending her essay, “We Need New Jewish Institutions.” Angel writes subtly about emotions, and less-than-subtly about Zionism, which she regards as an Ebola-like pathogen, infecting everything it touches. As she put it, “the entire enterprise of Judaism—and nearly every organization charged with stewarding it—is infected with a voracious rot.”

Angel projects the "rot" outward, but the rot is internal. The "pathogen" she describes is actually the survival instinct of the Jewish people. To call the mainstream Jewish community "infected" because they support the right of Jews not to be slaughtered is a level of dehumanization usually reserved for the pages of Der Stürmer. They want "New Institutions" because the old ones—synagogues, federations, day schools—remind them too much of the Covenant they are trying to escape.

After October 7, she led Jewish Currents into battle. One contributor, a Palestinian, tweeted, “I could not be more proud of my people.” Another declared, “Glory to the resistance.” That was typical scorched earth leftist rhetoric. An essay in the journal n+1 dismissed “smarmy moralizing about [Israeli] deaths.” Angel’s clear-cutting of the Zionist forest was resonating, and not just with Gen Z.


Magid, for his part, cheered younger Jews “re-making” Judaism, and hoped boomers might “recognize that, smile, and start listening.” The alternative was frightening. One could easily become “the old man with a rake screaming at the kids from his front porch, ‘get off my lawn.’”

Was I that geezer, waving his rake at Jewish Currents? I decided to call Larry Bush, its former editor. He seemed conflicted: reluctant to talk yet eager to talk. Since leaving Jewish Currents, he never reads it. Except for when he does.

"I just don’t find this generation’s voice compelling,” he admitted. During his editorship, he crafted a thoughtful, curious magazine. “My punctuation was a question mark,” he said. “Today, it’s an exclamation point.”


He had plenty of gripes, but he was pleased with the magazine’s success: “They’ve achieved the national presence that I couldn’t.” Indeed, Jewish Currents scored major profiles in the New Yorker and The New York Times. It even made the Times 2025 Giving Guide, alongside charities that help Sudanese war orphans and visually impaired schoolchildren.


Still, Bush sounded wistful. “I tried to cultivate a certain Jewish progressive pride,” he said. “Today, they have such a problem with Jewish exceptionalism. They’re so interested in shooting it down.”

Talking with Bush, I felt less alone yet also gloomier. I decided to call Paul Berman, the journalist and scholar of leftist movements. What happened to the liberal left? I asked. The moderate left. The social-democratic left.

Silence. I thought Berman had hung up. Hello?


“Obviously, your question stumps me,” Berman said. Eventually, he granted that his left—the liberal Zionist left—was fading. “The traditional mainstream Jewish left has suffered all kinds of political defeats,” he said. I began to mention the old, serious Dissent magazine. “Don’t go on,” Berman pleaded.


So we shifted to another fraught subject: Israel/Palestine. “The whole turn toward anti-Zionism is bizarre,” Berman told me. “This young generation lacks any idealism or passion except despising Israel. I know we’re not supposed to call it antisemitic. But it’s antisemitic.”


Did this send him to despair, or to the barricades? “I am in despair,” he said, though I also heard outrage, regret, and vexation. It wasn’t just students, I suggested, it was their professors. Could they moderate? Berman scoffed. “If, at twenty-two, that person mastered Foucault and Derrida, that’s the greatest feat of their lives. They’ll never move on.”

I thanked Berman. But he had one more thing to say. It was something he took from Daniel Bell, the great sociologist and postwar intellectual. “The young generation ignores the older generation, and just starts anew, with all the naïveté and errors,” Berman told me. “Thus, the American left fails to progress.”

Back at the conference, Dove Kent, a movement organizer, was discussing alliances. Kent is slender and stylish, and could pass for a hip barista in a place like Austin. On stage, she shifts easily between registers. One hears the soft, soothing tones of a crisis counselor, followed by long, lyrical bursts, a preacher rousing the flock.

“The U.S. Jewish left is massive,” she says, starting a call-and-response:

“I believe we can win.” (“Speak it!”) “We are the good news.” (“Whoop!”)

“When I see a winning coalition, it is a left-liberal coalition,” Kent was saying. That was the question of the day. Who was included? Should the big tent expand? Angel, for her part, was tired of Zionists crashing leftist meetings. “I would want to see liberal Zionists feeling uncomfortable,” she once said. (How uncomfortable? Through what tactics? Details for later.)

Such questions were hardly abstract. Back among the vendors, a drama was playing out, one that illustrated both the possibilities for dialogue and also its limits.

I had returned to check on my beleaguered student Zionists. As it happened, their long day was about to get longer. Just as I arrived, the young Syrian woman in the hijab wandered over. “We don’t work with Zionists. And you’re Zionists,” she announced. “There is nothing for us to say.” For a shocked moment, there was silence. Eduardo looked aghast. “What was that?” he said. “I was just talking with her. She was totally friendly.”

Earlier, his friend Shira had proposed a Jewish–Muslim alliance, and the Syrian seemed amenable. Then she spotted their Israeli flag.

“Well, this is going to be awkward,” Shira said. “We know each other. We’re in a class together.”

I was less surprised. Earlier, I met the Syrian woman, and we chatted pleasantly. “It’s nice to have Jewish allies,” she said, mentioning Jewish Voice for Peace. A minute later, though, she drew a hard line. “I’m not open to conversations with pro-Israel people,” she said. “It’s like having a conversation with a Nazi.”

Of course, she wasn’t alone. On the far Left, almost anyone can tell you that Israel is a criminal/colonial/apartheid state, and, yes, a genocidal Nazi state. Before the conference, I asked Michael Walzer, the great political theorist, about this. At ninety years old, he’s still writing, and, more remarkably, traveling, most recently to Israel. It was his forty-fifth trip (give or take).

Walzer met me at a patisserie in downtown Manhattan. I asked the author of Just and Unjust Wars whether Israel had committed genocide in Gaza.

He shook his head. Genocide was a special category, he said, the gravest human crime. (He had recently noted “how easy it is to define genocide down”). At the conference, one heard “genocide” tossed around casually—which raised another question. I asked Walzer whether anti-Zionism was antisemitism. “Anti-Zionism is bad enough,” he said.

Why was anti-Zionism—which Walzer has called “a very bad politics” and “the leftism of fools”—so popular? Leftists have a simple answer: revulsion over Gaza. That’s certainly true, but terrible wars don’t often produce calls for eliminating states.

The sociologist Atalia Omer, who studies Jewish anti-Zionists, has suggested another answer. In her research, she has observed “an enhanced sense of self-approval and self-love” in her subjects. In short, they feel good.

That was obvious at the conference, where a family reunion vibe prevailed. People hugged and swapped stories. They shared confessions of white privilege. (“I have so much racism in me just from being a white person,” said Kent.) At the final session, a young Jewish man told a Palestinian about his shame over Zionism. The moderator stepped in. “I think what the gentleman is asking for is your absolution,” he said.

Absolution feels good. Virtue feels good. Community feels good. A leftist community offers something rare in life: gentle acceptance. At the conference, the only violence was to language and reality. Israel wasn’t a complex, ever-evolving country. It didn’t have a culture. In a sense, it didn’t even exist. Not as a real place, where real people live.

Indeed, there was little of the pesky nuance that characterizes, well, reality. As Beinart framed the issue, you’re either for justice (“liberal ideals”) or you support apartheid and genocide. No moral complexity. No unsettling ambiguity. Only righteous action, with both feet planted on the right side of history.

One person who understands Israel’s history—yet still wants it to dissolve into a single binational state—is Shaul Magid, the Harvard scholar. During a quiet moment, I spotted Magid in a corner. Over a busy life, Magid has been a hippie; lived with haredim; embraced messianic Zionism in Israel; and gotten his PhD in Jewish thought at Brandeis.

Magid can sound like he would prefer to lecture, study hasidic texts, and never think about Israel again. But then—in a kind of repetition compulsion—he resumes his critique. “Zionism had its time,” he once wrote, but now it should be discarded—“along with Manifest Destiny, colonialism, and any number of other chauvinistic and ethnocentric ideologies of the past.”

When I approached, he indulged me. I asked if there were any conceivable Zionisms he would embrace. “Umm,” he said.

What if—miraculously—there was peace? Could Israel exist then?

He paused. “Well, I think—it’s an interesting hypothetical.” He began discussing Israel’s treaties with Arab countries. “But, umm, I think as long as Zionism is committed to an ethno-state, it can never work. Resistance will just keep coming up.”

Why did people cling to Zionism? Was their failing moral? Or intellectual? “I think its existential,” he said. “They—and I—were raised to believe in Israel’s right to exist. And the necessity of its existence.”

No one really wanted a one-state solution, I said. Not Israelis; not Palestinians. It was the one thing everyone agreed on. But Magid clung to his solution. “In 2026, I don’t think one state is any more impossible than two states,” he told me. If there was no feasible solution, why not an unfeasible one?

Magid’s "aspirational" one-state solution is a blueprint for the dissolution of the Jewish people. History has shown us exactly what happens to Jews in the Middle East when they do not have a state and an army: they are massacred, expelled, and relegated to second-class status. To call for a "binational state" in a region dominated by Islamic fundamentalism is not "academic"—it is a death wish for eight million or so Jews.

“At this point,” he said, “I’m satisfied to call it aspirational.”

By mid-afternoon, the conference was winding down. Beinart was long gone. Menchik was chatting with Dove Kent outside the hall. (“That genocide thing? Turns out, people don’t like that. And when the Jewish state does it . . .”) Twelve feet away, an eager crew circled Magid, who, with his gold earrings and long white beard, was hard to miss. “You’re Shaul Magid!” a wide-eyed freshman yelled. For an instant, Magid looked surprised, then greeted his admirers, all Princeton students. “We all love your book,” one said. “And your Substack.”

Some conference-goers had practically clawed their way to Boston, some arriving sleepless (in New York, an Amtrak snafu sent scores of passengers to the hellish Port Authority searching for overnight busses). Here, a woman told me, she felt at home. Her minority was a majority. Menchik seemed comfortable too: just his allies, no Zionist bullies. The conference—or whatever it was—had been powerful. It had made people feel good, while tapping into a deep collective rage over Israel.

Gradually, things wound down. People were doing the end-of-day shuffle. The armed security guards, casual but watchful, relaxed, assuming off-duty poses. From outside the hall, I watched Eduardo carefully fold his Israeli flag.

Leaving Boston, I pondered the popular one-state solution: what was it, exactly? A rhetorical gesture? A utopian fantasy? Or simply a reckless thought experiment? I also recalled my conversation with Walzer. I had asked what qualities he would inculcate in young thinkers. “Listening,” he said.

A leftism that listened. Something to consider. It might be less exciting, less inspiring, than the righteous radicalism of speeches, social media blasts, and quasi-academic conferences to rally the faithful. But it would certainly be more Jewish.

What would also be "more Jewish" is loyalty. In our tradition, we have a concept called Ahavat Yisrael—the love of our fellow Jews. This conference was the antithesis of that. It was a festival of Sinat Chinam (baseless hatred), wrapped in the language of social justice. While they "listen" to their own echoes in Boston, the real Jewish world—the one that Eduardo represents—will continue to build, defend, and thrive in our ancestral homeland. Am Yisrael Chai.


Mechiras Chometz

Mechiras chametz sometimes gets a bad rap. The widespread practice of observant Jews selling their chametz to a non-Jew prior to Passover, and thus avoiding the prohibitions of bal yeraeh and bal yematze while preserving the chametz for repossession after Passover, is sometimes seen as a way of not having one’s cake and eating it too; an evasion that perhaps fulfills the technical imperative of the Torah directive (and perhaps not), yet seems to be artificial and contrived in nature. The ambivalence toward this practice (as well as other “sale” approaches, which are subject to varying degrees of controversy) is reflected in the joke that is told about a rabbinic ban on smoking: the orthodox Jews aren’t worried, as they will simply sell their lungs to a non-Jew.


This conflicted attitude is played out in the halakhic literature. True, the Tosefta (Pesachim 2:6-7) does speak of a situation in which a Jew, finding himself stuck at sea as Passover approaches, transfers ownership of his chametz to a non-Jewish fellow traveler, and reclaims it after the holiday. However, the impression is one of an unplanned, non-ideal, and isolated incident; the current reality, where entire communities plan in advance to preserve their stocks of chametz through annually scheduled arrangements with their local rabbi, appears to be a significant expansion of the depicted scenario.


A more commonly heard complaint is that the sale seems like a joke: the chametz does not leave the original owner’s residence (something some poskim insisted should happen; see Terumat HaDeshen 119 and Bach, Orach Chaim 448, s.v. katav); the purchaser does not appear interested in actually taking possession of the chametz (see Machatzit HaShekel, O.C. 448:4; Responsa Chatam Sofer, YD 310; Responsa Li-Horot Natan, II, 27); rarely if ever does the seller have to open his doors and cabinets to the new owner of his food; and the chametz invariably reverts to its original ownership immediately after Passover.


Rabbenu Yerucham (Netiv V, part V, 46a), commenting on the Tosefta‘s ruling, asserts that one who utilizes this option should not engage in ha’aramah (translated alternatively either as a sham or an evasion of the halakhah). The Beit Yosef (Orach Chaim 448:5) questions this requirement: the entire plan appears to be a ha’aramah, and yet, it is permitted!


Controversy over the sale has persisted over the generations, despite its increasing usage, and while some of the objections focused on the more problem-fraught method of a rabbi purchasing his congregants’ chametz in order to sell it to a non-Jew (see, for example, R. Uri Shraga Feivush Toubish, Responsa Uri Vi-Yish’i, 121), it is clear that some great rabbinic authorities objected even to the more prevalent current practice, where the rabbi does not purchase the chametz but rather acts as an agent to sell it to the purchaser (see, for example, Responsa Shoel U’Meishiv, II, 2:77; on this distinction, see also R. Ya’akov Ariel, Resp. Bi-Ohalah Shel Torah, I, 59).


The Bekhor Shor (Pesachim 21a) is taken to assert that mekhirat chametz is indeed a ha’aramah, and for that reason is ineffective against a biblical prohibition of owning chametz. He assumes, however, that the chametz at hand is only subject to a rabbinical prohibition, because, as the Talmud states (Pesachim 10a) in the context of bedikat chametz, the bitul (nullification) of chametz is effective to negate the Torah prohibition. (Others who accepted this premise include Ketzot HaChoshen, 194:4; R. Meshulam Igra, Responsa 39:1; and R. Natan Note Kahane, Resp. Divrei Rinanah, 30, with extensive further references cited by R. Yitzchak Hershkowitz in footnote 11 therein. See also R. Yitzchak Shmuel Shechter, Responsa Yashiv Yitzchak X, OC 9.)


However, many acharonim challenged that premise, noting that the chametz that is negated is not the same chametz as that which is sold, and thus a biblical prohibition would still attach; as such, one who would utilize mekhirat chametz must be comfortable that it is effective on a Torah level (see, for example, Mekor Chaim 448:9; and the lengthy analysis of Responsa Minchat Yitzchak, VIII:41; the Kogalglover Rav offers a creative explanation of the Bekhor Shor’s view in his Responsa Eretz Tzvi, I, 84).


Indeed, there are many who have adopted a policy not to sell chametz gamur (outright chametz, as opposed to chametz-derived or mixed products), presumably reflecting a lack of confidence in the sale’s efficacy together with the assumption that the chametz in question is not batel (nullified) (see R. Asher Weiss, Haggadat Minchat Asher, p. 280). Nonetheless, the acceptance of mekhirat chametz in all forms is widespread, with Jews purchasing chametz knowing in advance it will be sold, and some rabbinic authorities even considering the question of whether it should be an obligation to sell one’s chametz as part of the appropriate safeguards for Passover (see Responsa Li-Horot Natan VI, 25).


Perhaps an explanation can be offered for the embrace by so much of observant Jewry of the embattled mekhirat chametz. It would begin by considering the prohibitions of bal yeraeh (“it shall not be seen”) and bal yematze (“it shall not be found”) that the sale is meant to address. The Ran (Pesachim 1a, s.v. u-mah; see also Peri Megadim, Petichah to Pesach 1:9) asserts that these prohibitions serve as a kind of “syag min haTorah,” a safeguard similar to those of rabbinic creation, but from the Torah itself (see R. Yosef Engel, Lekach Tov, 8:1): in essence, the Torah is really primarily concerned that we should not eat chametz. However, if chametz is kept in one’s possession, there is a great risk that in a distracted moment, or in the course of a semi-awake midnight snack, one might prepare himself a meal of the normally-permitted chametz. To avoid this eventuality, all chametz must be removed from one’s possession.


By embracing mekhirat chametz, the Jewish people are declaring that there are two things that can prevent them from eating chametz: not having any, and the transgression of gezel, of theft. If the chametz is in one’s house, but is off-limits because of the prohibition of stealing, that is enough to keep the Jews away from its consumption. Therefore, it doesn’t matter whether or not the chametz will ever be picked up by its purchaser, or whether or not the sale will be reversed after Passover. All that does matter is that during Passover, the chametz legally belongs to another; that is enough to make sure it will be untouched. In other words, Klal Yisrael is willing to stake its “kareit” (the most severe divine penalty, “cutting off” from the Jewish people), its very spiritual survival, on its commitment to avoiding theft.


In this context, it is worth noting the words of the Semag (Mitzvot Aseh #73), who states that the exile has gone on too long because of deficiencies in honesty and integrity in dealing with the nations of the world. When that problem is present, redemption cannot take place; it would be a chilul Hashem (desecration of God’s Name) for God to redeem a nation that is perceived as immoral. As such, perhaps the practice of mekhirat chametz is a conscious decision, at a time when we focus on geulah (redemption), to enter into a monetary relationship with a non-Jewish person, and to honor the integrity of that relationship with one’s spiritual life. Such an attitude, taken with proper seriousness, might just bring the redemption, one step at a time.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

The Fast Of The Firstborn

The siyum that has come to define erev Pesach morning for firstborns across the Jewish world carries with it a surprisingly rich and contested halakhic history.


Understanding the role of the siyum on Ta'anit Bekhorot requires having some understanding of that day itself, which is of somewhat mysterious origins. The idea of firstborns fasting on erev Pesach is mentioned in the minor tractate Masekhet Soferim(21:3) but is not brought in the Babylonian Talmud. In the Talmud Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:1), there is a passage that appears to both consider and reject the notion of erev Pesach being a time for firstborns to fast, although the passage is the subject of both variant texts and alternative interpretations. The Ra'avyah (#525) understands the Yerushalmi to be in conflict with Masekhet Soferim; see Ran, Pesachim16a in the pages of the Rif, s.v. yerushalmi, citing Nachmanides; Rosh 10:19 and Korban Netanel. The Meiri (Pesachim 107b) records a widespread "custom" of fasting that is "not at all compulsory" (ein bazeh srakh hekhrech klal). The Shulchan Arukh (OC 470:1) states simply that "the firstborns fast."


It is unclear why this should be, as the Jewish firstborns were saved during the final plague and would have no reason to treat the day as a sad one. There is even a suggestion in some writings that the text should be emended, and instead of ha-bekhorim mit'anin, the firstborns fast, it should read ha-bekhorim mit'angin, the firstborns enjoy themselves. (This reading is attributed to R. Zvi Hirsch of Zidotchov, cited in Resp. Minchat Yitzchak II, 93 and elsewhere. The Nimmukei Orach Chaim (470) is harshly critical of relying on such a suggestion as a basis for leniency.)


One particularly creative suggestion was put forward in recent generations by scholars who noted that the firstborn indeed have more of a reason to celebrate than others do, as they were saved from the plague in addition to the redemption from slavery, and all of that should presumably focus on Pesach night, not the day prior. Accordingly, they suggest that fasting on erev Pesach is actually an extension of the general restraint in eating, and complete abstention from matzah, that is expected from everyone on that day in order to increase the appetite and appreciation for the sedermeal. As beneficiaries of an expanded miracle, they are expected to intensify the commemorative experience. (R. Eliyahu Baruch Finkel, MiShulchan Rebbi Eliyahu Baruch, Mo'adim I, pp. 10–15; R. Shlomo Zalman Shmayah, Birkat Mo'adekha, Pesach-Shavuot #9; R. Eliyahu Levine, in the journal Orayta VI, 5759, pp. 91–92; R. Eliav Silverman, Meishiv Nefesh III, 65, cites this and discusses extensively the ramifications of whether the fast is functional or commemorative.)


R. Eliyahu Baruch Finkel notes a support for this position in the view of R. Yechiel, cited in the Mordechai (Pesachim 10:122), that allows light eating on this day, as opposed to a total restriction. (It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned passage from the Talmud Yerushalmi creates ambiguity here as well, with the Maharil, Resp. 157, citing it as a refutation of R. Yechiel and Bigdei Yesha, a commentary to the Mordechai, quoting it as support.) The Beit Yosefrecords that the practice is not in accordance with R. Yechiel, although the Mishnah Berurah (470:2 and Sha'ar HaTziyun 6) recommends the approach as an alternative for those who find the fast difficult or counterproductive. (See Darkei Shmuel: Halakhah U'Minhag, p. 252, n. 8, and the additional sources, positions, and explanations cited in R. Shlomo Schneider, Resp. Divrei Shlomo IV, p. 364.)


In any event, there is a tradition of efforts to avoid the fast, and of rabbinic disapproval of those efforts. R. Yechezkel Landau, the Noda B'Yehudah, in one responsum (Tinyana, YD, 167), is harshly critical of a practice that had developed to delay the brit of a newborn boy until erev Pesach so that the festive meal for that event could cancel the fast. (As for a britthat is appropriately held on erev Pesach, the Magen Avraham, OC 470:1, cites the view of Maharash HaLevi that it is permissible to eat, but also praiseworthy to be stringent, an attitude that, reports the Magen Avraham, prevailed in his locale.) While much of that opposition came from the unacceptable postponement of that mitzvah, R. Landau was also opposed to the siyum on that day, as reported by his student, R. Eliezer Fleckes (Resp. Teshuvah MeAhavahII, 281, and III, 376). Similar opposition has been relayed in the name of the Chatam Sofer (see Likutei Beit Ephraim #29; and Resp., CM, 148, where it is clear the expectation in his time was that a firstborn would fast on erev Pesach), and was echoed by his descendant R. Shimon Sofer (Resp. Hitorerut Teshuvah II, 245; note that the questioner does assume a siyum is effective for eating meat during the Nine Days, and the response does not note an objection to that).


Even for those who approved the siyum on erev Pesach, there were disputes over aspects of the event. A number of authorities asserted that while the one completing the tractate could eat, there was no justification to invite others who had not been a part of the study (see Resp. Teshuvah MeAhavah II, 266). Nonetheless, the contemporary custom is to invite others to the siyum, as acknowledged by the Mishnah Berurah and the Arukh HaShulchan. The Arukh HaShulchan assumes this to be a concession due to weakness. (Regarding the question of delaying a siyum so that it occurs on erev Pesach, there appear to be contradictions in the writings of R. Shlomo Kluger. In his Resp. HaElef Likha Shlomo (317), he disallows delaying a siyum until erev Pesach. However, later on (#387), he is more open to it, providing the learning accomplishment is significant enough. Compare also his statements in his Resp. Shenot Chaim (52, 173, 245), modifying an earlier statement in Sefer HaChaim, OC 581, where he suggests that pushing off a siyum to "a fast day" is actually an enhancement, in that it will increase one's appreciation for the siyum. See R. Yitzchak Tesler, in the journal Orayta XX, p. 170, and R. Yechiel Avraham Zilber, Birur Halakhah, telita'ah, p. 205. R. Yehudah Taiah Weill, in his responsa, OC 38, allows this delay.)


The Spirit of the Law


As far as the spirit of the law, one point to consider is a general mismatch between the fourteenth of Nissan and a fast day, and thus perhaps a greater readiness to see the fast overridden. In addition to the questionable appropriateness of a fast on erev Yom Tov, it is actually the case that the fourteenth has its own special status in its own right (see Mishneh L'Melekh, Hil. Klei HaMikdash 6:10). Further, to enter the seder in a compromised state due to fasting detracts from that obligation in a problematic fashion. (See Resp. HaElef Likha Shlomo, OC 316. Interestingly, he is stringent regarding this fast in not allowing the timing of a siyum to be manipulated to cancel it, but allows it to be abandoned by one who feels he is weak and it will interfere with the seder. Presumably, for such an individual, even an "artificial" siyum should improve the situation, especially if, as discussed below, the siyum offers some affirmative benefit. See also Resp. Ohr LeTziyon II, 12:1, who considers the concern for the seder a major component in justifying leniency, without which he advocates stringency.)


Also, the fact that this fast at most only applied to a small minority of the population plays a role as well. Accordingly, the spirit of the law of "the fourteenth of Nissan" may be a factor in the attitude here (see Pitchei Teshuvah to Orach Chaim 470:1, and the sources cited there). This is all combined with the fact, noted above, that both the origins of the fast and its binding nature are somewhat open to question. (See R. Yosef Mashash, Resp. Mayim Chaim 179; R. Yosef Shaul Nathanson, Yosef Da'at, YD 399, who invokes the combination of factors in explaining his own lenient practice; R. Moshe Shternbuch, Resp. Teshuvot V'Hanhagot II, 210, who assumes that it is only custom together with a lack of clear sourcing for the fast that can explain the lenient attitudes that prevail, noting that the objections of earlier authorities as well as conceptual analysis would have indicated otherwise, and who highlights in particular the allowance of a limited offering of cakes and fruit, rather than a genuine meal including bread, as reflective of this leniency. R. David Taharani, Resp. Divrei David III, 20, relies on this attitude to allow a siyum on Thursday when erev Pesach is on Shabbat, despite various logical inconsistencies noted by earlier authorities; regarding this issue, see Chidushim U'Biurim al HaShas of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, 15. A variation on the emphasis on the customary nature of the fast is not necessarily to see it as inherently less stringent, but rather to assume that the acceptance of the custom was predicated on excluding a seudat mitzvah from its scope; see Pri Chadash, OC 470:2; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Meor Yisrael, Pesachim 108a; and Ratz KaTzvi, Pesach/Shavuot 6:7.)


An attitude that de-emphasizes the importance of the fast may be evident in some rulings regarding the question of listening to a siyum over the telephone. From the perspective of the internal logic of the concept, it is difficult to permit this. (R. Yisrael David Harfenes, Resp. Mekadesh Yisrael, Pesach II, 256, does not permit this.) Separate and apart from the debate regarding the status of mitzvot performed over electronic media, this is not a commandment based on "hearing"; it would seem that actual, physical participation in the meal is the only basis to consider one a part of the celebration. (This position is expressed by R. Yisrael Belsky, Resp. Shulchan HaLevi13:1; see the discussion in Resp. Maharam Brisk I, 133, and the contrasting views brought in Ma'adanei Yom Tov IV, p. 581.) In fact, in the context of a siyumduring the Nine Days, meat and wine are not only limited to the siyum meal, but to the physical location of the meal (Mishnah Berurah 551:75; see also Rama, OC 565:2). Nonetheless, regarding the Ta'anit Bekhorim siyum, many authorities have allowed telephonic participation. (See R. Asher Bush, Shoel B'Shlomo (5778), 44. R. Noach Isaac Oehlbaum, Resp. Minchat Chen III, 30, recommended relying on this opinion in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, when gathering in person for a siyum was prohibitively dangerous; if no siyum at all was available, he advocated not fasting under those circumstances.)


Reflective of this general approach, the Arukh HaShulchan (OC 470:4) records that for many generations already it has been the practice to be extremely lenient with this fast, and to conduct a siyum in which not only the one who learned the text can eat, but all the firstborns are invited, and that this practice is widespread, and that it is unclear why this attitude of leniency has been accepted, although it is indeed the case that great rabbis have not objected. (See also Resp. Teshuvot V'Hanhagot II, 210, who notes other leniencies as well that have become associated with this fast; and Resp. Even Pinah I, 33.) In fact, some contemporary authorities assume that the attitude of negation towards the fast has taken on the status of an accepted custom, and accordingly, even a mourner in the middle of the shivah period who may not attend a siyum still does not fast, although he should make a charitable donation in its place. (See Nitei Gavriel 43:19 and Resp. D'var Yehoshua II, 81; see also Ratz K'Tzvi, Pesach-Shavuot 6, and his discussion as to the impact of a siyum on other customary fasts throughout the year. The D'var Yehoshua actually assumes that the custom to fast has been abandoned in favor of the alternative commemoration of a siyum, which therefore does not override the fast through its performance but simply replaces it. Accordingly, one who is unable to attend a siyum is nonetheless not obligated to fast. He also indicates that the siyum does not require a joint meal, but rather allows for the participants to go home and eat separately; see also Resp. Avnei Derekh I, 76. Compare Resp. Pri HaSadeh IV, 57, who forbids a mourner from attending a siyum and does not permit him outright to eat nonetheless unless he is particularly weak. Regarding the general question of a mourner and attending siyumim, see also R. Eliyahu Bakshi Doron, Resp. Binyan Av V, 54.)


What may also be relevant is the question of the spirit of the fast itself. If, indeed, the day does not merit a practice reflecting sadness, it may be that the fast has a different purpose. A number of commentaries see the fast as a zekher l'neis (Tur, OC 570, from Masekhet Soferim; see also Meiri to Pesachim 107b) or a publicizing of it, pirsumei nisa (see Birkei Yosef). In one later formulation, it is understood as a reenactment of the original event, in the sense that at that point, the Jewish firstborns had to establish their worthiness to be spared (R. Yehudah Greenwald, Resp. Zikhron Yehudah 133; Darkei Shmuel: Halakhah U'Minhag, p. 251, n. 4, notes the contrary implication of Resp. Maharil #110, who states that since the miracle happened at midnight of the fifteenth, observance of the fast on the fourteenth is a concession to necessity and only commemorative; see also R. Shlomo Schneider, Divrei Shlomo V, 1129). This would thus be comparable to Ta'anit Esther, the day before Purim, when a fast is observed to commemorate the fast and prayers undertaken to thwart the plot of Haman (see Chatam Sofer, chiddushim to Pesachim 108b, and note the critique of Birkhat Mo'adekha ibid.). Similarly, contemporary firstborns fast to evoke the repentance and prayer of their ancient counterparts. (See R. Yosef Tzvi Salant, Be'er Yosef II, inyanei Pesach, pp. 329–333, for an elaborate version of this approach; see also the addendum from the son of the author, pp. 333–342.)


R. Zvi Hirsch Frimer, the Kozhaglover Rav, drew on this notion to explain a distinction between the fast of the firstborn and the Nine Days regarding the siyum, in that in the former case, following the siyum, the fast is abandoned, while in the latter case, meat and wine can only be consumed during the siyum itself. He posited that this is a function of Ta'anit Bekhorim not being a standard fast day, but rather a reenactment of the original event.


To complete the explanation, it may be suggested that the purpose of the observance is to highlight the need for the Jewish people to earn the survival of their firstborns through merit, not merely as recipients of Divine favor. The initial path to do that is through prayer and penitential fasting. However, perhaps there is an alternative, maybe even a superior route: embracing the new mission of the Jewish people, the study of the Torah, and in fact doing so with enthusiasm. (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in the journal Mevakshei Torah, Pesachim II, p. 562, notes that the firstborn were sanctified to serve in the Temple on the night of the Exodus, but later lost that privilege due to the sin of the golden calf. Accordingly, that day approaching Pesach night has taken on an aspect of sadness for the firstborn. Similarly, R. Moshe Shternbuch, Mo'adim U'Zmannim VII, 69, suggests that for this reason it has become a day of fasting and repentance. R. Auerbach posits that since Torah study is even greater than the priestly service, the practice developed to study Torah and joyously commemorate that study on that day, as a comfort to the firstborn.


R. Moshe Greenwald, in his Resp. Arugat HaBosem, OC 139, in the middle of a paragraph where he is actually harshly critical of attendance at an erev Pesach siyum by those who have no connection to the scholar or to learning in general, makes a fascinating statement that can also be incorporated into the above perspective. Addressing a comment of the Magen Avraham that in his day they were lenient to eat on erev Pesach for a siyum but not for a brit milah, he offers a novel suggestion to explain the distinction. A brit, which generally must be at a set time, would conceal the existence of Ta'anit Bekhorim, were people to be eating then. By contrast, the siyum has no inherent need to take place at that time. The fact that one is being arranged at that specific time will itself serve the purpose of publicizing the occasion, and thus is, apparently, more in harmony with the spirit and intent of Ta'anit Bekhorim. See also the objection of Resp. Maharam Brisk I, 133.) In such a manner, it could be suggested that minhag yisrael has developed to see the siyum on Ta'anit Bekhorim as a more appropriate reflection of the theme of the day, given all the elements, than fasting would be.


It should be noted that according to the view cited above, that the purpose of the fast is to intensify the experience of eating matzah later that night for the firstborns who owe increased gratitude, an exemption due to participating in a siyum is particularly difficult to understand. Unlike a day of sadness, which may yield in its atmosphere to the mitzvah meal, in this case the fast comes from a practical consideration to preserve appetite. R. Eliyahu Baruch Finkel, one of the proponents of the "appetite" theory, suggests that the fast for this purpose is observed as an enhancement (hiddur) of the mitzvah, undertaken as a general policy to preserve preparation for the later mitzvah. As such, a meal that is itself a mitzvah is understandably excluded from this policy (MiShulchan Rebbi Eliyahu Baruch, ibid., pp. 14–15; see there also for his explanation as to why this mitzvah meal cancels the fast for the rest of the day that follows as well).


More broadly compatible with the theories mentioned above, his understanding is that this effort to intensify the mitzvah of matzah serves as an additional merit for the firstborns. As such, the siyum meal, together with the learning that prompts it, is effective as an alternate, perhaps even preferable, source of merit. Similarly, R. Velvel Soloveitchik of Brisk was asked regarding a father who was fasting on erev Pesach on behalf of his minor son who was a firstborn. The son, however, completed a tractate that day, although the father did not attend the siyum. R. Soloveitchik responded that the father need not fast in this instance (cited in Haggadah MiBeit Levi). Apparently, the goal is to provide a source of merit as a protection, and the scholarship of the son is as effective as the fast of the father.


The history of this unusual fast day, and the perspectives of those who have considered and addressed it throughout the ages, suggest that the siyum may be less a workaround than a crystallization of what the day has always been about. The halakhic instinct of the Jewish people, the “sons of prophets”, has taken the message of this day and applied it in a fashion that it reaches out to all of us, inspiring and elevating us to aspire to ever greater heights. 

R' Feldman