Said Hadrian to R. Joshua: "How great is the ewe which survives among seventy wolves." Said [R. Joshua to Hadrian]: "How great is the Shepherd who rescues and preserves her and destroys them before her."
TANHUMA, TOLDOT 5
Rav Bleich
The Rescue Operation
The dazzling rescue by the Israeli Defense Forces of the hostages held in Entebbe following the hijacking of an Air France jet airliner by terrorists in the summer of 1976 earned widespread acclaim. The propriety of this action in accordance with the conventions of international law is analyzed by Malcolm Shaw in the premier volume of The Jewish Law Annual, edited by Bernard S. Jackson (Leiden: A. J. Brill, 1978), pp. 232-239. There has also been considerable discussion of halakhic issues raised by the rescue operation. The question of the halakhic propriety of the Israeli government's policy of adamant refusal to free captured guerillas in exchange for release of hostages was raised in the aftermath of a similar incident in the autumn of 1970. The Entebbe operation posed the additional question of endangering the lives of the members of the commando unit in their endeavor to rescue the hostages. These questions are discussed by Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef in a wide-ranging article which appears in the 5737 issue of Torah she-be-'al Peh.
In his discussion Rabbi Yosef presents a thorough review of sources dealing with an individual's obligation to jeopardize his life in order to save the life of another. Earlier discussions of this question appear in Rabbi Shlomoh Yosef Zevin's Le-Or ha-Halakhah, pp. 14-18, as well as in Minḥat Yizḥak, VI, no. 103, and in Ẓiz Eli'ezer, IX, no. 45 and X, no. 25, chaps. 7 and 18. The latter two discussions are within the context of the broader question of organ donation for transplant surgery. This portion of Rabbi Yosef's discussion also appears in an article on kidney transplants in volume 7 (5737) of Diné Israel, an annual published by the Faculty of Law of Tel Aviv University.
The question of whether or not one must risk one's life in order to save the life of another is the subject of considerable disagreement. R. Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:14, and Bet Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 426, cites Hagahot Maimuniyot who, in turn, bases himself upon a statement found in the Palestinian Talmud and declares that one is indeed obligated to assume such a risk. Bet Yosef explains that if the impending loss of life is certain, while the danger to the would-be rescuer is doubtful, the "certainty" of one's fellow takes precedence over the "doubtful" loss of one's own life. On the other hand, Issur ve-Hetter 59:38 declares that no person is obligated to place himself at risk in order to save the life of another. Sema, Hoshen Mishpat 426:2, notes that no such obligation is recorded by any early authority. A similar ruling was issued by R. David ibn Zimra, Teshuvot Radbaz, III, no. 625. The question submitted to Radbaz involved a situation in which a feudal despot demanded of a Jew that he permit one of his limbs to be cut off and threatened that, should permission to do so not be forthcoming, a fellow Jew would be put to death. Radbaz answered that compliance with this cruel request would constitute an act of piety, but that there exists no obligation to do so, particularly since the amputation of a limb may lead to death. In situations where there exists a significant hazard to the life of the would-be rescuer, Radbaz speaks of one who assumes such risk as a "pious fool." In such cases the applicable consideration is, "How do you know that the blood of your fellow is sweeter than your blood?" a variation of the talmudic dictum which prohibits the taking of the life of one's fellow in order to save one's own life.
Teshuvot Yad Eliyahu, no. 43, p. 48b, adduces evidence bolstering this position on the basis of Tosafot's understanding of an incident recorded in Niddah 61a. It was rumored that certain individuals had committed an act of murder. These persons appeared before R. Tarfon and requested that he shelter them from the authorities. Although the rumor was unconfirmed, R. Tarfon refused to do so and instead instructed them to find refuge in some other manner. Tosafot explains that R. Tarfon was afraid that he himself would be put to death for harboring fugitives. Yad Eliyahu argues that since R. Tarfon refused to place his own life in danger it may be inferred that a person is not obligated to place himself at risk in order to save the life of another. However, the argument based upon this source is not at all conclusive. It is quite possible that the persons in question were capable of finding refuge without endangering R. Tarfon. Moreover, it is quite possible that even had R. Tarfon hidden them, their hiding place might have been discovered, thereby causing not only their lives but also the life of R. Tarfon to be forfeit. Virtually all authorities agree that there is no obligation to place oneself at risk unless it is certain that preservation of the life of another is assured thereby. Furthermore, R. Naftali Zevi Yehudah Berlin, Ha'amek She'elah 129:2, argues that, on the contrary, Niddah 61a serves as evidence for the opposing view of Hagahot Maimuniyot. Ha'amek She'elah argues that R. Tarfon acted as he did only because there existed genuine doubt with regard to the culpability of those who sought his assistance. Had it been certain that they were guiltless, argues Ha'amek She'elah, R. Tarfon would have been duty-bound to assume the hazards involved in providing them with shelter.
Among the factors militating against release of terrorists under any conditions is the fear that upon their release they are likely to resume their nefarious activities and thereby endanger the lives of others. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yosef argues that since, according to Hagahot Maimuniyot, a person must place himself at risk in order to prevent the certain death of his fellow, it would be permissible to free terrorists in exchange for the lives of hostages. The danger to the hostages who face imminent execution is certain and immediate, while the danger to others as a result of the release of guerillas is merely doubtful. Moreover, argues Rabbi Yosef, even those who dispute the position of Hagahot Maimuniyot do so on the basis of the fact that a person may justifiably give consideration to his own safety over that of others. A third party, however, whose own person is not at risk, when confronted by certain danger to one individual and merely possible danger to other individuals, is not at all in an analogous situation. Since his obligation to both is equal he must act to eliminate the certain and immediate danger. This course of action is mandated by the principle that the "certain" takes precedence over the "doubtful."
A similar case is discussed by Teshuvot Maharibal, II, no. 20. A person was unjustly held for execution by a feudal despot. It was within the power of a friend to secure his release but the friend had reason to fear that a third person would be seized and executed in place of the released prisoner. Teshuvot Maharibal rules that if the execution of another person is deemed a certainty, a third party is forbidden to intervene. However, if it is possible that the wrath of the authorities will subside and no one will be executed in place of the released victim, elimination of the certain and immediate danger to the designated victim takes precedence over the possible danger to others.
Rabbi Yosef cites Tal Orot 16b who finds a source for this ruling in the commentary of Rashi on the verse, "Send the lad with me and we will arise and go that we may live and not die" (Genesis 43:8). Rashi depicts Judah as arguing, "As for Benjamin it is doubtful whether he will be seized or whether he will not be seized, but for us, we shall certainly all die of hunger if we do not go. It is better that you shall set aside that which is doubtful and grasp that which is certain." However, upon closer scrutiny, it is readily apparent that Rashi's comments are not at all germane to the case at hand. Placing the life of Benjamin in jeopardy in compliance with Joseph's demand does not serve as a paradigm establishing a normative principle for a third party who must weigh the danger his actions may cause to others. Nor, in the biblical narrative, does Benjamin place himself in danger solely on behalf of others. On the contrary, failure to appear before Joseph would mean that not only will the family fail to secure food, but that Benjamin himself will die of hunger. Accordingly, Rashi depicts Judah as advancing the compelling argument that even insofar as Benjamin himself is concerned, appearing before Joseph constitutes a lesser danger.
Rabbi Yosef also ignores the fact that the release of terrorists in order to save the lives of hostages is not the act of a third party who is himself free of danger. The government officials and the citizens of the State of Israel who must release the imprisoned guerillas are themselves among the potential victims of possible terrorist activity. Hence, according to the vast majority of authorities who dispute the position of Hagahot Maimuniyot, there is no obligation for them, on these grounds, to assume additional risks in order to prevent the execution of hostages.
It should, however, be stressed that a person is exempt from coming to the aid of his fellow only when such intervention poses a significant risk to himself. When, however, the risk to himself is minimal he is obligated to do so. This point is made by R. David ibn Zimra himself in another responsum, Teshuvot Radbaz, II, no. 217. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, obligates a person to render assistance to the individual whose life is endangered and enumerates as examples specific circumstances including those of a person drowning in a river, being attacked by armed bandits or mauled by a wild beast. Each of these examples involves at least minimal danger to the rescuer. The obligation to render assistance in cases of minimal danger to oneself is clear. The matter is best summed up in the words of Rabbi Yechiel Michal Epstein in the early twentieth-century compendium Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Hoshen Mishpat 426:4, who writes, "However, everything depends upon the circumstances; it is necessary to weigh the matter on a scale and not to safeguard oneself more than necessary."
Rabbi Yosef finds justification for military action in rescuing the hostages on the basis of a declaration of the Gemara, Eruvin 45a. The Gemara states that an invading army seeking to seize a city near the nation's border may be resisted even on Shabbat despite the absence of an imminent threat to life. The reason is quite simple. Conquest of border strongholds facilitates further military activity by the enemy which, in turn, may readily result in loss of lives. Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 2:33, rules that all Jews who are capable of doing so are obligated to aid their fellow Jews in the beseiged city. Rabbi Yosef argues that, quite apart from the danger to the hostages, seizure of the airliner constitutes an act of aggression. Were the hijackers to be allowed to succeed it is quite possible that their initial success would spur them to further acts of aggression with resultant loss of life. Therefore, concludes Rabbi Yosef, the initial effort may, if militarily advisable, be resisted even on Shabbat.
Miracles and Blessings
The phenomenal rescue by Israeli commandos of hostages held by terrorists at the Entebbe airport was greeted by waves of joy and exuberance. The operation was widely heralded as a meticulously planned and miraculously executed tactical feat. Jews, in particular, saw in the success of the operation the handiwork of divine providence.
Yet, in some limited circles, the Entebbe operation was seen in a completely different light. Some persons influenced by Neturei Karta ideology denied that soldiers of a secularist Jewish state could possibly be agents of divine providence. The Central Rabbinical Congress, known as the Hitaḥdut ha-Rabbanim, issued a formal declaration dated 15 Ab 5736 expressing criticism of the operation and of the acclaim showered upon the Israeli forces. This statement has been widely, although probably erroneously, understood as implying that in this and similar situations it is forbidden to organize rescue missions which utilize the services of those who deny providence but rather proclaim that their success is achieved by virtue of their own prowess through "my own power and the strength of my hand." The text of this statement was published in the weekly newspaper which serves as the organ of the Satmar community, Der Yid, Aug. 20, 1976.
In response Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, pointed out that, if understood in this manner, this psak would lead to the absurd conclusion that it is forbidden to avail oneself of the medical ministration of a physician who is a non-believer. Rabbi Schneerson, noting that further hijackings remain a distinct possibility, issued a call to all rabbinic authorities to state their position with regard to this matter so that the Torah community might know how to react in the future. Subsequently, the Yiddish-reading public was treated to the bizarre spectacle of rabbinic piskei din appearing, apparently as paid advertisements, in successive issues of Der Algemeiner Journal dated November 5, November 12 and November 26, 1976.
The ideological aspects of this matter are beyond the scope of this discussion. The rabbinic opinions which have appeared do, however, raise one issue which involves a purely technical question of Halakhah, having nothing at all to do with the theological question of whether or not secularists may be employed as agents through whom providential guardianship is exercised. Each of the published rabbinic opinions not only confirms Rabbi Schneerson's position but states that in the event that any of the rescued hostages should ever return to the Entebbe airport where the rescue occurred that person is obligated to pronounce the benediction "Blessed is He who performed a miracle on my behalf at this place." A similar blessing, "Blessed is He who performed a miracle, on behalf of my father in this place," must also be recited by children of those hostages who visit the site of their parents' deliverance. It appears to this writer that the question of the necessity and, indeed, the permissibility, of pronouncing such a benediction is far from a settled issue.
The formula of the blessing "who has performed a miracle on my behalf" indicates that only an event which is miraculous in nature occasions such a benediction. A blessing pronounced other than in the context decreed by Jewish law constitutes a brakhah le-vatalah—an impermissible invocation of the Divine Name. Providential deliverance from danger does occasion a birkat ha-gomel, a blessing of thanksgiving upon such deliverance. The blessing "who has bestowed upon me all manner of beneficence," is pronounced on a single occasion following deliverance from danger, but is not associated with the site of deliverance and is not repeated each time one visits the site of former danger. It is only a miraculous deliverance which occasions repeated blessings at the time of each subsequent return to the site of the miracle.
The crucial question is this: How is the term "miracle" to be defined? The notion of a miracle, insofar as halakhic ramifications of such phenomena are concerned, is discussed by Rabbi Zevi Hirsch Chajes in his Darkei Mosheh, published in Kol Sifrei Maharaz Hayes (Jerusalem 5718), I, 460-461. In this work, Rabbi Chajes is concerned with the conditions requiring the promulgation of the recitation of hallel as a commemoration of divine beneficence. Rabbi Chajes declares that hallel which is ordained for this purpose must commemorate a miracle performed on behalf of the entire community of Israel and further defines a miracle as an act involving the suspension of causal laws governing the natural order. Events that occur in accordance with the laws of nature, no matter how fortuitous they may be, are not miraculous; a miracle, by definition, involves a change in "the order of creation."
As evidence that hallel is ordained to commemorate only a miraculous beneficence, Rabbi Chajes cites the discussion recounted in the Gemara, Shabbat 22b, concerning the hallel of Chanukkah. The Gemara queries, "What is Chanukkah?" and proceeds to narrate the historical miracle of the cruse of oil. The narrative concludes with the statement that the eight-day period of Chanukkah was subsequently ordained as a period of hallel and thanksgiving in commemoration of this wonder. Conspicuously absent in this discussion is any reference to the glorious military victory of the Hasmoneans over the Greek forces which vastly outnumbered them. Rashi, obviously seeking to explain this glaring omission, comments that the query, "What is Chanukkah?" must be understood as meaning "[In commemoration] of which miracle was it ordained?" The ensuing discussion must then be understood as establishing a halakhic justification for the recitation of hallel. It is thus apparent from the discussion that it is the miracle of the oil which justifies commemorative recitation of hallel, whereas the miracle of the military victory does not. The reason, explains Maharaz Hayes, is that the military victory, amazing as it was, was achieved entirely in accordance with the laws of nature and did not in any way involve a suspension of the "order of creation." In contradistinction, the miracle of the cruse of oil clearly did involve a suspension of the natural order.
The implication of this thesis with regard to the question of recitation of hallel on Yom ha-Azma'ut is obvious. Rabbi Moshe Zevi Neriah, in an article which appeared in Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, V, 228-240, and was reprinted by Nahum Rakover, Hilkhot Yom ha-Azma'ut ve-Yom Yerushalayim, pp. 182-197, while stating that, because of other considerations, hallel should not be recited on Yom ha-Azma'ut, nevertheless argues that the definition of the term "miracle" advanced by Maharaz Hayes is too restrictive, particularly insofar as the recitation of hallel is concerned. Among the questions which he raises is the propriety of the recitation on Purim of the blessing "who has performed miracles for our fathers in those days at this season." The events recorded in the Book of Esther, argues Rabbi Neriah, while undoubtedly the product of divine guardianship and deliverance rather than fortuitous coincidence, nevertheless do not reflect a suspension of natural law.
In point of fact, this question was raised many centuries ago by Avudraham. In his resolution of this problem, Avudraham appears to state that Ahasuerus did not exercise free will in complying with the requests of Esther and that the populace, in not fulfilling the decree to which the royal seal had been affixed ordering them to rise against the Jews, were similarly deprived of the ability to exercise freedom of will. Deprivation of free will is viewed by Avudraham as an act of intervention in the natural order and as tantamount to suspension of a fundamental law of nature. The very fact that Avudraham poses this question demonstrates that he defined the term "miracle" in much the same manner as does Maharaz Hayes.
Insofar as the blessing "who has performed a miracle on my behalf" is concerned, Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 218:9, records two conflicting opinions. The first view asserts that this blessing is to be pronounced only in the event of a miracle which is "yozei me-minhag ha-olam," i.e., an event which cannot possibly be regarded as "natural." Lest this term be misunderstood, Mishnah Berurah defines the phrase by means of instantiation and cites the Gemara's example of a person lost in a desert who is saved from death by miraculous gushing of water from the sand. Bi'ur Halakhah defined the term even more explicitly as an event which "transcends the way of nature such as the miracles [which befell] our forefathers." A second, differing view is cited by Shulḥan Arukh and rejected. The latter view does not require that the event involve the suspension of natural law. Magen Avraham 218:12, commenting on this dissenting view, questions its source and states that he could find no authority who advances such a position. He further remarks with amazement, "Certainly with regard to [that which occurs in accordance with] the custom of the world and its nature one cannot recite the blessing 'who has performed miracles on my behalf'!" Rabbi Elijah of Vilna, Bi'ur ha-Gra, ad locum, also refutes the dissenting view cited by Shulḥan Arukh. He does so by means of a reductio ad absurdum: It would follow that, according to this opinion, every woman who has experienced childbirth should recite this blessing upon visiting the site at which her child was delivered and that a similar blessing should be recited by her progeny throughout all subsequent generations ! These authorities all agree that providential events occurring through the medium of natural phenomena do not occasion the blessings associated with "miracles."
It is astonishing that, with a single exception, the various piskei din published in Der Algemeiner Journal make no mention of the definitive ruling of Shulḥan Arukh or of later authorities regarding the definition of a miracle. Allusion to this question is made in only one statement, that issued by the late Rabbi Shlomoh Yosef Zevin and his colleagues within the Habad movement in Israel. It is, to be sure, unthinkable that this renowned encyclopedist would have overlooked such a significant aspect of the question. Rabbi Zevin's psak din contains a statement in parentheses indicating that it is signed by persons who accept as binding the opinions codified in the Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, and refers specifically to the ruling which appears in an appendix to the first volume of the Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, "Seder Birkat ha-Nehenin," chap. 13. (Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav is a halakhic compendium authored by R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the founder of the Lubavitch dynasty and the Habad movement.) This authority rules in accordance with the second opinion recorded in Shulḥan Arukh, namely, the view which deems an extraordinary or fortuitous deliverance from impending disaster as constituting a "miracle." However, as noted earlier, this view is rejected by the Shulḥan Arukh and by other later authorities.
With Rabbi Zevin's elucidation the matter may be placed in proper perspective. Any follower of the Habad movement, or one who consistently follows the opinions of Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, who may have been among the hostages in Entebbe, or whose parent or grandparent may have been among the hostages, may of course, follow the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav in this matter as well. Others would find it difficult to follow an opinion specifically rejected by the author of Shulḥan Arukh and by the vast majority of later authorities including Magen Avraham, Rabbi Elijah of Vilna and Mishnah Berurah.
There is no question that those released from Entebbe are obligated to pronounce birkat ha-gomel as an expression of thanksgiving for their deliverance. Among those required to recite this blessing are those who have been imprisoned and threatened with execution. The released hostages are clearly in that category.
Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, in a contribution which appears in the Elul 5736 issue of Or Torah, questions whether a similar blessing may be pronounced by relatives and close friends of the hostages. Bet Yosef, Oraḥ Hayyim 219, cites the opinion of Rashba who maintains that the blessing may be pronounced vicariously only by a student (or son) upon the deliverance of his master (or parent) from danger, but not by other relatives or friends. Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 219:4 disagrees, as apparently does Shulḥan Arukh, and rules that this blessing may be recited by any individual who genuinely shares in the feeling of exhilaration and thanksgiving.
The late Brisker Rav found support for this opinion in the utterance of Jethro, "Blessed be the Lord, who has delivered you out of the hands of the Egyptians and out of the hands of Pharaoh, and has delivered the people from under the hand of the Egyptians" (Exodus 18:10). This declaration, remarked the Brisker Rav was tantamount to the birkat ha-gomel and was pronounced by Jethro upon the deliverance of Israel, a deliverance in which he himself did not personally share. Scripture carefully records, "And Jethro rejoiced for all the goodness which the Lord had done to Israel" (Exodus 18:9), indicating that the blessing can be pronounced by others not personally affected by the event only if the blessing is occasioned by genuine jubilation as demanded by Rema and as explained by Taz, Oraḥ Hayyim 219:3.
However, in light of the controversy between Bet Yosef and Rema, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef invokes the halakhic principle which provides that in the presence of doubt a blessing is not to be recited and rules against pronouncement of the blessing by relatives and friends of the hostages. This is also the decision of Mishnah Berurah 219:18.
Nevertheless, Rabbi Yosef opines that friends and relatives may recite the she-heḥiyanu blessing if they have not seen the hostage for a period of thirty days. Indeed, Shulḥan Arukh provides that this blessing may be recited by any person who is overjoyed at seeing a friend or relative following an absence of thirty days. Birkei Yosef 225:3 indicates that this usage has largely lapsed in an age of rapid and efficient communications. Under such conditions "no news is good news" and the joy of being reunited after an absence is not as great as it was in earlier times. However, argues Rabbi Yosef, absence under conditions of danger such as experienced by the hostages in Entebbe certainly warrants recitation of the she-heḥiyanu by those who sincerely rejoice at being reunited with their loved ones.
