Summary
In this 1981 Tradition article, Professor Shnayer Z. Leiman critiques an essay by Zvi A. Yehuda regarding the views of the Hazon Ish (a leading 20th-century rabbi) on textual criticism and Halakhah (Jewish law). While Leiman praises Yehuda for raising vital questions about how archaeological discoveries and ancient manuscripts affect Jewish law, he argues that Yehuda deeply misrepresents the Hazon Ish's actual positions.
Leiman's primary critiques are:
Unclear Attribution: Yehuda blurs the lines between his own theories and the actual teachings of the Hazon Ish, using very few direct quotes.
The Majority Rule vs. Truth: Yehuda claims the Hazon Ish believed the "majority rule" of current Torah scrolls would legally override even a newly discovered scroll written by Moses. Leiman uses historical precedent and the Hazon Ish’s own writings to prove that established textual truth and manuscript reliability can, and do, override the majority.
Use of Newly Discovered Texts: Contrary to Yehuda’s claim that Halakhah only relies on continuously transmitted texts, Leiman shows that Rabbinic authorities—including the Hazon Ish—cautiously welcomed newly discovered manuscripts (such as Otzar ha-Geonim) if their authorship and reliability were verified.
Theological Determinism: Leiman strongly rejects Yehuda's assertion that whatever textual errors exist in a given generation are "the will of God." Leiman argues this "textual determinism" contradicts core Jewish dogma regarding the Sinai revelation and absurdly elevates human scribal errors to divine fiat.
Ultimately, Leiman concludes that while Yehuda correctly identified the Hazon Ish's general caution regarding textual criticism, he failed to capture the nuance, depth, and historical grounding of the Hazon Ish's actual views.
By Prof. Shnayer Z. Leiman
What is meritorious about Zvi A. Yehuda's essay, "Hazon Ish on Textual Criticism and Halakhah" (Tradition, 18, No. 2, Summer 1980), is that it clearly sets forth questions that all intelligent Jews should ask regarding Torah and textual criticism: Can archaeological discovery influence Halakhah? If, perchance, archaeologists recovered a copy of the Torah written by Moshe Rabbenu himself, would Halakhah require Torah scribes to correct our Torah scrolls in light of the original? Should one take seriously the variant readings of the Talmud, and the numerous Gaonic interpretations of Talmudic texts, that were lost for centuries only to be rediscovered in the Cairo Geniza in this century? Should these readings and interpretations be adduced or ignored by rabbis concerned with the halakhic consequences of classical Jewish texts?
Unclear Ascriptions
Had Yehuda rested content with posing the above questions, or with presenting the ipsissima verba (exact words) of the Hazon Ish's resolution to these questions, Tradition's readership would have been indebted to him, and the matter could have rested there. Yehuda's presentation, however, is much more elaborate and complex. Not more than seven lines of the nine-page article are presented as verbatim quotations from the Hazon Ish. Much of the essay is an alleged summary of what the Hazon Ish said. Still more of the article reflects perorations by Yehuda in response to issues raised by the Hazon Ish.
In all fairness to Yehuda, occasional attempts were made to distinguish the Hazon Ish's views from his own. Nonetheless, for much of the article, one doesn't know where the Hazon Ish ends and Yehuda begins. Such ambiguity frustrates the very purpose of Yehuda's study: the attempt to isolate and present the Hazon Ish's views on textual criticism and Halakhah.
Skewed Assertions
Various assertions strewn throughout the article are ascribed to the Hazon Ish. These need to be analyzed to determine the likelihood of his authorship. Even if correctly ascribed, it would be helpful to know whether they reflect normative Rabbinic opinion or views unique to the Hazon Ish. I am persuaded that much of what Yehuda attributes to the Hazon Ish could not have been said by him—at least not as formulated by Yehuda. In several instances, the Hazon Ish's published writings openly contradict what Yehuda asserts he heard from him. Some specific examples follow:
1. The Principle of Majority vs. Antiquity
Yehuda writes:
"Halakhah dictates, said Hazon Ish, that we do not correct our sefarim according to the old sefer, but vice versa... The halakhic conception of 'correctness' with regard to the Torah text is based on the rule of majority, not antiquity. The real Sefer Torah of Moshe—as paradoxical and shocking as it sounds—is inconsequential for Halakhah..."
Let us suppose, for heuristic purposes, that a demented Jewish scribe decided to write thousands of erroneous Torah scrolls, establishing new readings and a new majority. Would the new majority supplant the old one? Needless to say, it would not. Majority rule (rov) in Halakhah governs only in instances of doubt (safeq). Where certainty reigns, majority rule plays no role.
Specifically, the Rashba (d. 1310) and the Radbaz (d. 1573) ruled long ago that where the Talmud established the correct reading of the Torah text, one corrects the majority of Torah scrolls on the basis of the few, even if the majority have dictated otherwise for centuries. In a conflict between established truth and majority, truth prevails. Thus, the Sefer Torah of Moshe Rabbenu would be most consequential for Halakhah.
Furthermore, the Hazon Ish was not committed exclusively to the majority principle in textual matters. In a letter acknowledging the Munich manuscript of the Babylonian Talmud, the Hazon Ish argues against emending the printed text solely on its basis not only because of the majority principle, but because the Munich manuscript may not have been considered trustworthy in antiquity. Clearly, for the Hazon Ish, the trustworthiness of a manuscript plays a significant role.
2. The "Unbroken Chain" of Tradition
Yehuda writes:
"Authoritative Halakhah is based only on the sources that went through the living chain of tradition, generation after generation..."
This striking formulation cannot be squared with the Hazon Ish's published writings. If taken literally, it would mean that medieval authorities whose writings were lost and only rediscovered in the 19th and 20th centuries (like R. Menahem Meiri) are not authoritative. In reality, when a newly discovered manuscript's author could be identified and their reliability assured (such as an obscure ruling by R. Solomon Luria regarding contraception), the Hazon Ish welcomed the discovery of ancient Torah. He only cautioned that one ought not "overly rely" on new discoveries of unknown authorship.
3. The Status of a Mosaic Scroll
Yehuda attempts to argue that a scroll written by Moshe would be inconsequential because it might be technically pasul (unfit for public use in the synagogue). Such confusion can hardly be ascribed to the Hazon Ish. The terms pasul and kasher are irrelevant in discussions of textual criticism. The most authoritative medieval Torah texts (including the Aleppo Codex used by Maimonides to set the text) were pasul for synagogue use. All that is significant in textual criticism is the trustworthiness of the text for deciding issues of spelling, paragraph breaks, and the like.
Attitude Toward Otzar ha-Geonim and Rabbinic Texts
Yehuda ascribes to the Hazon Ish the view that B.M. Lewin's monumental Otzar ha-Geonim (a compilation of rediscovered Geonic responsa) was unnecessary and halakhically irrelevant. In fact, the Hazon Ish explicitly consulted Otzar ha-Geonim and cited its material as authoritative.
Regarding the textual emendation of Rabbinic texts, Yehuda implies the Hazon Ish entirely rejected it. While the Hazon Ish did not look kindly upon reckless emendation, he did not rule it out. Where there was support within the received tradition and reason dictated that an emendation was necessary, the Hazon Ish welcomed it. In fact, he ingeniously emended the text of Tosefta Parah against all known versions when logic demanded it.
"Shake Well Before Using": Theological Overreach
Yehuda makes several puzzling, deterministic formulations, claiming that Halakhah could organically "create" a synthetic new Torah text, and that:
"If the rishonim did not have the material and knowledge we now discover, this was the will of God."
If these formulations reflect the views of the Hazon Ish as heard by Yehuda, they are daring and highly problematic. If Rabbi Akiva's Torah scroll was not identical to Moshe Rabbenu's, what does Torah mi-Sinai (Torah from Sinai) mean?
Furthermore, the claim that textual accidents of history are inherently "the will of God" is a non sequitur that invites abuse. God apparently has no interest in maintaining the original Masoretic text; rather, His primary concern is that Jews venerate whatever official text exists in their generation. This textual determinism renders all textual criticism obsolete. What appears to be a human error becomes divine fiat.
It is the better side of wisdom to admit that not all historical accidents are the will of God. In 1632, printers in England accidentally published a Bible that read: "Thou shalt commit adultery." No one claimed this printer's error was the will of God. Elevating human error to divine fiat creates far more problems than it solves.
Summary
When Yehuda's account of the Hazon Ish's views on textual criticism is compared with the Hazon Ish's published writings, it becomes apparent that the two differ. While Yehuda has captured the general thrust of the Hazon Ish's approach—which is best described as cautious—he has not done justice to the fullness, variety, and precision of his views. The discrepancies are best explained by assuming that Yehuda's formulations, perhaps more often than he intended, are his own, and not necessarily those of the Hazon Ish.
